INFORMATION TO USERS

The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. These are also available as one exposure on a standard 35mm slide or as a 17" x 23" black and white photographic print for an additional charge.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

U·M·I

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Number 8912471

Regional cleavages and orientations toward the political system in South Korea

Park, Jongduck, Ph.D.

Temple University, 1989

U·M·I
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Regional Cleavages and Orientations toward the Political System in South Korea

A dissertation
submitted to
The Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Jongduck Park

November 1988

FORM IV

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE BOARD

Title of Dissertation. REGIONAL CLEAVAGES AND ORIENTATIONS TOWARD THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN SOUTH KOREA

Author MR. JONGDUCK PARK

Read and Approved by. ....

Date submitted to Graduate Board. ....January 1989....

Accepted by the Graduate Board of Temple University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy.**

Date ....
(Dean of Graduate School)

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Charts

Chapter I. Introduction: Basic problem and theoretical considerations

1. Purpose of the study

Koreans live in times in which considerations of physical locale are indispensable to the study of the functioning of the Korean political system. Geography is so important to an understanding of Korean politics that discussions of contemporary political affairs would be meaningless without reference to the spatial makeup of Korea. It may not be exaggerating to say that many existing political and social problems of Korea are in large part due to regional differences in general and territorial cleavages between the Yungnam and Honam regions in particular, two major regions of Korea that are the focus of this study.[1]

In many European countries, where factors of decentralization of power were strong before modernization, regionalism and provincialism have been somewhat alleviated by national integration movements during the period of modernization. However, even in countries where national unification looks complete, regional conflicts caused by racial, linguistic and religious differences are still hard to overcome.[2]

In Korea, even after the formation of a modern nation, the remnants of regionalistic elements were combined with political factionalism to form regional conflicts, finally resulting in today's regional tensions between Honam and Yungnam.[3] Inter-regional strife between the two regions has recently become one of the most serious political issues, causing serious

problems in maintaining and unifying the overall structure of society.

How serious is regional divisiveness between the Honam and Yungnam regions? And what factors behind regional forces have been operating to stimulate regional tensions? Generally speaking, inter-regional strife between the two regions is intense and seems to have taken place when regional imbalances, especially in terms of economic inequality, and concentrated, unequally distributed political power, were present and acknowledged by the residents.[4]

From a historical point of view, Honam people have been persistently disadvantaged in political rewards, whereas Yungnam people were given much opportunity to rise to higher social positions. In particular, since the 1960s, there have been remarkable and persistent differences between Honam and Yungnam in the recruitment to important positions of government Also, the economic development policy promoted by the military government concentrated its benefits in the Yungnam region, which made alienation of Honam residents on the mass level an established fact.[5]

Whereas in traditional Korean society, regionalism was mainly a matter of rivalry between politicians or political powers, rather than the whole population, in today's society, regionalism influences the general public and society because of easy access to information, high mobility in society, and the increasing influence of politics on people's lives. Perceptions of conditions in other areas and comparison to one's own may be just what is needed to foster regional conflicts on the mass level.[6] In fact, it is a wide-spread belief among people from the Honam region that they have been treated unfavorably in the economic

development plans since 1962 and this made their region fall behind the other regions.[7]

A recent survey conducted by Moon Suk-Nam supports this argument.[8] An overwhelming majority (76.7 %) of people from South of the Honam region believe that their region is far behind the other provinces and that this is due to policy-makers' prejudice against the Honam region (45.5 %). They also believe that in Korean society connections are necessary in order to be successful (62.5 %) and that the place of birth is especially important (48.4). In short, the Honam people feel the reason people from Honam have not been socially successful is not because of their lack of ability, but because of their lack of connections.

Such different positions in Korean society between the Honam and Yungnam regions might have resulted in the formulation of particularistic political subculture unique to each region.[9] The privileged situation of Yungnam would lead us to anticipate that political culture in Yungnam would be shaped by a sense of satisfaction and potency. On the other hand, it is anticipated that, given the Honam region's severely disadvantaged political situation, political culture in Honam would be shaped by relatively enduring feelings of rejection, negativism, and unhappiness with the political system. Both of the regional subcultures, however, are likely to be constrained by the influence of the general political culture covering the whole nation. Under the subject political culture, to use Almond and Verba's term, which characterizes Korean society, Korean mass publics, regardless of region, tend to feel powerless in their abilities to influence the political process, and tend to feel estranged from politics.[10] Thus, the feelings of satisfaction in Yungnam are likely

to be somewhat reduced, and conversely, the senses of estrangement in Honam are likely to be further reinforced. It may be proposed here, then, that Honam people are extremely alienated and Yungnam people are relatively allegiant.[11] When we say that Honam people tend to be alienated and Yungnam people tend to be allegiant, we mean that people from each region feel alienated from or allegiant toward, national politics, not local politics because political power has so far been concentrated in central government, and local autonomy has never developed. Consequently, if one would ever feel alienated or allegiant, it would be from national politics, not from local politics. The overall effect is the emergence of Korea as a regionally-divided and culturally-fragmented society.

However, regional cultural differences are not either necessary or sufficient for inter-regional strife. There could be interregional conflict in the absence of any marked differences in culture. Yet interregional conflict is more likely to occur where there are important and remarkable regional cultural differences. Thus, the degree of cultural homogeneity is an important determinant of the level of political integration.

Largely because of possible dysfunctional consequences for national unity caused by the fragmented nature of Korean society, there is a pressing need to examine thoroughly the reasons for the emergence and continuity of regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam. It is, then, one of the main purposes of this study to present a general picture of contemporary regionalism in Korea from historical and theoretical perspectives, largely focusing on territorial cleavages between the Honam

and Yungnam regions.

More importantly, perhaps, from the standpoint of political stability, is the extent to which, and the ways in which, regional conflicts between the Honam and Yungnam regions have affected the operation of the contemporary Korean political system. It is anticipated that regional forces present in each region have influenced the distribution of responses to the political system in ways distinct for each region.

Relying on David Easton, the political system may be differentiated among three different levels--the political community, the regime, and the political authorities.[12]

> (Political community)...will refer to that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor. The existence of a political system must include a plurality of political relationships through which the individual members are linked to each other and through which the political objectives of the system are pursued, however limited they may be.[13]

In other words, the political community is a group of people living within a geographic area who are bound together politically through many common political values, attitudes, and loyalties.

> The regime (is that aspect of a political system) that represents relatively stable expectations, depending on the system and its state of change, with regard to the range of matters that can be handled politically, the rules or norms governing the way these matters can be processed, and the position of those through whom binding action may be taken on these matters.[14]

As manifested in the above statement, Easton suggests three components of the regime: values, norms, and the authority structure.

> The values serve as broad limits with regard to what can be taken for granted in the guidance of day-to-day policy without violating deep feelings of important segments of the community. The norms specify the kinds of procedures that are expected and acceptable in the processing and implementation of demands. The structures of authority designate the formal and informal patterns in which power is distributed and organized with regard to the authoritative making and implementing of decisions--the roles and their relationships through which authority is distributed and exercised.[15]

> (Political authorities are engaged) in the daily affairs of a political system; they must be recognized by most members of the system as having the responsibility for these matters; and their actions must be accepted as binding most of the time by most of the members as long as they act within the limits of their roles.[16]

For any polity, there exists some group or an individual who makes binding decisions. Thus the term authorities refers to the present incumbents of the authority roles.

These three levels of political objects constitute a sort of hierarchical structure. As Gamson puts it, "These objects...have increasing levels of inclusiveness--the regime includes the authorities but is more general and the political community includes the regime but is more general."[17] Thus the political community may be conceived as the most fundamental level of political system, for it relates, first of all, to the entire composition of the political system.

Changes in public support for the political system of a nation might be

differentiated among the three political objects. Thus, stress at one of these levels does not necessarily affect the others. Mistrust of the political authorities can coexist with high levels of trust toward the regime.[18] In the same vein, one may manifest continued distrust of the regime but still display high support for a political community.

It seems, however, to be a normal aspect of political life that continued dissatisfaction with incumbent office holders may become generalized into widespread public cynicism about the regime or even rejection of the entire political system.[19] As Easton has pointed out, dissatisfaction with outcomes of the current government policies, "output failure" in his terms, would operate to produce severe tensions initially within the authority level.[20] If such unhappy outcomes happen over and over, and there is no sign of improvement, citizens may change the target of criticism toward the regime or even the political community, thus reducing support for these generalized political objects.[21] In short, conflicts at the authority level might reduce support for more generalized objects of a political system. On the contrary, if policies satisfy the members of a system, the support generated at the authority level may be extended to the regime or community.

Applying the above arguments to the Korean political context, regional imbalances, largely weighted in favor of the Yungnam region at the cost of the Honam region, might cause different responses from the residents in each region to the political system.[22] It is natural that regionalism so interacts with a system as to produce tensions within the political system. For instance, the generally acknowledged privileged position of the Yungnam region might have led its residents to exhibit pro-government

sentiments, and, conversely, disadvantaged position of the Honam region might have resulted in widespread cynicism there. Generally speaking, those who feel alienated reject the political system as unworthy of their support, and tend to feel that " people are often manipulated by politicians, that a country's leadership is corrupt and self-serving, and that special interests wield too much power."[23] On the contrary, allegiant citizens evaluate the system positively and believe that it has a proper claim to their obedience and support. They are more likely to believe that "governmental activity tends to improve conditions, that politics is not all dirty, and that public officials work for citizen welfare."[24]

The basic problem lies in the extent to which regional forces have affected the three different levels of the political system. For instance, are the Honam people, who are believed to disbenifit from the national policies, simply opposed to the authorities? Or is the extended series of unpopular policies operating to reduce support to the regime or even the community? It is the ultimate concern of this study to inquire into the nature and role of the influence of regional conflicts between the Honam and Yungnam regions as they affect the three different levels of the Korean political system.

Also, regional cleavages are generally known to be manifested in the party system and voting patterns unique to each region. For a majority of Honam and Yungnam people, geographical attachments to a candidate have played an important role in the vote decisions. Especially when candidates attempt to appeal to regional sentiments and predispositions

in their favor, no other issue seems as important for the Korean electorate as regional affiliations. In other words, the electoral choices a voter makes are responsive to regional tensions present between the two regions. The particularistic patterns of the political party system may be regarded as another mirror of territorial cleavages. Each party is geographically identified by the residents, and thus it has its base of support in a region to large extent, possibly in a native area of its leader. As Easton puts it, "Where each party restricts its appeal to only a limited class of members, cleavage is reinforced; where the parties seek to embrace the widest mixture of groups and individuals..., the political divisions are softened."[25] The latter seems to be the case of current Korean political party system. In short, apart from the three levels of political objects, the impacts of regional forces operating between the Honam and Yungnam regions on the party system and electoral behavior will be examined in this study.

Democracy works well when citizens give the political system their support. The stresses on one or another of three political objects are, however, unavoidable in democratic systems in which free expression of diverse views is permitted and an individual is given an equal opportunity to formulate a group so as to influence the processing of demands. Where some groups enjoy output satisfaction, some other groups inevitably are disadvantaged, causing the decline of support for the political system. According to David Easton:

> Some erosion of support is inevitable in all systems; cleavage among collectivities and accompanying output failure could not be entirely

> avoided. In all systems, sharp conflict in competition for scarce social and economic values represents a normal aspect of political interaction. If we accept this assumption, we may infer that without some provision to compensate for the dissatisfaction with outputs or to regulate the relationsips among actually or potentially conflicting groups, a system would be open to the constant and ultimate danger of disorder or chaos.[26]

Any polity, in order to maintain itself in a relatively stable state, must be able to meet those disturbances caused by a reduction of attachment to the major political objects-- the political community, the regime, and the authorities.

One way of muting stresses is through cross-cutting cleavages.[27] The cross-cutting nature of group membership means that citizens do not hold exclusive loyalties to one group. As Schattschneider has argued, multiple group membership tends to moderate conflict and fragmentation because the many groups to which a given individual belongs are usually mutually conflicting rather than politically cumulative.[28]

The notion that conflicts can themselves produce cohesion of a sort remains essential to group theorists in dealing with how to maintain stability in representative systems. For instance, a pioneer of group theorists, Bentley, characterizes the governmental process as a continuous process of "balances" among conflicting groups and interests.[29] David Truman also sees in "cross-cutting conflicts," "overlapping-memberships,"primary sources of political integration, hence of political stability.[30]

Easton suggests three classes of different mechanisms for overcoming stresses--one relating to structural changes, and the other two relating

to attitudinal support.[31] For Easton, attitudinal support is the major variable linking a system to its environment. He differentiates two classes of attitudinal support: One is based on the manipulation of outputs to satisfy members, which is termed "specific support" by Easton, and the other relates to supportive attitudes independent of immediate outputs, termed "diffuse support." Specific support is a type of support mechanism linking members who make up the political system and the incumbent political authorities. Members' satisfaction with the authorities depends on their positive evaluation of outputs. Such performance satisfactions consist of not only instrumental performance satisfactions, but expressive symbols as well.[32] In return for specific rewards, the system is supported and maintained.[33] Thus the main source of specific support is members' feelings of being represented by the performance of political authorities.

This support is, however, tenuous from the long-range standpoint of political stability. "The responses may offer passing rewards for the support of some set of authorities without necessarily intending to add to the contentment with the regime or community."[34]

Viewed from a different angle, purely instrumental or pragmatic involvement in politics without any meaningful emotional commitment to a political system "implies a politics of opportunism; a politics that will probably lead to cynicism."[35] Thus, a system requires a mimimum of emotional involvement from the mass to maintain its stability over time. A kind of affect that is independent of immediate outputs, and thus that is different from short-run evaluations of

individual incumbent authority, termed "diffuse support," is critical if a political system is to survive. Diffuse support consists of affective loyalties to the political system as a whole, and is not contingent upon specific rewards or deprivation.[36] As Easton puts it, "Except in the long run, diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily outputs. It consists of a reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against inputs of demands."[37] Such sentimental and affective support without regard to the pragmatic performance reflects cultural aspect of a nation, formulated and learned through the socialization process of the individual.[38]

Easton views sentiments of legitimacy as the major source of diffuse support.[39] "It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere."[40] In fact, Lipset has suggested a regime's legitimacy to be more important in the light of political stability than the actual performance of the regime.[41] Also, Parsons has argued that legitimacy is the "highest normative defense against the breakdown of a system of social order."[42] In short, legitimacy, the widespread public confidence in political authorities and governmental institutions, is generally viewed as a precondition for political stability.

As Almond and Verba have pointed out, however, an excessively emotion-ladden politics without pragmatic considerations of the effectiveness of a political system, as manifested by pervasive, intensive, and unquestioning affective commitment to the authorities, the

regime, or the community, would produce dysfunctional consequences for a democracy.

> In the first place, an intense emotional involvement in politics endangers the balance between activity and passivity, for that balance depends on the low salience of politics. Second, such intense involvement tends to "raise the stakes" of politics: to foster the sort of mass, messianic movements that lead to democratic instability. Furthermore, the consequences can be harmful whether the commitment is to the system as a whole and the incumbent elites or only to particular subgroups in society. It is clear that intense commitment to particular political parties or groups can produce an unstabilizing level of fragmentation in the system. But even an intense commitment to the political system and to the incumbent elites is likely to have harmful effects. If citizens are to maintain some control over political elites, their loyalty to the system and to the elites must not be complete and unquestioning.[43]

It follows, then, that even in a well-functioning political system, some degree of conflict through output satisfaction-dissatisfaction is essential in attaining the society's collectively held goals. Yet if cleavage went too far, the over-arching consensus necessary for the orderly settling of disputes would not exist, threatening democratic stability. Implacable political animosities, particularly those superimposed on other social lines of conflicts including regional, religious, ideological, and cultural, are certainly incompatible with a democratic society. According to one analyst:

> Inherent in all democratic systems is the constant threat that the group conflicts which are democracy's life-blood may solidify to the point where they threaten to disintegrate the society. Hence

> conditions which serve to moderate the intensity of partisan battle are among the key requisites of democratic government.[44]

Hence, the search for measures of coping with stresses, such as diffuse support and specific support, would finally lead us to a discussion of a balance between consensus and cleavage in a democratic society.

It might be proposed that a democratic society largely depends on the maintenance of a balance between conflict and consensus.[45] This is what Parsons has called a "limited polarization of society."[46] A balance must be achieved because "too much consensus would be deadening and restrictive of liberty; too much cleavage would be destructive of society as a whole."[47]

The idea of a balance between consensus and cleavage without any reservation, however, is not enough to explain the nature of democratic stability. Following Devine, cleavage at the authority level and consensus at the regime and community may be conceived of as a desirable balance conducive to democratic stability.

> The excesses of intense cleavage are protected against by an overarching protective consensus on regime rules. It is assumed that conflict at the authority level can take place because of the consensus that exists at the more fundamental levels. In a liberal tradition regime the paradox of valuing conflict and needing consensus must be met by allowing policy conflict within a protecting consensus on regime and community values.[48]

Widespread public confidence in the regime is essential for the system to maintain itself in the face of tensions. When public confidence in a political regime is weak or non-existent, "it would be impossible to

assure some kind of stability in the rules and structures through the use of which demands are converted into outputs," thus seriously impairing the regime's functioning and increasing the potential for disorder.[49]

A loss of public confidence in the regime is frequently suggested to be closely associated with protest movements. That is, individuals with little confidence in the regime would have a propensity to take radical action against it.[50] In an extreme case, a revolutionary movement might appear to replace an existing regime with a new order. Also, "support (for the political community) is vital in order to maintain minimal cohesion within a membership," thus making it possible for a system to be able to persist in a world of stress and change.[51] According to Devine:

> ...Active community cleavage would create antagonistic groups which could not conflict in the restricted manner required by the tradition. (It) would make civil society communication almost impossible. Without community trust, associative cooperation would seem to have little chance for success."[52]

Separatist movements are typical examples of movements motivated by rejection of the political community. The creation of the new state of Pakistan for the Muslim minority is an early example of the secessionist movements common to many newer states.

In brief, if there were active cleavages at the regime or community level, political conflicts would possibly escalate until even the constitutional framework was called into question. The Protestant-Catholic split in Northern Ireland, where religious conflicts are superimposed on political, social, and economic conflicts, is a classic

example of excessive cleavage that makes democratic stability impossible. On the other hand, if a society is consensual in its underlying fundamental political values, this consensus is especially functional for resolving conflicts. This broad social consensus minimizes and buffers, if not totally eliminates, severe political divisiveness which most often triggers political violence.

Support at the authority level is also essential, because it is the political authorities who deal with the daily affairs of the system of converting demands into binding outputs. Without support for the incumbent administrations, "demands could not be processed into outputs."[53] However, outputs are so visible that the authorities are likely to be vulnerable to stresses from the losing groups to the extent that the authorities can not satisfy all demands from competing groups.[54] For this reason, it is impossible to be completely consensual at the authority level. More important, it is not even desirable to have consensus at this level, for if there were no cleavage at the authority level, politics would lack meaning for a political community, with the elite consequently becoming unresponsive to the non-elite. Cleavage serves as the basis for political competition which is a defining characteristic of democratic systems, thus making peaceful alteration of political power an established fact.

Even the most cynical theorists including Schumpeter have never conceived democracy without competition. Similarly, Pye views the widespread exisence of an unquestioning and childlike trust in political authorities as an obstacle to democracy.[55] Thus, disagreement at the

authority level (or a vigilant skeptism), rather than unquestioning loyalties to political authorities, is conducive to democratic functioning. However, deep cleavages at the authority level may affect the others:

> If no powerful group questions the nature of the regime (or the unity of the given political comunity), the consensus with regard to basic orientations at this level leaves the way free for even deep and protracted pluralistic struggles over control of public policy. To be sure, if these governmental or policy conflicts persisted over a long period, the cleavage of this level would filter through to other levels...At this point, cleavage at the lower, that is, the governmental level begins to act upon to erode consensus at the higher level.[56]

Hence, democratic stability presupposes the existence of moderate conflicts at the authority level, of a type that does not cause stress on the regime or community.

Related to authority-level cleavages are cleavages at the partisan level. Idealistically speaking, political parties are expected to act as potentially consensus-building mechanisms by channeling public opinion of the population. As a matter of fact, in a democratic system which permits or even encourages free expression of diverse opinions, and the formulation of groups so as to influence the governmental processing of demands, parties emerge as the advocates of specific groups of people. Thus, they usually act as avenues for channeling demands of their supporting groups rather than whole population. It is natural, then, to have partisan-level conflicts in a democratic political life. Some degree of cleavages at the partisan level is even desirable. Cleavage serves as

the basis for political competition, which is certainly a determining factor in making governmental structure democratic. However, deep cleavages at the partisan level, viewed from a standpoint of regionalism, sustain, or even foster regional cleavages, for the parties act exclusively as the spokesman of certain regional interests. Hence, the existence of moderate conflicts at the partisan level will be taken, in this study, as one of the manifestations of authority-level conflicts.

What all of the aformentioned arguments suggest is that an ideal conception of democratic stability involves moderate authority- and partisan- level cleavages, protected from further cleavage by a high level of consensus on the regime and community.

Another requirement, however, needs to be added to make political stability more probable. High variation among affected groups in support for the authorities means that the authorities are biased, or at least they are perceived to be so by the losing groups.[57] As Gamson puts it, "the political system in a society in which average trust is quite high but variance in trust between different groups is also substantial is doing well in the achievement of collective goals but has problems of equity in distribution."[58] To be sure, equity or fairness is a very important factor in maintaining democratic stability. Feelings of alienation among losing groups might lead them to apathetic attitudes, or to political participation of illegitimate sorts.[59] Either of them is not desirable from the standpoint of political stability. From this point of view, it may be proposed that small variation among competing groups in support for the authorities is another condition conducive to democratic stability.

From the democratic elitists' point of view, however, political apathy does not pose any problem for democracy.[60] Rather, it is desirable. For instance, Morris-Jones has argued that a degree of apathy may be a sign of a healthy democracy and that compulsory participation ("the duty to vote") is a feature of totalitarian regimes.[61] Likewise, Berelson views that high participation and interest are required from a minority of citizens only and, moreover, the apathy and disinterest of the majority play a significant role in maintaining democratic stability.[62]

The major points posited out by elitist theorists might be summarized as follows: Since most citizens are irresolute in dedication to democratic ideas,[63] it is best that they should remain apathetic, and thus, the fact that they are actually apathetic is encouraging for democratic stability.[64] If this untapped pool were mobilized, it would be a source of extreme danger and instability of the democratic system.

On the other hand, if active participation is an indicator of support for an institution as claimed by participatory democratic theorists, then the low participation might have dysfunctional consequences on the political system.[65] Walker, for instance, argues that low turnout is an indication of complete alienation from the political system.[66] Kornhauser takes the position that nonparticipation caused by cynicism and distrust of political authorities might lead to extremism such as violence or severe demonstrations by nonparticipants.[67] That is, political passivity, especially when it is the expression of underlying disaffection from the political system, may be dysfunctional for the system's stability, which may finally lead to large-scale illegitimate movements subversive of "libertarian" government.[68]

The democratic elitists' perspective, which views political apathy on the part of the masses as desirable for democratic stability, is largely based on empirical evidence showing a marked culture gap between political elites and masses. Elites are generally found to be highly dedicated to democratic principles, in contrast to the masses. A recent survey by two Korean political analysts, however, shows that this is not the case in Korean politics.[69] It was found that elites did not exhibit a higher level of adherence to democratic principles than the masses. Under such circumstance, rule by the elites, without any control from the masses, might result in a totalitarian government. Thus, active participation by ordinary citizens seems to be required as a way of constraining arbitrary exercises of elite power.

For our purposes, the factors supportive of democracy will be conceived of as the state of a high level of consensus on the regime and community, and medium support for the authorities (including parties) with small variations among groups. Using this conception of democratic stability as the standard of judgment, we will attempt to determine how closely the Korean polity approaches the ideal state of a balance between cleavage and consensus.

In sum, the central questions to be asked in this dissertation are three-fold: (1) What are the reasons for the emergence and continuity of territorial tensions between the Honam and Yungnam regions, interpreted in the light of theoretical and empirical backgrounds? (2) To what extent and in what ways have regional forces affected citizens' attitudes from each region toward the three different system levels--the

community, the regime, and the authorities? Related to this issue is the examination of the impacts of regionalism upon the party system and electoral behavior. (3) How close or far is the Korean polity from the ideal state of a balance between consensus and cleavage, as required for democratic stability? Given answers to these questions, we could finally answer what factors operate to maintain the Korean polity in the face of extreme antagonism between the Honam and Yungnam regions.

2. Method of the study

The data for this study comes from a nationwide survey which was conducted in the Honam and Yungnam regions between 11th of July, 1987 and 13th of July, 1987. This survey was done through door-to-door interviews which were carried out by female students under my supervision.

The sample size was set at 800, which is a figure arrived at by a realistic compromise between scientific ideals and the limitations of resources at hand. This survey uses a proportional probability random sampling method to select 800 responsents from Yungnam and Honam residents in the age between eighteen and seventy as of June 27, 1987. A total of 753 interviews were completed. For all respondents, the same items were asked, expecting that difference in the personal experiences would affect the distribution of responses in ways distinct for each region. After collecting the data through interviews, statistical procedures such as X^2 were used to analyze them. The significance level is fixed at .05. More details on sampling procedure, sampling

representativeness and other pertinent comments are included in the appendix.

Also, we have assembled a considerable body of information on structural variations between the Honam and Yungnma region, largely from the Economic Planning Board of Korea. The data consist of the results of presidential elections held in 1963, 1967, 1971, and 1987, and census data for 1985, including educational, agricultural, industrial and fiscal statistics. We will use the data to throw light on the character of regional differences in Korean politics.

3. Structure of the study

The chapters in this dissertation will closely follow the analytical framework described above.

Chapter One provides the background information essential to an understanding of the later analysis. For instance, three different levels of the political system conceptualized by David Easton, and the concept of a balance between cleavage and consensus have been described.

Chapter Two deals with regionalism interpreted in the light of theoretical and empirical backgrounds. By the presentation of historical, economic, political, and social data, this chapter will show regional imbalances between the Honam and Yungnam regions. Only after the regional differences have been considered and analyzed in detail will it be possible to see how promising are the prospects for continued political stability.

Chapter Three, Four, and Five, explicates the process of regionalism as

it affects the political system.

Chapter Three examines how regional conflicts between the Honam and Yungnam regions have affected the authorities and the regime of Korean polity.

Chapter Four investigates the impact of regional conflicts upon the party system and voting behavior unique to the Honam and Yungnam regions. It is anticipated that distinctive patterns of party system and electoral politics present in each region reflect the continuing regional cleavages.

Chapter Five explores the influence of regional forces as they relate to the political community.

In Conclusion, Chapter Six analyzes from the standpoint of political stability the survival of the Korean political system in the face of deep cleavages. This chapter focuses on how the Korean polity is maintained despite political cleavages.

Endnotes

1 The Honam region covers Jonla North and South Provinces, which are located on the Western side of the Southern part of South Korea. The Yungnam region covers Kyungsang North and South Provinces, which are located on the Eastern side of the Southern part. The rest of the territory of South Korea, namely Middle region, covers KangWon Province, Chungcheong Province, KyungKi Province, and the Seoul Metropolitan area, all of which are located across the Northern part of South Korea.

2 There have been also many instances of regional conflicts in other nations. The legitimacy of relatively long-established states has been sharply questioned: in Canada by the Quebecois, in Britain by the Scots and Welsh, in Spain by Basques and Catalons, in Belgium by both Flemings and Walloons, and in Switzerland by the French of the Jura. There are also ethnic movements in seven regions of France, among Alsatians, Flemings, Bretons, Basques, Catalons, Occitans, and Corsicans.

3 Meanwhile, traditional sources of cleavages, such as language, religion, and ethnicity, that have proved to be very divisive in many old and new nations, have been absent in Korea, due to the relatively homogeneous nature of Korean society.

4 For more information on objective conditions affecting regional conflicts, see Mildred A. Schwartz, Politics and Territory: The Sociology of Regional Persistence in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974), P. 12-13, 15-16. Although the conditions were employed to explain Canadian regionalism, they seem to be of sufficient generality to apply to the Korean political context.

5 The economic development strategy was based on Hirschman's unbalanced model of economic growth, which was expected to maximize the effect of investment by concentrating resources in the Yungnam region. See Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic

Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), P. 66-67.

6 For a reference, see Schwartz, op. cit., P. 9-10.

7 Dong-Kyun Yang, "What is the Truth of Inhospitality Against the Honam Region?" Shindonga (January 1968); see also Pyung-Ki Jin, "Open Letter Sent to President Park," Chun-Buk Daily Newspaper (April 13, 1966).

8 For a reference, see Suk-Nam Moon, The Consciousness Structure of the People from South of Honam (Seoul: Dae-Wang Co., 1984), P. 242-43, 136.

9 Political culture is generally believed to be rooted in the cumulative historical experiences of the population, reflecting both the collective history of a political system and personal experiences of the individuals who currently make up the system. For more disccussion on the general political culture covering a whole nation, see Jarol B. Manheim, The Politics Within (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975): Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, 18 (August 1956). Apart from the general political culture covering a nation as a whole, different groups that make up the population of a nation may have special propensities in orientations to politics. These special tendencies of different groups are called subcultures. A subculture shares some of the patterns of political orientations with the general culture covering the whole country, but it exhibits its own patterns of political orientation and behavior relatively unique to itself. Referring to regional variations in political orientations, the existence of regional political subculture stems from the assumption that the strength of regional forces, deeply rooted in collective histories of the citizens who make up a region, will affect the distribution of responses in ways distinct for each region. The existence of regional variations in political orientations, in turn, might help to maintain territorial politics, hence fostering regional divisiveness.

10 Almond and Verba developed a three-part typology of political cultures, participant, subject and parochial. In the subject political

culture, the members of the society assume a passive role or obedient relationship to the system. There is a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the outputs of the political system, but none toward the inputs or toward the self as an active participant. In the parochial political culture, the individual is aware neither of the inputs nor of the outputs of the political system, and hardly relates himself to the political system. The individual expects nothing from the system. In the participant political culture, the individual tends to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the inputs and the outputs of the political system. In brief, orientations among the members of the society are positive to all the objects. For more information, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), P. 17-19.

[11] One of the most promising and comprehensive efforts to delineate and classify American political culture was made by Daniel Elazar. He suggests that American political culture is a mix of basically three political subcultures termed moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic. For details, see Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), P. 256-266; See also Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), P. 90-102.

[12] For a reference, see David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (N. Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965). Mitchell further differentiates the major objects of the political system. "The objects of support consist of the political values the polity presumably attempts to honor and realize, the polity itself(structures), the laws that govern society, the leaders and other personnel who operate the polity and government, and the policies being pursued by specific governments." For a reference, see William C. Mitchell, The American Polity (New York: The Free Press, 1962), P. 16. Also, Gamson identifies four different levels of the political system--the political community, the public philosophy of a regime, specific political institutions of a regime, and the authorities. Gamson's classification is similar to David Easton's except for the fact that Gamson subcategoreizes a regime into two

components--its public philosophy and its specific political institutions. For a reference, see William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illi.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), P. 49-50.

[13] Easton, op. cit., P. 177.

[14] Ibid., P. 192.

[15] Ibid., P. 193.

[16] Ibid., P. 212.

[17] Gamson, op. cit., P. 49.

[18] Easton and Hess write, "Not all disagreements or cleavages in these... orientations (to authority-level conflicts over party, candidates, or issues) need necessarily constitute a threat to the survival of a system. Whether or not it does will depend upon the subject matter or object with respect to which the disagreement prevails. For example, it is obvious that democratic systems manage to survive even in the face of deep cleavages with respect to all these orientations." For a reference, see David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "Youth and the Political System," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds., Culture and Social Character (N.Y.: Free Press, 1961), P. 229.

[19] For more information, see Gamson, op. cit., P. 50-52.

[20] For a reference, see Easton, op. cit., P. 231: See also Gamson, op. cit., P. 51-52. There seems to be numerous conditions which might lead to output failure--for instance, the qualities of incumbent political authorities themselves, the resources available to governments in terms of money, skilled administrators, and the like, and political cleavage. David Easton views political cleavages as a possible major source of stress on the system. He uses political cleavages to refer to "two different dimensions: diversity of opinions, attitudes, or culture and conflict among political support groups." For more detailed

discussion, see Easton, op. cit., P. 235.

[21] For a reference, see David Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support," British Journal of Political Science, 5, P. 435-57.

[22] A thorough examination of regional imbalances between the Honam and Yungnam regions is made in Chapter 2.

[23] Laster W. Milbrath and M. L. Goel, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1977), P. 63.

[24] Ibid., P. 63.

[25] Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, P. 257.

[26] Ibid., P. 247.

[27] How social cohesion may stem from cross-cutting conflicts is well illustrated by Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), P. 76-81. Also, functions of social conflicts in human groups is discussed by Edward A. Ross, The Principles of Sociology (New York: The Century Co., 1920). "Every species of social conflict," he writes, "interferes with every other species...save only when lines of cleavage coincide; in which case they reinforce one another....A society, therefore, which is ridden by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split along just one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together by its inner conflicts."

[28] E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (N. Y.: Rinehart, 1942), P. 33.

[29] Authur F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, Inc., 1935).

[30] David Truman, The Governmental Process (N. Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), Chapter 6. A number of writers view social pluralism as highly conducive to democratic stability. For detailed discussions, see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economic and Welfare (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1953), P. 302-306; William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illi.: Free Press, 1959), Chapter 3; Emile Durkeim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (Glencoe, Illi.: Free Press, 1958), 62-63; G. Simmel, The Web of Group-Affiliations, trans. by R. Bendix (Glencoe, Illi.: Free Press, 1955); T. Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Politial System" in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck eds., American Voting behavior (Glencoe, Illi.: Free Press, 1959), P. 80-120; R. E. Lane, Political Life, Chapter 14.

[31] Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Chapter 16-18. Referring to structural changes, Easton presents five different types of structural changes-- homogenization, expressive structures, representative structures, the intersection of political structures, and modifications in regime norm. He views aforementioned overlappings of groups as one measure of structural changes.

[32] For more information on symbolic satisfactions, see Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

[33] Easton views coercion (negative rewards) as another measure of specific support. See Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, P. 276.

[34] Ibid., P. 249.

[35] For more information, see Almond and Verba, op. cit., P. 488.

[36] In place of diffuse support, Almond and Verba use "system affect" to refer to "generalized attitudes toward the system as a whole: toward the nation, its virtues, accomplishments, and the like." For details,

see Almond and Verba, op. cit., P. 101-105.

[37] Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, P. 273.

[38] For detailed discussion of these socialization processes, see Easton and Hess, op. cit., P. 229-246; See also, David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), P. 632-644.

[39] David Easton identifies two additional sources of diffuse support--"those that invoke symbols of the common interest," and "those that promote and strengthen the degree to which members identify with the political community." For a reference, see Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, P. 277.

[40] Ibid., P. 278.

[41] For more information, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (N. Y.: Doubleday, 1963).

[42] For a reference, see Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (N. Y.: Free Press, 1963), P. 57.

[43] For details, see Almond and Verba, op. cit., P. 488. From this, they present their second condition vital for democratic stability--a balance between instrumental and affective orientations to politics. "Politics must not be so instrumental and pragmatic that participants lose all emotional involvement in it." he writes, "On the other hand, the level of affective orientation to politics ought not to become too intense (P. 488.)."

[44] For a reference, see Lipset, op. cit., P. 70-71.

[45] For Harry Eckstein, the business of democracy is to produce "a balance of division and cohesion in political life." For detailed discussion, see

Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), P. 11-32. The authors of the Civic Culture also suggest a balance between consensus and cleavage to be their third condition vital for democratic stability. They contend that political divisions can be managed in a way not destroy the cohesion of a society "by subordinating conflicts on the political level to some higher, overarching attitudes of solidarity." For more information, see Almond and Verba, op. cit., P. 490-493.

46 Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in Burdick and Brodbeck, op. cit., P. 92.

47 Bernard R. Berelson, Paul L. Lazarsfeld, and William M. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), P. 318; See also Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in Burdick and Brodbeck, op. cit., P. 100-114.

48 For a reference, see Donald J. Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), P. 240.

49 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, P. 157.

50 Many scholars, however, cast doubt on the direct relation between low confidence in the government and protest. They generally contend that the translation of dissatisfaction with a political system into coherent protest against it is largely contingent on other social factors, such as communication networks among the aggrieved and their command over critical resources. Without such intervening variables, political cynicism is likely to lead to apathy, withdrawal, or non-political anger. For a reference, see Sandor Halebsk, Mass Society and Political Conflict: Toward a Reconstruction of Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973); C. Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975); John Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Kenneth Wilson and Tony

Orum, "Mobilizing People for Collective Political action," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 4 (Fall), P. 187-202; Michael Useem, Conscription, Protest, and Social Conflict: The Life and Death of a Draft Resistance Movement (New York: Wiley, 1973); See also Michael Useem, Protest Movements in America (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975).

51 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, P. 157.

52 Devine, op. cit., P. 239.

53 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, P. 157. Verba also takes the position that the general sense of trust ordinary individuals have in political authorities is an important aspect of a democratic political culture. For a reference, see Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), P. 536-537.

54 In Gamson's terms, too much disagreement at the authority level means that government is not efficient and biased against some groups. Thus Gansom contends that "The best long-run strategy for authorities in building confidence concentrates on equity in allocating resources and effectiveness in generating them." For a reference, see Gamson, op cit., P. 53-58, 183.

55 For a reference, see Lucian Pye, "Introduction," in Pye and Verba, op. cit., P. 22.

56 Easton and Hess, "Youth and the Political System," in Lipset and Lowenthal,op cit., P. 230.

57 For details, see Gamson, op. cit., P. 54-58.

58 Ibid., P. 58.

[59] It is generally claimed that low political trust, combined by low political efficacy, might lead to apathy or withdrawal from politics, on the one hand, and it, supported by high political efficacy, might lead to unconventional or radical patterns of political behavior, on the other. For a reference, see Robert S. Erickson, Norman R. Luttbeg, and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), P. 103-104; See also John C. Pierce, Kathleen H. Beatty, and Paul R. Hagner, The Dynamics of American Public Opinion (Glenview, Illi.: Scot, Foresman, 1982), P. 225-226.

[60] Democratic elitism stems from the necessity of defining democracy in a manner that fits the contemporary American political situation, under the assumption that the American political system itself is democratic. The advocates of democratic elitism include such scholars as Berelson, Dahl, and Key. For a reference, see B. R. Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, 16 (Fall 1952), P. 313-330; B. R. Berelson et al., Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), Chapter 14; R. A. Dahl, "Further reflections on the 'Elitist' Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 60 (June 1966), P. 296-305; R. A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), Part 6.

[61] For a reference, see W. H. Morris-Jones, "In Defense of Apathy; Some Doubts on the Duty to Vote," Political Studies, 2 (February 1954), P. 33-37. The causes and determinants of political apathy have been deeply explored by Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (Winter 1954), P. 349-366.

[62] For a reference, see Berelson, op. cit. Also, low participation of average citizens in the political process is desirable from Almond and Verba's point of view because it provides government a wide sphere of authority to exercise its leadership. For a referernce, see Almond and Verba, op. cit., P. 476-487.

[63] In America there are ample data to suggest that there is a fundamental cleavage between the political elites and masses in terms of their democratic orientation. Most studies comparing political attitudes of political influentials with ordinary citizens commonly reveals that the elite is more supportive of democratic values and more consistent in translating these values into appropriate practices than the general public. For a reference, see Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Griggs, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement, Journal of Politics, 22 (May 1960), P. 276-294; See also Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June 1964), P. 361-382.

[64] Political apathy may be mainfested by the low participation. For detailed analysis of the level of political participation, see Edward Greenberg, The American Political System: A Radical Approach (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1977). He presents the following relative participation rates for different political activities (Calculated as rough averages from scores of academic studies): About 40 percent do not vote in presidential elections; about 60 percent do not votein Congressional elections; 70 percent do not belong to any organization that takes stands on political issues; 70 to 80 percent do not vote in off-year state and local elections; 90 percent never make financial contributions to a party or candidate; 95 percent never work in a political campaign; overall 99 percent never run for political office at any level.

[65] For more information on classical theory, see Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: English University Press, 1970); See also A. Ross, Why Democracy? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952).

[66] For a reference, see Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 60 (June 1966), P. 285-295.

[67] For more information, see Kornhauser, op cit.

[68] Also, it has been argued by Muller that sense of policy dissatisfaction could have a potentially important effect on aggresive political participation. For a reference, see Edward N. Muller, Aggressive Political Participation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), P. 276.

[69] Dong-Suh Park and Kwang-Woong Kim, Korean People's Democratic Political Consciousness: Elites and Masses (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1987).

Chapter II. Regionalism

We are mainly concerned, in this chapter, with regionalism in Korea interpreted in the light of theoretical and empirical considerations. Two questions are raised: what is the nature and extent of regional differences from a theoretical point of view, and what factors operate to strengthen territorial tensions in contemporary Korean politics? Also, a historical review will be done on the nature and growth of regionalism in Korea, and of regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam in particular.

1. Theoretical review

It is generally claimed that social progress, as manifested by social and technological developments in industrial societies, would bring about a reduction in local and particularistic loyalties. Parsons, for example, characterizes the evolution of societies as a shift from ascriptive status to universal considerations of achievement.[1] Also, Tonnies, one of early students of sociology, points out that the movement of progressive societies has been uniform in one respect: a movement from a social order based on consensus of wills, which he conceptualized as '*gemeinschaft*,' to a social order based on convention and agreement, termed '*gesellschaft*.'[2] According to him, the individual was, in previous times, implicated in a web of circumstances imposed on him by the accident of birth. As society develops, the individual establishes contacts with

persons outside his intimate boundaries for the purpose of optimizing his values.

Tonnies' use of *Gemeinshaft* and *Gesellschaft* resembles traditional conceptual forms which characterize social entities antithetically. His analytical categories correspond to Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity; Cooley's primary and secondary groups; Redfield's folk-urbal continuum; Becker's sacred and secular societies; Maine's status society and contract society; Spencer's militant and industrial forms; MacIver's commual and asociational relations; Odum's folk-state pair; and Sorokin's familistic and contractual relations. Along the same line, Max Weber postulated the tendency of societies to pass from one form of structure to another.[3] He contended that the shift from particularistic loyalties to a shared sense of values, as manifested by the acceptance of political authority based on an individualistic or a rational-bureaucratic rule would characterize a mobile, functional society.

Focusing on regional phenomena, individuals in modern times replace physical locality with contractual arrangements as the unit of social organization.[4] Then it is natural that the individuals' territorial dependency declines in the process of social progress. According to Durkheim:

> Some have seen (the increase in national homogeneity) to be a simple consequence of the law of imitation. But it is rather a levelling analogous to that which is produced between liquid masses put into communication. The partitions which separate the various cells of social life, being less thick, are more often broken through....Territorial divisions are thus less and less grounded in the

> nature of things, and consequently lose their significance. We can almost say that a people is as much advanced as territorial divisions are more superficial.[5]

In sum, industrial societies are commonly characterized by dissolution of the older social ties of blood, lineage, and territory and development of bonds based on personality, skill, and interest. It is expected, then, that with the declining importance of territory, territorial conflicts, if any, would not constitute a threat in developing and maintaining national unity.

Rokkan, in an analysis of Norwegian politics, asserted that the growth of an urban, industrial society involves the replacement of regional-cultural cleavages by functional-economic ones.[6] The importance of regional ties would decline in the process of social change, finally replaced by the salience of class conficts. Also, Marx and Engels were firmly convinced that conflicts between workers and capitalists would become more severe and more universal, rendering the other lines of cleavages, including religious and territorial, strains unimportant. In short, a process of change within a society would be accompained by a gradual decline in the political significance of territorial conflicts.

This perspective that views social and political change in terms of a reduction of territorial strains owes its popularity throughout the present century to the works of social scientists of the past generation, the twentieth-century structural-functionalists, and political scientists mainly concerned with communications theory. Such a positive view of regional phenomena seems to constitute an important part of a "diffusion" model mainly dealing with relations between the core region and

peripheral regions in a country.[7] According to this model[8], the growth of industrial society, involving urbanization, high personal mobility, high flow of mass communication, and the development of a nation-wide money and market economy, would lead to a gradual breakdown of the cultural differences between the core and the peripheral regions of a nation-state. As the whole country becomes industrialized, parochial attachments may be overlaid by an acquired loyalty to a wider society and its political institutions. The overall tendency will be towards a diminution of territorial strains and an increase in the importance of class conflicts.

Recent evidence of regional cleavages in various nations, however, suggests that particularistic loyalties have not withered away as a consequence of the growth of industrial society, and ethnic and local loyalties are still enduring features of social life. In France, for instance, there are long-standing separatist movements among the Basques, supplemented recently by agitations among the Corsicans. All of them willingly involve themselves in direct action, often violent, to put forward their cause. In Spain, there are national movements in the Basque country and intermittent rumblings in the Ukraine and Georgia. In Canada, the Quebec nationalist movement has grown markedly in strength and now commands a majority of seats in the Quebec legislative assembly. Regional within-nation differences have long been an outstanding feature of the Korean scene.

Largely because of a resurgence of local loyalties in industrial societies, a new model, known as "internal colonialism," has appeared in

discussions of territorial cleavages.[9] This model seeks to explain the recent manifestations of minority nationalism as the revolt of peripheral groups within the state who have been systematically exploited by the majority. The exploitation of the core region of a state over the peripheral regions is a defining characteristics of this model. The core region dominates the peripheral regions politically and exploits them materially. Some marked features of "internal colonialism" are illustrated by Michael Hetcher as follows.

> The spatially uneven wave of modernization over state territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage, there is crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. The superordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system. It attempts to regulate the allocation of social roles such that those roles commonly defined as having high prestige are reserved for its members. Conversely, individuals from the less advanced group are denied access to these roles. This stratification system which may be termed a cultural division of labor, contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups....Whereas the core is characterized by a diversified industrial structure, the pattern of development in the periphery is dependent, and complementary to that in the core. Peripheral industrialization, if it occures at all, is highly specialized and geared for export. The peripheral economy is, therefore, relatively sensitive to price fluctuations in the international market. Decisions about investment, credit, and wages tend to be made in the core. As a consequence of economic dependence, wealth in the periphery lags behind the core.[10]

In sum, internal colonialism is characterizd by two features: 1) political

inequalities between the core region and the peripheral areas, with concentrated, unequally distributed power in the dominant group; 2) economic inequalities, with peripheral industrialization being controlled by the dominant group.

Both of those features may not be of sufficient generality to apply across nations, yet the internal colonialism model seems to be useful in analyzing the contemporary Korean political situation, and regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam in particular. In a real sense, the Seoul Metropolitan Area is a core region of presesnt-day Korea, relagating all other provinces to the status of peripheral areas. The city is Korea's financial, commercial, and political capital. It is the main node of communication and transportation net that covers Korea. Newspapers from Seoul are daily reading matter in the provinces.

In addition, the Yungnam region also deserves to be called a core region only second to Seoul. In dealing with territorial cleavages between Honam and Yungnam, it makes sense to conceive Yungnam as a core region and Honam as a peripheral area. As is explained fully in Section 3 of this chapter, positions of high prestige and influence tend, with far greater frequency, to be filled by people from Yungnam relative to people from Honam. Korea has been in a rapid process of economic development for the past few decades. But as in other aspects of life, each region has been affected differently by economic progress. The Yungman region, as the main beneficiary of development programs, is industrialized and economically developed, whereas the Honam region is predominantly rural and economically backward.[11] Thus, the Yungnam region might be

regarded as a core region, and the Honam region might be considered a peripheral area. However, whether or not the relations between the Honam and Yungnam regions are exploitative; that is, whether the Yungnam region continues its development at the deliberate expenses of the Honam region, remains to be answered. Unfortunately, there is no definite evidence to show exploitative relations betweeen the two regions. To be sure, the existence of exploitative relations is the key element of "internal colonialism" model. Nonetheless, internal colonialism, rather than the diffusion model, enjoys relative merits in the explanation of political aspects of regionalism in Korea, because there exist marked and persistent power differentials in national politics between the two regions, which would contribute to the continuity of regional economic differences regardless of exploitative relations.

What do we mean, then, by a region and regionalism? Defining a region and regionalism is the first task in analyzing the political implications of territory for political integration, which is the point to which we turn.

Rupert Vance defines a region as "a homogeneous area with physical and cultural characteristics distinct from those of neighboring areas. As a part of a national domain a region is sufficiently unified to have a consciousness of its customs and ideals and thus possess a sense of identity distinct from the rest of the country."[12] Along the same lines, Dickinson defines region as "an area in which all places have certain characteristics by virtue of which it is distinct from the areas around."[13] He suggests the existence of three similar or interrelated human

attributes such as economic, cultural, and political to be the determining factors in making an area a region.

Following these definitions, region will be used, in this dissertation, to refer to an identifiable area in which there is homogeneous economic, cultural, and political attributes. Thus, a region is identified by the existence of distinctive and common political, cultural, and economic attributes within a given territory. Economic attributes pertain to the limited territorial dimensions of production or commercial relations. Cultural aspects reflect the spatial groupings of cultural factors such as language, custom, historical traditions, and social structure. Finally, political factors refer to an historically unique set of political forces.

When defining a region this way, Honam and Yungnam fulfill the requirements of the existence of a region. Distinctive economic, cultural, and political attributes can be found in both areas: there are specific patterns of production or commercial relations; that is, Yungnam is highly dependent on manufacturing industries, and Honam is characterized by its agricultural economy. Human populations in each area are marked off in terms of dialect, custom, and even social structure. Historically unique sets of political forces and relations have been operating in each area; that is, Honam has been persistently alienated from national politics, whereas Yungnam has frequently dominated the political stage. This does not suggest, however, that the Yungnam or Honam regions are completely homogeneous in terms of economic, political, and social attributes. Yet relative to the rest of the country, the constituent elements of each region and the problems posed in each region are sufficiently unique to

treat each of them as distinct units.[14]

Where the term "region" identifies an area in question, regionalism emerges when members of the region acquire an awareness of their uniqueness. Consciousness of regional uniqueness on the part of the local inhabitants provides the potential for building up regional group identity.[15] The acquisition of such awareness may be linked to what is broadly conceptualized under reference group theory. We will discuss the concept of reference group in detail to facilitate understanding of the phenomenon of regionalism.

Kelly's distinction between comparative and normative reference groups is essential to this discussion.[16] The normative function of reference groups refers to the setting of norms, attitudes, and values for individual members, whereas the comparative function is "that of serving as or being a standard or comparison point against which the person can evaluate himself and others." In other words, normative reference groups can be taken as a reference point in the formulation of attitudes and decisions about behavior.[17] Comparative reference groups may be taken as standards of comparison for self-appraisal.

The two different functions of reference groups both operate to arouse the salience of a region. As Easton has pointed out, the attitudes of individuals toward the political system might be "mediated through subgroups to which a member belongs and from which he takes his political cues, whether cognitive or affective."[18] Thus an individual's reference groups play a very significant role in shaping his attitudes

toward the political system. Regionalism affects the attitudes of the residents in a certain region toward political objects, but this is mediated through normative reference functions. In addition, comparative reference functions are essential in producing regional tensions. As Schwartz puts it, "knowledge of conditions in other areas and how they compare with those in one's own may be just what is needed to arouse a sense of regional identity."[19]

Returning to the original issue of regionalism, whenever an individual lives in relation to other people, different groups are formed, according to blood ties, regional ties, social class, and so forth. When regional ties are used as a reference for feelings of we-ness, regionalism comes into existence. Simply stated, regionalism is a shared sense of identification among residents with a territorial unit.[20] From this point of view, the term "regionalism" basically has two meanings. One is the feeling of solidarity with one's home town. One normally has affection for and longs for the place where one was born and grew up. It is a very human aspect of political life to have a sentimental attachment to one's native area. Regionalism, in this pure sense, enhances the solidarity of a nation, because such a home-oriented feeling contributes to a sense of cooperation among the people.

When this natural emotion is manipulated for political purposes, however, regional ties become a source of conflict between factions. When members of a certain regional group irrationally seek the interests of their own group, regional ties can result in the malfunction of society by breaking down the balance of society as a whole. A nation's human and

material resources have great potential for being allocated according to decision makers' regional preferences with no regard to overall necessity, the principle of efficiency or equity. Regionalism, in this sense, might be associated with "situations of politically relevant divisiveness and territorial cleavages, often accompanied by some consciousness on the part of residents that they have distinct, regionally based interests."[21]

A second conception of regionalism implies regional conflicts in the very definition. Regionalism, in this sense, occurs when regional differences in terms of economic inequality, and concentrated, unequally distributed political power, are present and acknowledged by the residents. Presence of objective conditions indicating regional differences creates the environment for the formation of regional group identity among the residents and for the mobilization of political action aimed at obtaining special consideration for their common interests and tradition, economic favoratism, a chance for greater decision-making autonomy, and so forth.

The evaluation of regional differences could be made irrespective of objective conditions.[22] For instance, even though regional differences could be minor, they might be generally believed to be extensive. Such an undervaluation of one's own region reflects the pessimistic political environment surrounding the region. Where residents feel that they are being unfairly treated, and thus that they are particularly deprived relative to other regions, a sense of relative deprivation is apt to emerge. Such feelings could either dampen or exacerbate the territorial tensions. Objective conditions and self-conceptions, however, are usually linked

with each other in various respects and are interdependent, operating to promote the emergence and continuity of territorial cleavages. Such prominent regional divisions would be a matter of anxiety from the standpoint of political stability, rendering the existence of an integrated society impossible. The likelihood of a politically and culturally fragmented society will be greater where there are marked and persistent regional differences. In a word, regionalism, as a manifestation of politically-mobilized territorial cleavages, thwarts political integration.

From the perspective of regionalism, political integration may be defined as "the process by which local communities are not only brought within the control of a larger state but also submerge their local loyalties into feelings of loyalty and support for the larger unit."[23] Along the same lines, Ernst Haas defines political integration as "a process whereby political actors in distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towad a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation-state.[24]

Political integration, in this sense, corresponds to national integration in Myron Weiner's terms.[25] He uses national integration to refer to "the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity." National integration thus refers specifically to the problem of creating a sense of "community" among a population of diverse social groupings which overshadows--or eliminates--subordinate parochial loyalties.

When political integration is conceptualized as the "progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities--in the process of creating a homogeneous territorial political community,"[26] severe regional conflicts would necessarily lead to a politically fragmented society. It appears, then, that political cleavages are potentially most troublesome for the development of "community" in both new and old nations in the modern world when they are based on territorial boundaries.

The main factors which lead to or hinder political integration are well described by Birch.[27] He singles out the factors leading to political integration as follows:

1. the development of a common language, national educational system and national mass media;
2. the growth of personal interaction and mobility between different regions;
3. the development of national political parties with centralised forms of organization;
4. the growth of an integrated economic system with features (natural or artificial) which ensure that all regions share to some extent in the benefits of economic growth.

In particular, he conceives the rewards of economic growth as the most important of the factors aiding political integration.[28]

Related to Birch's second condition listed above is the impact of communication on regional tensions. It is repeatedly asserted that the mass media of communication tend to diminish regional differences. Karl Deutsch, for instance, has emphasized a significant role for communication in lessening territorial cleavages.[29] However, there is evidence that can be interpreted as contrary to this assertion. A number

of researchers concerned with the effects of the mass media upon attitudes have shown that the media often reinforce pre-existing values and views, but they rarely provide a milieu in which attitude or even behavior is more likely to be altered.[30] That is, the media tends to intensify, rather than change opinion. As a matter of fact, information about conditions in other areas, even without any objective evidence, might operate to intensify regional conflicts. Thus, the rapid development of mass communication, combined by high mobility in the society, and the increasing influence of politics on people's lives, tends to increase rather than decrease the salience of a region.

Birch specifies the factors hindering political integration as follows:

1. the persistence of ethnic, religious or linguistic divisions between regions;
2. economic imbalace between the regions, of a type which may lead residents of the poorer areas to feel that they are being unfairly treated.

In sum, regionalism, as a phenomenon of culturally and politically divided territorial cleavage, poses a serious problem for the functioning of a political system.

We are now ready to connect the theoretical issues of regionalism to a realistic comprehension of regional divisiveness in Korean society. Regionalism is a historical process and thus should be understood in historical perspective. A brief description of the development of regionalism in Korea for purposes of background will be made in the

forthcoming section.

2. Historical outline of regionalism in Korea

From ancient times, the Korean people's thought and culture have been formed based on the feelings of regional solidarity. In traditional Korean society, free passage and cultural exchange among different regions were extremely limited, largely due to poor means of transportation and communication, thus producing particularistic regional characteristics unique to each region. Traditionally, Korea did not pave roads. Although a post-horse system existed and there were governmental officers to manage the roads nation-wide, the central government intentionally avoided widening the roads because it was believed the widened roads would provide easy access for rebels or enemies. Such unmodernized means of transportation naturally made it difficult for the culture of one region to influence other regions, thus obstructing the formation of a single culture covering the whole nation. Due to the lack of sufficient means of transportation, there was virtually no migration among the people of different regions, which made it more difficult for mutual understanding among regions to develop. The overall effect is the emergence of South Korea as a regionally divided society.

Regional sectionalism is so deeply-rooted that a number of writers concerned with regionalism in Korea sometimes trace its origin to the earlier days of 'the era of the Three Kingdoms' (around B.C. 1 century--A.D. 7 century).[31] Although the three kingdoms-Koguryo, Paekche, and

Shilla-had many things in common, they engaged each other in a series of wars as they competed for territory and subjects.[32] A kingdom had to win wars against neighboring kingdoms, if it were to become and remain a power. The people of each kingdom united against the other kingdoms in trying to extend their territory and conquer others. Sometimes Shilla and Paekche allied and fought against Koguryo. Sometimes Koguryo and Paekche did the same against Shilla. The hostility among the ruling clases of these three kingdoms and even among the people was extremely severe.[33] For instance, Koguryo's antagonism against Paekche is evidenced in the Koguryo's King Kwang-Gae-To's epitaph. On it, a passage "contemptible Paekche people" is written. Likewise, Kim Yu-Shin of the Shilla Dynasty expressed a strong hostile feeling against the other kingdoms, by calling both Koguryo and Paekche Shilla's enemies.[34]

The three kingdoms extended their hostility and confrontation beyond the Korean peninsula. For example, we can find this hostility in relation to ancient Japan. The Yamato Reform of the 7th century, which occured during the formation of Japan's ancient kingdom, was strongly influenced by Kim Choon-Choo of the Shilla Dynasty. The Reform in itself was nothing more than a power transfer from the immigrants of the Paekche Dynasty, who had been the actual power-holders in Japan's Royal Family, to those of the Shilla Dynasty. The Im-Shin Revolt (672) which occured 26 years later was another power struggle between the descendants of Korea's two kingdoms, Paekche and Shilla. This time the descendants of the Paekche Kingdom tried to regain their power by overthrowing the descendants of the Shilla Kingdom.[35]

Through a long and bitter battle, Shilla conquered Paekche and Koguryo with the help of China's Tang Dynasty, thus finally leading Shilla to unify the three kingdoms (A. D. 705).[36]

The remaining people of Paekche and Koguryo, especially the ruling classes of these kingdoms, unsuccessfully fought to preserve their tradition and revive their kingdoms. They thought of the Unified Shilla as the enemy of their mother kingdoms. The Unified Shilla kept an eye on these remaining people and deprived these people of their social and political status. It severely restrained especially the remaining Koguryo people from having any social and economic position.[37] Also, the Unified Shilla tried to extirpate customs and thoughts peculiar to Paekche and Koguryo from the consciousness of both the ruling class and the people. On the other hand, three families who came from Shilla-- the Park, Kim, and Suk families--took the throne in rotation, building a strong bureaucratic system within their own group and people. Such repressive policies, however, failed to completely root out the individual ideologies of the people from old Paekche and Koguryo, only aggravating regional conflicts.

The era of the Unified Shilla was followed by 'the era of the Later-Three Kingdoms,' composed of the Unified Shilla, Later-Paekche, and Koryo.[38] In the long run, Wang-Kon, who was a leader of Koryo, had brought the whole Korean peninsula under his rule by the conquest of the Unified Shilla in 935 and Later-Paekche in 936, and became the first King of the Koryo Dynasty. He issued one proclamation which led to severe regional antagonism. In his testament, usually called the "ten

commandments for the descendants," Wang-Kon ordered his descendants never to rely on or give any governmental position to the people from the Southern part of the Keum river.[39] It is a well-known historical fact that the resistance of the people of the Later-Paekche (the descendants of the Paekche Kingdom), made it impossible for Wang-Kon to conquer it without being engaged in a bloody battle, while he had conquered the Shilla Kingdom without any resistence. As one analyst has argued, the policy of discrimination against the Honam region might be regarded as Wang-Kon's personal expression of revenge against the Later-Paekche people's resistance.[40] Also, a superstitious belief called Poong-Soo-Ji-Ri-Sul helped Wang-Kon and his descendants to discriminate against the people from the Honam region.[41] Although there is no apparent evidence that the testament was observed exactly by his descendants in the Koryo Dynasty, the prejudice against the Honam people, based on the superstitious belief, seems to have affected the consciousness of Koryo's ruling class. Also, it might not be too much to say that the prejudice has considerably affected Koreans' attitudes toward the Honam people up to the present.[42]

The regional favoratism or prejudice which came to the surface formally in the Koryo Dynasty became more complicated and more diversified during the Yi's Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) which succeeded the Koryo Dynasty. During the Yi Dynasty, most regional discrimination was determined by a power struggle between different political groups (factions) so that the discriminated regions varied according to the regional base or character of the winning group. Neverthless, the

exclusion of and discrimination against the North-West region and Honam region has been continuous.[43]

Lee Sung-Gae who overthrew the Koryo Dynasty and founded the Yi Dynasty, was born in Ham-Kyung Province located in the far Northern part of Korea. Although he founded the new dynasty with the help of the people from his native area, he was so concerned about these people's strong temperament that he prevented these people from holding any governmental offices.

In the early days of the Yi Dynasty (A. D. 1453), Lee Jing-Oak and Lee Shi-Ae, who were from Ham-Kyung Province, and thus were discontented with the Yi Dynasty's policy of discrimination against their native area, revolted against the Yi Dynasty. The attempt ended in a failure, only resulting in the declaration of Ham-Kyung Province as the home of rebels by the government in the thirteenth year of King Se-Jo's reign (A. D. 1467), rather than in the alleviation of discrimination. Later, the regional discrimination against Ham-Kyung Province was extended to those territories situated in the whole Northern part of Korea, that is , North Korea of today. The central political circles were closed to the people from those regions. They were not given high-level governmental positions even when they passed the state examinations.

This regional discriminaion policy continued until the last period of the Yi Dynasty. Impatient with such continued discrimination, Im Keok-Jung and Hong Kyung-Rae revolted against the dynasty in the middle of Yi's Chosun, but all their efforts came to nothing.

Next, we are going to consider regional discrimination against the

Honam region after the revolt led by Jung Yeo-Lip (A. D. 1589). Jung, who had once been the leader of Tongin (The "Easterners," one of the political groups),[44] was a well-known, distinguished scholar in Jun-Joo, a city located in Honam, but he was falsely charged with leading a revolt to overthrow the Yi Dynasty. The opposing political group called Soin (the "Westerners"), taking advantage of this opportunity, massacred all the scholars from the Honam region, including Jung himself. After the massacre, the government forbade the Honam people from holding any governmental offices, based on the superstitious belief called Poong-Soo-Ji-Ri-Sul which originated in the Koryo Dynasty. The Honam region was once again regarded as the home of rebels throughout the Yi Dynasty.

With the establishment of the landed class and tenancy system in the middle of the Yi Dynasty, farmers in the Honam region were severely exploited and hence tried to migrate into other regions. These wanderers, however, experienced further discrimination by the people in other regions where they finally settled.

We will now turn to discrimination against the Yungnam region. In the latter part of the Yi Dynasty, four political groups emerged as they competed each other to retain political hegemony. Among them, Namin (The "Southerners") and Noron (The "Old Doctrine") were the main opposing political groups. At that time, Yungnam was a base of operation of Namin, most of whom were disciples of the famous Confucian scholar, Lee Hwang.

The Noron group drove the Namin group out of power and seized political power during the reign of King Sook-Chong. Consequently, most

people of the Namin group, who were mainly from the Yungnam region, were removed from central political circles. Noron's hatred for Namin was so intense that they never gave Namin any governmental positions. During the reign of King Jung-Jo, the Noron group prohibited the Yungnam people from taking state examinations for the governmental offices for 50 years.

Prior to this exclusion of Namin, there had been a successful court-coup called Injo-Banjung (after this coup, Injo became the 16th King of the Yi Dynasty) which resulted in the exclusion of Pukin (The "Northerners") who were originally from the Southern part of the Yungnam region.[45] Faced with such discrimination, many scholars of the Namin political group went back to their native Yungnam region and dedicated themselves to teaching. From that time isolationism began to bud in Yungnam. In the long run, exclusivism based on blood ties or regional ties was wide-spread, distinctly so in the Yungnam region. The Yungnam people's power-oriented tendencies of today seemed to emerge largely out of such unique political consciousness.[46] Overall, the discrimination against the Yungnam region lasted throughout the 19th century until Dae-Won-Koon (King Gojong's father) took power.

In addition to the regional discrimination against the Northern part, Honam and Yungnam, the government discriminated against people from Gae-Sung, the Capital of the Koryo Dynasty, and from Gang-Wha Province, a small island in which descendants of political offenders used to reside. Jung Yak-Yong, a famous scholar and writer in the latter part of the Yi Dynasty, in his book titled Tong-Saek-eui, lamented the fact that only one

or two out of every ten talented men were recruited. Some were excluded because of their class and others were excluded because of their native place. Jung specifically named the alienated regions, which were Pyung-An Province, Ham-Kyung Province, Hwang-Hae Province, Gaesung, Kang-Wha Province, and the Honam region.[47]

To summarize regional favoritism during the Yi Dynasty, political power was dominated by a small group of people from the Kiho region (Seoul and its vicinity of the present). They discriminated against people from all other regions. For instance, Y. M. Kim, in his study of the Yi Dynasty's top political elites during the reign of Kojong (1864-1907) and Sunjong (1907-1910), identified regional favoritism as follows.[48] Among those recruited through civil examination (a total of 4,693 top bureaucrats of "rank three" or above), Seoul represented 72.4 %, KyungKi Province, 5.9 %, ChungChong, 7.6 %, Yungnam, 3.7 %, Honam, 1.8 %, KangWon, 1.3 %, Pyung-An, 1.3 % and Ham-Kyung, 0.3 %, respectively.[49] Thus, the top bureaucrats were mostly from the capital.

Moreover, the regional administrative unit of "Do" (Privince), which is understood as the basis of the concept of region in Korean society, has remained practically unchanged since the Yi Dynasty (or even the Koryo Dynasty). Therefore this regional unit in itself contains factors of regionalism.[50]

The regional discrimination policy in the Yi Dynasty directly affected the formation of modern Koreans' consciousness. It is a key factor in today's Korean people's consciousness which discriminates between Seoul 'nobility' and country-side 'common people.' This is an inevitable result of

the exclusive possession of governmental office by a small group of people from Seoul and its vicinity.

The fall of the Yi Dynasty and the Japanese colonization of Korea (1910-1945) provided a golden opportunity for Koreans to root out regionalism. Although the Japanese imperialists tried to take advantage of the chronic regionalism of Korea in order to weaken Korea's unity against Japanese imperialism, Korea's national leaders developed a consciousness reform movement based on nationalism so as to confront foreign (Japanese) forces. This movement turned out to be successful, for the Korean people realized that contradictions between their nation and Japan were imminent than between themselves. This helped to diminish the effects of regionalism during this period.

The political fever after Korea's liberation from Japan in 1945 created another golden opportunity to wipe out regional favoritism. Around the foundation of the Republic of Korea (R. O. K.) in 1945, most people in the politically leading class were national elites who stood above regionalism. So regionalism rarely became a political issue.[51] But a new form of regionalism had begun to bud after the Korean War, when a group of refugees opposing Communism of North Korea rushed to the South. Since they came to the R. O. K. empty-handed, strong solidarity among them based on region was the only means for survival. This caused a somewhat strange regional problem between Southerners and Northerners in the R. O. K., and this problem continued throughout the 1950s.[52] This

kind of regionalism, however, was far less troublesome politically beause they (Northerners) had already lost their regional grounds.

After the student revolution of April 19th, 1960 which put an end to the dictatorship of President Lee, the Democratic Party took political power. The Party was formed based on public opinion and thus, respected the authority and opinions of the lawmakers representing the people. On this basis, no particular region could be treated preferentially or contemptuously. As long as this principle was observed, regionalism could have been gradually eased or rooted out.

During Lee's regime and the short period of the Democratic Party's regime (1960, April to 1961, May), the principal problem was ideological confrontation between free Economy and Communism or between Democracy and Dictatorship; regionalism itself rarely became a political issue. Thus, in the 1950s and at the beginning of 1960s, the system came close to a stable equilibrium and the territorial contrasts were less salient than in any other period. This equilibrium was quickly broken when in May, 1961, the military overthrew the civil government, and came onto the political stage.

After the military coup took place in 1961, a series of changes took place in politics, economy, and society under the new regime led by General Park Jung-Hee (who became the President of South Korea later). These structural changes in politics, economy, and society, however, only intensified regional consciousness and regional antagonism. It is a widespread belief among Koreans that since 1961 when the military came

onto the political stage, Honam people have been persistently disadvantaged in political rewards, whereas Yungnam people were given much opportunity of being raised to higher social positions. Also, the economic development policy promoted by the military government concentrated its benefit in Yungnam, which made alienation of Honam residents on the mass level an established fact. All such regional imbalances worked to arouse regional tensions between the Honam and Yungnam regions, one of the most serious contemporary political issues. Thus, the overall tendency in Korean politics since 1961 has been towards an increase of territorial strains, superimposed by economic and political conflicts in the system.

We have so far been describing regionalism in Korea from a historical point of view. Now, we are going to focus on the political position of Honam and Yungnam, respectively, in the Korean political context. Marked and persistent differences between Honam and Yungnam can be documented throughout the history of Korean politics, as the foregoing description has already showed.

Historically, there have been many instances of political conflicts between different groups based on regional or blood ties. The initiative in these political conflicts has always been out of the reach of the Honam people. The alienation of the Honam people from political power is retroactive to the period of the Unified Shilla Dynasty.[53] After unifying the three kindoms, the Shilla Dynasty adopted a policy restricting the activities of the remaining people of Paekche who are the predecessors of

the Honam people.[54]

Also, in the period of the Koryo Dynasty, the people from Paekche were persistently alienated from politics.[55] Especially, Wan-Kon's ten commandments for his descendants was a key factor in arousing the salience of a region, since it formulated the conception of the Southern area of the Keum River as the land of revolt. His testament seemed to be observed more or less until the middle of the Koryo Dynasty when the centralized bureaucratic system began to crumble.

Such prejudice against Honam was passed down to the ruling class of the Yi Dynasty so that they believed people from this region had to be more severely ruled than people from other regions. Also, power elites in the Yi Dynasty believed that the governor of this region should be someone of renown since the customs of this region were disgraceful.[56] After a revolt led by Jung Yeo-Lip in 1589, the Honam people were once again restricted from holding any governmental positions. Also, as the result of the revolt, more than 100 scholars of the Dongin group (who were mainly from the Honam region) were killed by the Soin who were in power at that time. The situation worsened after a successful court coup by Soin, named Injo-Banjung. Soin strictly restrained the Honam people from holding any governmental position in the Yungnam and Honam regions where most people of Dongin resided. In brief, from the Unified Shilla Dynasty to the latter part of the Yi Dynasty, the road to governmental offices had been very narrow for people from Honam as compared to people from Kiho or Yungnam.[57] Furthermore, it can be easily conjectured, then, that economical exploitation of this region was very severe, for

traditionally political considerations determined the economic characteristics of Korean society.[58] The Honam people, alienated from political power, vented their frustrations by developing the arts. Sixty-two percent of the 90 clowns from the King Young-Jo period to the latter part of the Yi Dynasty, were from Honam.[59] Others became vagrants, wandering around the Provinces and Seoul.[60] This tendency intensified during the Japanese Occupation of Korea. Many of those who went elsewhere became part of the lowest class in society and were treated contemptuously. Their struggle for survival ultimately damaged the general impression people had for those from this region. Negative prejucices against these wanderers from Honam were intensified by the anti-government sentiment, radicalism, and shrewdness of these people.

The characteristics of the Honam region may be summarized as follows. It is alienated from political power despite its national financial burden, academic, and cultural development. It has been severely exploited economically by the ruling authorities due to its exclusion from the political power. Regional discriminaion by the central governmental power enabled them to build a strong spirit of resistance, and they began to be disdainful of people from other regions, thus contributing to the formation of a peculiar regional culture.

Meanwhile, the Yungnam region seems to have had more oppotunities to approach the core of power. Many scholars came from the Yungnam region and played leading roles in the history of Korea. Statesmen, scholars, and monks such as Kim Choon-Choo, Kim Yoo-Shin, Won Hyo, Eui Sang, Choi

Chi-Won, Kim Boo-Sik, Lee Jei-Hyun and Lee Saek, played important roles during the Shilla Dynasty and the Koryo Dynasty. Yungnam pople were treated with consideration by Tae-Jo (Wang-Kon), the first king of the Koryo Dynasty, for they surrendered without resisting to Koryo. Many talented men from the Shilla Dynasty also contributed in establishing the Koryo Dynasty.

Also, people such as Jung Do-Jun and Kwon Keun played important roles in the political and the academic fields during the former part of the Yi Dynasty. It is clear that from the period of King Sae-Jo to the period of King Sung-Jong, people from the Yungnam region had much opportunity to enter the central political world.[61] In the middle of the Yi Dynasty, many great Confucian scholars were born in the Yungnam region. Among them were Lee Un-Juk, Lee Hwang, Jo Shik, Kim Sung-Il, and Yoo Sung-Ryong. The Yungnam region also produced many great leaders of independence movement in the latter part of the Yi Dynasty and during the Japanese Occupation. This region produced a large number of famous Buddhist monks including Sa-Myung-Dae-Sa. The temples in this region including the Hae-In temple in Hap-Chon, the Tong-Do tempel in Yang-San, and the Bum-Uh tempel in Dong-Rae were the head temples, forming the center of Buddhism in our nation.

On the other hand, as described before, in the latter part of the Yi Dynasty, people from Yungnam were precluded from holding offices in the central political circles.

In conclusion, it appears that the Honam region has been continually

politically isolated in our nation's history, while the Yungnam region relatively has had many chances of advancement to central political circles.

In the next section, we will describe regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam. We will pay special attention to the political factors that account for the extreme antagonism between the two regions since 1961, in which a small group of the military, led by General Park who were from the Yungnam region, took political power.

3. Regional differences between the Honam and Yungnam regions

As the foregoing analyses show, South Korea's regional conflicts before Japan's occupation of Korea were not between Honam and Yungnam but emerged in the form of the central region's (Kiho region) exclusion of the remaining regions. A regional conflict such as the one between Yungnam and Honam did not exist. In fact, during the latter part of the Yi Dynasty, the people from Yungnam and Honam were equally cast out by the ruling Noron (The "Old Doctrines") who were mostly from the Kiho region. They had at this time formed a common bond in resisting against the Kiho region. Throughout the long history of Korea, there seems to be no definite evidence showing regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam.[62] Rather, this issue seems to emerge as one form of the contemporary regional phenomenon.

The year of 1961 in which Jung-Hee Park from Yungnam overthrew the civilian government and took political power, is generally claimed as the genuine starting point of regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam, bringing territorial divisiveness to a crisis of national integration. It seems that after Park came onto the political stage, the Honam region has not only been excluded from being selected as a site for industrial development, but has also been excluded from port and road developmental projects. In contrast, the Yungnam region enjoyed a lot of the economic benefits of development programs. Due to the unfair distribution of wealth, the income and economical structures of the two regions began to differ greatly.

In addition to economic imbalances, a lot of regional imbalances have been present between the two regions, which finally led to regional conflicts. An examination of the objective conditions accounting for regional differences between Honam and Yungnam in the contemporary political context is the main purpose of this section. Only after objective conditions have been identified and analyzed in detail will it be possible to see how promising are the prospects for continued national unity. Those conditions explain how territorial considerations continue to permeate the political life of Korean society, fostering political tensions. Conditions to be considered are as follows: economic imbalances (inequalities in the distribution of wealth, income, productive capacity); political imbalances (political inequalities in the recruitment process); social imbalances (ineqalities in living conditions); perceptions (residents' recognition of regional imbalances). In the following discussion, marked and persistent differences will be revealed. It must be added before-hand, however, that it has been extremely difficult to publicly obtain statistics and data due to the political and social circumstances present in Korea.[63]

1) Economic Conditions

Economic conditions are the first to be considered. An industrialized society is commonly characterized by the concentration of resources in secondary and tertiary industry and a reduction in the dependence on primary industry.[64] The industrial composition of an economy in a region, then, provides a crucial clue in measuring economic imbalances. Table 2-1 shows several noteworthy findings. The Honam region has been

dependent mainly on primary industry, although there is a sign of increase in its investment in secondary and tertiary industry. Honam seems to derive the majority of its wealth from commodity-producing industries in primary resources.

Table 2-1: The Industrial Composition of an Economy
(in percentages)

		1965	1967	1970	1975	1978	1980	1982
Yungnam	1	40.2	35.0	30.2	22.8	21.3	---	---
	2	23.7	23.6	27.2	34 3	36.0	---	---
	3	36.1	41.4	42.6	42.9	42 7	---	---
Honam	1	61.8	53 9	51 7	46 4	43.2	38 6	38.0
	2	11.8	13.0	13.0	18.4	17.8	20.1	25.0
	3	26 4	33.1	35.3	35 2	39.0	41.3	37 0

Source: Suk-Nam Moon, "The Study on Regional Differences and Conflicts," Korean Sociology, (Winter 1984), P. 198.
Kwang-Soo Kim, "Honam in Korean Politics," Korean Political Science Journal, 20 (1986).

Notes: 1) Numbers refer to the following: "1" - primary industry, "2" - secondary industry, "3" - tertiary industry.

2) Unfortunately, the data indicating the industrial composition of the Yungnam region in 1980 and 1982, are not available. But from the table, it is reasonably projected that Yungnam will become more concentrated in secondary industry with a diminution in the dependence on primary industry.

Meanwhile, the Yungnam region has channeled increasingly more of its economic output into secondary and tertiary industry, most of its wealth coming from manufacturing industries. The gap between the two regions has been widening in the investment in secondary industry. The relative position of regions, with respect to dependence on primary, secondary, and tertiary industry, remains the same throughout the years which we are covering. In terms of industrial composition, the Honam region is less industrialized than the counterpart.

It is generally acknowledged that the signs of a developed economy include heavy reliance on secondary industry. Table 2-2 tells that the manufacturing industries are heavily concentrated in Seoul, KyungKi, and particularly Yungnam as of 1983, viewed from the labor force participation rate as well as additional values produced in each Province.

Table 2-2: The Composition of Manufacturing Industry
(in percentages)

		Seoul	Kyung-Ki	Kangwon	Chung-Cheong	Honam	Yungnam	Cheju
1963	1	29.9	10.1	2.0	8.4	12.1	37 0	0.8
	2	35 8	9.5	1 9	9.1	10 8	32.0	0 6
1983	1	21 1	25.0	0.9	6 0	5 5	41.2	0 2
	2	16 6	26.3	1.2	7 5	8.0	40 3	0.2

Source: The Economic Planning Board, Yearbook of Korean Statistics,1965, 1985, 1986

Notes: 1) Percentages in row 1 and 3, as indicated by the number

"1", refer to the ratio of a region over a whole nation in labor force participation. Percentages in row 2 and 4, as indicated by the number "2", refer to the ratio of additional values produced in a region over a whole nation.

2) According to our demarcation of a region, Seoul, KyungKi, KwangWon, and ChunCheong, in combination, constitute the Middle region. Cheju, located on the island off the southern coast of Peninsula of South Korea, has been excluded from the consideration of a region.

The table also reveals a marked and persistent gap in the composition of manufacturing industry between Yungnam and Honam (For instance, in 1983, 41.2% and 5.5% in the labor force participation rate, respectively). In terms of a developed economy, the Yungnam region, as compared with the Honam region, is more industrialized.

Given these structural differences, it is not unreasonable to assume that each region has enjoyed large and continuingly different economic rewards. The total personal income in Honam has reached only 70 to 80% of the national level throughout 1970s (table 2-3). The disadvantaged economic situation of Honam is exactly reversed in Yungnam. The total personal income has always been beyond the national level. Basic differences in levels of earnings might be accounted for by age composition, education level and urban-rural distribution of population. However, regionally differentiated resource potentials in terms of industrial and occupational distribution also in large part account for the differences. Moreover, political considerations favoring the Yungnam

region might have intervened in this process, which is probably a more important factor than anything else in influencing continued regional divisiveness.

Table 2-3: Total Personal Income

(in Wons)

		1965	1967	1970	1975	1978	1980
Honam	(A)	21,713	27,270	58,919	205,919	470,100	732,283
Yungnam	(B)	30,344	43,876	84,634	282,058	661,846	946,216
Nation	(C)	28,100	42,500	83,200	277,600	619,900	900,301
A/C	(%)	77.2	64.2	70.8	74.2	75.8	81.3
B/C	(%)	108.0	103.2	101.7	102.0	107.0	107.1

Source: Moon-Suk Nam, "The Study on Regional Differences and Conflicts," Korean Sociology, (Winter 1984), P. 198.

Notes: A monetary unit is expressed in terms of Won. Currency value of 500 Wons approximately corresponds to $ 1 in the U. S. terms as of 1970s.

In concluding, Korea now deserves to be called an industrialized society. But the move to modernization and social change has affected each region differently. The Yungnam region, as beneficiary, in one way or another, of governmental subsidies, is prosperous economically and highly industrialized, whereas the Honam region is predominantly rural and lagging badly.

2) The Distribution of Power

Political inequalities in terms of a differential distribution of power, with concentrated, unequally concentrated power in certain regions, provide another important base in fostering territorial cleavages. Ministers and vice-ministers are considered, first of all, to determine some geographical patterns of recruitment for important positions, for the real executive power rest with the cabinet.[65] The executive branch of the Korean government serves as the most powerful instrument through which national problems and issues are identified and solved. The distinct geographical patterns of the selection of members for the executive branch, then, may be one of the most determinant factors in explaining how territorial considerations continue to influence the Korean politics.[66] Table 2-4 shows the regional trends in the distribution of cabinet ministers and vice-ministers. Overall, the members for these important positions have been heavily weighted in favor of Yungnam, whereas Honam

Table 2-4: Distribution of Cabinet Ministers and Vice-Ministers, 1948-1985

(in percentages)

	1	Interim Govt	2	3,4	Interim Govt.	5
Yungnam	75 4	50 0	61.0	69 5	65 2	81 7
	(46)	(7)	(25)	(130)	(15)	(67)
Honam	24.6	50 0	39.0	30.5	34.8	18.3
	(15)	(7)	(16)	(57)	(8)	(15)

Source: General Book of All the Successive Key Figures in the Korean Government, 1985

Notes: Numbers refer to the number of Republic; "1" - the First Republic of Korea (1948-1960), "2" - the Second Republic of Korea (1960-1961), "3" and "4" - the Third and Fourth Republic (1963-1979), and "5" - the Fifth Republic (1980-1988). There have been, since Korea's Republican inception in 1948, three instances of constitutional government being suspended, once by student coup of 1960, and the others by military coup of 1961 and 1979, respectively. After each incidence of 1960 and 1979 an interim government has been established. Also, it should be noted that a military coup in May 1961 overthrew the Second Republic of Korea and a military junta, rather than interim government, governed the country for about two and one-half years (May 1961-December 1963).

has been persistently deprived in recruitment. In particular, in the fifth Republic of President Chun, the gap between the two regions has reached its extremity (81.7% and 18.3%, respectively).

Such political inequalities are revealed in the legislative branch as well. The legislature is composed of congressmen politically appointed by the president as well as elected by the people. The congressmen appointed by the president are, of course, our interest, for political considerations of territory may intervene in the appointment process. The result is as expected: Those positions in the legislature have been highly alloted to members from Yungnam, and the opportunity of Honamers' being appointed appears to be small, with regional imbalance on the increase in the fifth Republic (Table 2-5).

Table 2-5: Distribution of Congressmen Appointed by the President

(in percentages)

	3th and 4th Republic	5th Republic
Yungnam	65.4 (100)	72.3 (68)
Honam	34.6 (53)	27 7 (26)

Source: General Books of All the Successive Key Figures in the Korean Government, 1985

Notes: The appointment process should be differentiated between the 3th and 4th Republic, on the one hand, and the 5th Republic, on the other. In the 3th and 4th Republic, the President was given the full priviledge to appoint one third of fixed number of Congressman. In 5th Republic,they were selected in proportion to total vote received by each party. Accordingly, the opposition party as well as the government party has the right to appoint people to Congress in order of the persons nominated.

It would be interesting to see the regional distribution of key figures in the judiciary. It is generally believed that territorial considerations have operated least to influence the recruitment process of the judiciary, for the position of a judicial officer is reserved only for a successful candidate of state examinations. Table 2-6 reveals results consistent with this expectation. Honam prevails slightly over Yungnam in occupying important positions of the judiciary. This fact indicates that ability, rather than a place of residence, plays an important role in the recruitment process, where there is little room for political considerations.

Considering the fact that the judiciary has been reduced to a servant of the executive, throughout the short history of South Korea as an independent nation, this advantage in favor of Honam is negligible in influencing Korean politics.

Table 2-6: Distribution of Central Figures in the Judiciary

(in percentages)

Honam	Yungnam
52.6	47 4
(20)	(18)

Source: General Book of All the Successive Key Figures in the Korean Government, 1985

Note: Central figures include the Chief Justice and judges in the Supreme Court

At a more superficial level, suffficient material is provided to demonstrate the nature of differences between the two regions.

Table 2-7: Distribution of Central Figures of Korea, 1983

(in percentages)

	Politics	Economics	Society	Bureaucracy	Education
Yungnam	60 0	77 4	66.4	78 1	70.2
	(135)	(229)	(211)	(157)	(589)
Honam	40.0	22.6	33.6	21.9	29.8
	(90)	(67)	(107)	(44)	(250)

Source: Year Book of Dong-a, 1984

Note: Politics, economics, society, bureaucracy, and education

refers to each sphere of activity.

Table 2-7 sets out the regional distribution of central figures acting in different spheres and reveals the story as expected. People from Yungnam appear to be consistently active in every sphere, and particularly in politics, economics, and the bureaucracy. The gap between Honam and Yungnam is very large in every sphere of society.

Another way of viewing inequalities is to compare the number of large economic combines existing in Korea. Considering the enormous impact of large economic combines on the national economy of Korea, their distribution provides an important criterion in determining regional differences. As may be seen in Table 2-8, large economic combines are concentrated in Yungnam (45%), whereas there is only one large economic combine whose base is in the Honam region.

Table 2-8: Distribution of 20 Largest Economic Combines
(in percentages)

Seoul	KyungKi	ChungCheong	KangWon	Honam	Yungnam	Cheju
20	10	5	15	5	45	0
(4)	(2)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(9)	(0)

Source: Hankook Newspaper, The 50 Largest Economic Combines in Korea (Seoul: Research Institute on Economy and Efficiency, 1985).

What all of the preceding analyses suggest is, then, that territorial considerations have been operating as one of the most important factors

in the recruitment process, resulting in political inequalities between Yungnam and Honam. Honam has enjoyed less political rewards than Yungnam, with a marked gap in the fifth Republic. To be sure, in recruiting members for different positions, region, rather than ability, has played a significant role in the Korean political context.

3) Social Conditions

Quality of life makes up another set of conditions which may vary on a territorial basis. The availability of health and educational services, and communication media, which define the quality of life in a region, depend largely on the likelihood of exposure to an urban environment. Urbanization, then, is strongly associated with good quality of life. As may be seen in Table 2-9, the Seoul Metropolitan Area remains the most urbanized, with

Table 2-9: Distribution of Urban Population, as of the end of 1985

(in percentages)

Seoul	KyungKi	KangWon	Chung Buk	Chung Nam	Chun Buk	Chun Nam	Kyung Buk	Kyung Nam	Che Ju
100	58	42	41	35	43	40	57	75	58

Source: The Economic Planning Board, 1987 Census of Korea

Notes: Chung-Buk and Chung-Nam refer to the North and South of ChungCheong Province, respectively; Chun-Buk and Chun-Nam refer to the North and South of the Honam region, respectively; Kyung-Buk and Kyung-Nam refer to the North and South of the Yungnam region, respectively.

all of Seoul citizens living in urban area as of the end of 1985. The South of Yungnam is only second to Seoul and the South of Honam is second from the last. The Yungnam region appears to be far more urbanized than the Honam region. In terms of the implications of urbanization for quality of life, the Yungnam region is a better place to live than the Honam region, for the former is likely to create the conditions leading to the best quality of life.

The inter-regional mobility rate is also closely related to quality of life in a region. Population movements between parts of the country may increase exposure to new people, and possibly, new ideas. Consequently, interregional mobility may foster a willingness to tolerate individuals of different thoughts and backgrounds. It is also, conversely, an indication of the relative isolation experienced by the residents of certain region. For people tend to emigrate out of their residence, when they feel that they are disadvantaged in job opportunities, resource allocation, and the implementation of modernization programs as a consequence of uneven progress in the process of modernization. The Honam region has continued to suffer from a net loss of population uncomparable to other regions (Table 2-10). Also, it turns out that the Seoul Metropolitan Area has gained population most through migration. The other provinces, including Yungnam, have not experienced a drastic change in the population rate. Rather, the rate of population remains almost the same during 35 years. In sum, the Seoul Metropolitan Area appears to be the most attractive, as manifested by a continuously increasing rate of population, whereas the Honam region turns out to be the most unattractive. In terms of mobility

rate, Yungnam apprears to be more attractive than Honam.

Table 2-10: Distribution of Population Ratio
(in percentages)

	Seoul	KyungKi	KangWon	Chung-Cheong	Yungnam	Honam	Cheju
1949	7.7	13 0	5 7	15 7	31.4	25.2	1.3
1955	7.3	11 0	7.0	15.9	33.1	24 4	1.3
1962	11.8	10 5	6.1	15 7	31 8	23.0	1 1
1966	13.3	10 6	6.3	15 3	31.1	22.5	1 2
1970	17.6	10 7	5.9	13 8	30 4	20 5	1 1
1975	19 9	11.6	5.4	12 9	30.5	18.8	1.1
1980	22.3	13.2	4.8	11.7	30.6	16.2	1.2
1984	24.0	14 4	4.4	10.9	30 1	15 1	1.1

Source: Kwang-Soo Kim, "Honam in Korean Politics," Korean Political Science Journal, 20 (1986).

Emigrant people out of Honam apparently tend to settle in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, constituting the majority of the poor in it, as may be seen in Table 2-11. Those who have left the Honam region, probably expecting a different life from what they experienced in their original place of residence, have to feel frustrated when the actual conditions of life in Seoul are not favorable to them. This sort of frustration would contribute to the salience of a region, instigating regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam, since those from Yungnam have dominated political power. Hence, Yungnam people in general would be believed to be

responsible for Honam people's disadvantaged life conditions.

Table 2-11: Distribution of Small Income Earners in Seoul
(in percentages)

Seoul	KyungKi	KangWon	ChungCheong	Honam	Yungnam	Cheju
14.2	11.1	4.7	17.3	28.3	12.5	0.3

Source: Seoul Special City, "Research on the Actual Condition of small Income Earners and a Suggestion for Policy Directions," November, 1979.

To summarize the objective conditions of regional differences, regional imbalances can be said to prevail in Korea, and between Yungnam and Honam in particular. Rapid urbanization and industrialization in the last two decades in Korea have been accompanied by dramatic regional imbalances in the organization of the Korean economic, social, and political system. The salience of region as a significant dimension of political life depends in large part on the degree of regional imbalances.

4) Perception

The preceding conditions all relate to aspects of the economic, social, and political systems of regions. Psychological factors of the residents also play a crucial role, presumably more important than the presence of objective conditions, in fostering political tensions between the Honam and Yungnam regions. It is not likely that ordinary citizens are to be involved

in the rational analysis of objective conditions as illustrated in the foregoing analysis. In reality, Korean publics are generally believed to be uninformed about political affairs, and unsophisticated in terms of political thinking. Given this fact, accurate assessments of objective conditions is beyond the Korean publics' ability. To be sure, Honam people may not recognize the presence of aformentioned objective conditions indicating regional imbalances. The perception, presumably rooted in historical events, that their region has been excluded from the benifit of the implementation of modernization programs, largely weighted in favor of Yungnam, is sufficient to foster territoral cleavages. Thus, the perception, even in the absence of any of those objective conditions, that a region is unfairly treated, might work to perpetuate political tensions. Such perception sometimes creates the environment for active efforts to alter political circumstance, based on regional, as opposed to any overriding national interests. Perception, when reinforced by the recognition of the presence of objective conditions by the residents, of course, will bring about more serious dysfunctional consequences with reference to peaceful relations between the Honam and Yungnam residents. In short, self-perception, singly or in combination with the presence of objective conditions, operates to arouse a sense of regional group consciousness.

Our survey contains a series of items designed to measure perception--how residents feel about their region in terms of economic and political position. We are first concerned with how residents from

each region view the distribution of the wealth between the Honam and Yungnam regions. Respondents were first asked how equally they feel the benefits of national policies are distributed between the Honam and Yungnam regions (Table 2-12). A large number of the Honam respondents (48.0 %) answered that the benefit is "very unfavorably" distributed against the Honam region, and an additional 42.2 percent of the Honam sample answered "unfavorably." Thus, most of the Honam citizens viewed that they are disadvantaged in the distribution of the benefits of modernization programs.

Table 2-12: "Distribution of the wealth between the Honam and Yungnam regions" (in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Very favorably	0.0	5.1
Favorably	1.1	35.4
Equally	7.7	42.3
Unfavorably	42.2	7.4
Very unfavorably	48.0	0.8
Don't know	1.1	9.0
Total	100.1	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

Actual question: "To what extent do you think that the benefit of national policies is favorably distributed to your region, compared to other region?"

$X^2 = 518.00928$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0

Contingency Coefficient (C. C.) = .63840

Regarding the other region, 42.3 percent of the Yungnam people answered that the benefit is "equally" distributed between the two regions. About 4 out of 10 Yungnam respondents acknowledged that their region benefits more in the national policies than the Honam region.

When respondents answered that the benefit is not equally distributed, they were further queried with follow-up questions. Tables 2-13 and 2-14 will be analyzed together for the convenience of comparision. The explanation for economic imbalances does vary depending on where one lives. As may be seen in Table 2-13, the reason for the unequal distribution of wealth in favor of Yungnam region, among the 340 Honam respondents who replied that the wealth is favorably distributed to Yungnam, is heavily concentrated on the problem of the political system favoring Yungnam (91.5 %), and barely more than 4 percent of the Honam respondents blamed themselves for their disadvantaged economic position (4.1 %).

Table 2-13: "The perceived reason for the unequal distribution favoring other region"

	Honam	Yungnam
Lack of efforts	4.1	29.0
Political system	91.5	51.6
Other	3.5	12.9
Don't know	0.9	6.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(340)	(31)

Actual question: "If you think that the benefit of national policies is unfairly distributed to your region, compared to other region, to what are you going to attribute it?"

X^2 = 514.75488 D. F. = 3 Significance = .0

C. C. = .63721

Table 2-14: "The perceived reason for the unequal distribution favoring one's own region"

	Honam	Yungnam
Efforts	100.0	13.8
Political system	0.0	65.8
Others	0.0	18.4
Don't know	0.0	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(4)	(52)

Actual question: "If you think that the benefit of national policies is favorably distributed to your region, compared to other region, to what are you going to attribute it?"

X^2 = 171.69861 D. F. = 3 Significance = .0

C. C. = .43091

Interestingly enough, as indicated in Table 2-14, about two-thirds of the 152 Yungnam respondents (65.8 %) attributed their advantaged economic position to political considerations favoring Yungnam, and the remaining 32.2 percent mentioned "their efforts" or "semething else."

On the other hand, only a small fraction of the Honam respondents (4 in number) who judged the wealth to be distributed in favor of their region,

all attributed it to their efforts (see Table 2-14). Among the 31 Yungnam respondents who said that the Honam people have enjoyed the benefit of modernization programs more than the Yungnam people, as Table 2-13 shows, about half of them attributed their disadvantaged economic position to "the problem of political system" weighted in favor of Honam, and the remaining 41.9 percent indicated "the lack of their efforts" or "something else."

To summarize the findings regarding the distribution of the wealth, large majorities of the Honam citizens judged wealth to be concentrated in the Yungnam region. Moreover, most of them attributed such economic imbalances to political considerations favoring Yungnam and hardly anyone of them blamed themselves. Yungnam citizens are in some sense at the opposite extreme. Nearly half of them viewed that the Honam and Yungnam people received equal economic rewards. Even among Yungnam citizens who acknowledged that wealth is uneqally distributed in favor of their region, the cause for it was split into "political considerations favoring Yungnam," on the one hand, and "their efforts," or "something else," on the other hand It suggests, then, that Yungnam citizens are unwilling to acknowledge they are advantaged in national policies.

Next, we are concerned with how individuals view their home town in relation to "success in life." The two "success in life" items are based on a 5-point scale which ranges from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." When first asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "I can be promoted to a high social position, if I have ability," a large number of the Yungnam

citizens (54.8%) suspected that all careers are open to ability. It was 45.4 percent for the Honam sample (Table 2-15).

Table 2-15: "Confidence in advancement"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	26.8	33.5
Agree	18.6	21.3
So and so	13.0	13.6
Disgree	30.5	26.3
Strongly disagree	10.9	4.0
Don't know	0.3	1.3
Total	100.1	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 19.39303 D. F. = 5 Significance = .0016
C. C. = .15845

Negative responses have been more frequently expressed in Honam than Yungnam. Roughly 41 percent of the Honam citizens, as opposed to about 30 percent of the Yungnam citizens, responded negatively to the item, implying that for them, more than ability, perhaps, one's native place, is required in rising in the world. The results of our survey indicate, then, that more Yungnam citizens than the Honam people tended to view that they could rise to a high social position through ability, implicitly denying the importance of one's native place in career advancement.

More interesting results are observable in a follow-up question which

clearly touches the core of the implication that a home town might have for the success in life. Respondents were straight-forwardly asked how importantly they view their home town in the success in life. As may be seen in Table 2-16, whereas large majorities of the Honam citizens (74.8 %) recognized that one's home town is important in rising in the world, only 21.8 percent of the Yungnam citizens did so.

Table 2-16: "The importance of native place"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	35.8	8.5
Agree	39.0	13.3
So and so	6.4	17.6
Disagree	14.1	40.2
Strongly disagree	4.8	19.9
Don'k know	0.0	0.5
Total	100.1	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 214.90133 D. F. = 5 Sig = 0
C. C. = .47120

Looking at the other side of the coin, a large number of Yungnam citizens (60.1 %) clearly denied the importance of native place, implying that ability is all it takes to make someone a success in this world. Conversely, only 18.9 percent of the 377 Honam respondents disapproved of one's home town as a determinant in attaining distinction. In short, more Honam citizens

than the Yungnam citizens tended to regard native place as important in making one's way in life.

The next question to be posed is whether Honam people's pessimistic views and Yungnam people's optimistic views are just rooted in the personal experiences of individuals who make up each region or they are due to differences in social structure. We will see what will happen after demographic variables such as educational attainment, sex, age, and types of residence, are controlled for. The results are reported in Chart 2-1 and 2-2. The two charts tell the same story about relations between demographic variables and the "confidence in career advancement" item, on the one hand, and the "importance of native place" item, on the other: Overall, demographic variables within regions are not shown to be significantly associated with each "success in life" item.

Chart 2-1, which shows the effects of each demographic variable, reveals, on the whole, the similarity of trends of regional differences which were manifested before controls were introduced.

Chart 2-2 displays persistent and enormous regional differences even after controlling for the third variables. The initially observed differences did not decrease in size at all when variations due to demographic variables have been taken into account. What it suggests is that a region itself does exert direct influence upon the "importance of native place" item.

Chart 2-1: "Confidence in career advancement"
(percent disagreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Chart 2-2: "Importance of native place"
(percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Also, our survey contains one related item concerning the problem which the citizens of each region regard as the most important facing the nation. When asked to identify the most important problem facing the nation, a large number of respondents in the Honam and Yungnam region mentioned "political development" (58.9 % vs 44.1%) (See Table 2-17). The Honam citizens listed "political development" more often than their Yungnam counterparts, with about a 15 percent difference. The issue of "national security" received the next largest proportion of identification in both regions, which constituted 30.0 percent of the Honam sample and 38.8 percent of the Yungnam sample. Only a small fraction of the respondents indicated "economic development" as the most important problem facing their community, implying that the economic development issue is no longer a nation-wide concern.

Table 2-17: "Policy priority"

	Honam	Yungnam
Political development	58.9	44.1
National security	30.0	38.8
Economic development	5.3	12.8
Others	2.1	1.6
Don't know	3.7	2.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 24.76759$ D. F. = 4 Significance = .0001
Cramer S V = .18136

It would be interesting to note that the order of the issues respondents consider important remains the same in both regions; political development, national security, and economic development in descending order. Yet the two regions differ in the relative frequencies of response. More Honam respondents (58.9 %) than the Yungnam people (44.1 %) mentioned "political development" as the most important issue facing their country, implying that the realization of democracy is an overriding concern for many Honam people.

On the other hand, Honam citizens (30.0 %) reported "national security" to be an important problem facing the country less frequently than the Yungnam citizens (38.8 %). "Economic develpment"received the least reference from both regions. In short, political differences between the two regions are reflected in policy priorities. Honam people regard "political democracy" as the most imminent and important issue to be pursued. Meanwhile, Yungnam people consider "national security" to be important as much as "political democracy."

What the foregoing analyses suggest is that a region in which people live acts as a crucial variable in influencing their political perceptions. Thus inter-regional strife between Honam and Yungnam may be viewed as a consequence of different perceptions unique to each region, reinforced by the presence of objective conditions as a result of the dynamic process of uneven progress.

4. Emergence of regional group consciousness

So far we have tried to identify structural conditions as well as psychological ones for the maintenance of territorial politics in Korea. Marked and persistent regional differences provide the potential for the emergence of regional group identity. Our survey contains a battery of items covering regional identity--how citizens feel about their native place. Four items were constructed to measure different sentimental outlooks on citizen's native place. Each item was based on a 5-point scale which ranges from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree."

Respondents were first asked regarding their feelings regarding traditions specific to their region, Yungnam or Honam. As may be seen in Table 2-18, a majority in each region agreed to the statement: "I am proud of traditional culture and ceremonies specific to my native place. 60.2 percent of the Honam citizens answered "strongly agree," and an additional 19.6 percent answered "agree." It was 44.1 percent and 31.4 percent for the Yungnam sample, respectively. Respondents who did not feel proud of the traditions constituted only 7.7 percent of the Honam people and 8.7 percent of the Yungnam people. The results suggest, then, that the citizens in each region are very proud of traditions unique to each region. Some discernible regional differences, however, could be observed in terms of the intensity of regional identification. More Honam respondents (60.2 %) than the Yungnam respondents (44.1 %) answered "strongly agree," indicating that the Honam citizens' feelings of regional identity are

stronger in intensity than their Yungnam counterparts.

Table 2-18: "Pride of tradition"

(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	60.2	44.1
Agree	19.6	31.4
So and so	12.5	15.2
Disagree	7.4	7.4
Strongly disagree	0.3	1.3
Don't know	0.0	0.5
Total	100.0	99.9
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 25.17845$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0001
C. C. = .17988

Next, we are going to examine the tendency toward regional loyalty. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "I will not emigrate to any other provinces, although I may be badly off in my native place." Table 2-19 tells that large majorities of the respondents in each region exhibited a strikingly felt sense of regional identification. 85.7 percent of the Honam citizens said that they would remain in Honam, although they might not make a good living there, and 84.4 percent of the Yungnam citizens did the same.

The proportion of respondents who reported that they would leave their region if they were badly off in their place of residence is very low in both regions. It was 7.7 percent for the Honam citizens and 9.3 percent of the

Yungnam citizens. Although the Honam and Yungnam citizens showed an equally high tendency toward regional loyalty, they could be differentiated in term of the strength of agreement responses. The "strongly agree" responses have been more frequently expressed in Honam (76.9 %) than Yungnam (66.0%). It follows, then, that feelings of regional loyalty were more strong in Honam than Yungnam.

Table 2-19: "Regional loyalty"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly Agree	76.9	66.0
Agree	8.8	18.4
So and So	6.4	5.6
Disagree	6.6	8.5
Strongly Disagree	1.1	0.8
Don't Know	0.3	0.8
Total	100.1	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 18.18590 D. F. = 5 Significance = .0027
C. C. = .15356

Next, respondents were asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "I am proud of being born in my native place (Honam or Yungnam region). As may be seen in Table 2-20, 73.2 percent of the Honam respondents said "strongly agree," and additional 8.8 percent said "agree ." It was 63.6 percent and 18.9 percent for the Yungnam respondents, respectively. To be sure, most of the citizens in each region appeared to be proud of being

born in their region.

Table 2-20: "Pride in being born in the native place"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	73.2	63.6
Agree	8.8	18.9
So and so	11.9	11.7
Disagree	4.5	4.5
Strongly disagree	1.6	0.5
Don't know	0.0	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 21.55281$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0006
C. C. = .16681

Barely more than 6 percent of the Honam respondents and only 5 percent of the Yungnam respondents thought it a shame to be born in their place of residence. A high sense of pride of the native place proved to be prevalent in both regions. Yet, as an about 10 percent discrepancy between two regions in the frequency of "strongly agree" tells, the feelings of pride were more intensive in Honam than Yungnam.

Finally, we are going to touch on the degree of hesitation to identify citizens' native place to strangers. As shown in Table 2-21, the propotion of respondents who reported that "I talk proudly about my native place" is extremely high in both regions. It was 92.3 percent for the Honam sample

and 92.1 percent for the Yungnam sample. Only around 3 percent of the Honam and Yungnam respondents were observed to feel some hesitation in identifying their native places to others.

Table 2-21: "Non-Hesitation to identify the native place"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	82.8	74.5
Agree	9.5	17.6
So and so	4.5	5.1
Disagree	3.2	2.4
Strongly disagree	0.0	0.5
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 13.09161 D. F. = 4 Significance = .0108
C. C. = .13072

Thus, citizens in both regions appeared to be strongly identified with their region. As in three preceding "regional identity" items, they could be differentiated in terms of the intensity of feelings. The regional group consciousness was stronger in Honam than Yungnam, as evidenced in the different frequency of "strongly agree" responses (It was 82.8 percent for the Honam sample and 74.5 percent for the Yungnam sample).

Reviewing the results in Table 5-18 to 5-21, two important conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, the citizens of each region showed a remarkably strong sense of regional identity. Large majorities of respondents

answered "strongly agree" or "agree" to all dimensions we have considered.

Secondly, the strength of the sense of regional identity was more intense in Honam than Yungnam. More Honam respondents than the Yungnam respondents tended to answer "strongly agree" rather than "agree." Such regional differences in terms of intensity of feelings are, as may be seen in Chart 2-3 to 2-7, still valid even after controlling for education.[67] Most of the results are, however, shown to be not statistically significant, due to the small sample size comprising each educational category. Two exceptions occur for the lowest educational category of Chart 2-4, and the 10 to 12 year of schooling group of Chart 2-5. In those two cases, the original regional differences almost disappear, but the results are not statistically significant. The results suggest, then, that, regardless of education, regional loyalty is high in both regions with stronger feelings of identity in Honam, implying that citizens in both regions are inclined to exaggerate their region's positions. More interesting is the finding that Honam citizens, despite the objective evidence of the highest migration rate in the nation, were unwilling to admit the attractiveness of other provinces, as may be seen in Table 2-19 and Chart 2-4 in particular.

It would be also interesting to note that the proportion of respondents who answered "strongly agree" is lowest consistently for the highest educated persons, except for "Non-hesitation to identify the native place" item, implying that primordial ties to home are not that strong for the high-educated.

Chart 2-3: "Pride of tradition"



Chart 2-4: "Regional loyalty"

(Percent strongly agreeing)



Chart 2-5: "Pride in being born in the native place"



Chart 2-6: "Non-Hesitation to identify the native place"



(Percent strongly agreeing)

Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

It seems clear that a potential for the creation and maintenance of territorial politics has been uncovered, despite some limitations due to the absence of more direct items covering regional identity. Such regional attitudes would not necessarily bring about dysfunctional consequences with respect to national integration. Interregional strife, however, will be more likely to occur when citizens display such an inflated in-group consciousness.

An important question should be raised at this point: What impacts does such a strong regional identity have upon the operation of the political system? It is anticipated that a strong regional group consciousness might influence citizens' attitudes toward the political system. It is the ultimate concern of this study to examine the extent to which the two regions differ in the judgment as to the operation of three different political objects--the political community, the regime, and the authorities. This topic is covererd in the next three chapters.

Endnotes

1 For details, see Talcott Parsons, Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), P.21-25; See also Richard P. Applebaum, Theories of Social Change (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), P. 36-59.

2 The key-stones of Tonnies system are the concepts or ideal types, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, which are based primarily upon natural will and rational will. Tonnies calls "all kinds of associations in which natural will predominates, *Gemeinschaft*," and all those which are formed and "fundamentally conditioned by rational will, *Gesellschaft*." For more information, see Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society, ed. and trans., Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963). Pye summarizes Tonnies' view as follows: "...human relations in the *Gemeinschaft* (community) form of association were highly affective, emphasizing the non-rational, emotional dimensions of the "natural will" of man which have their clearest expression in the intimate feelings of kinship, comradeship and neighborliness, while relations in the *Gesellschaft* (society) form of association were affectively neutral and emphasized the rational capacities of man by which he is able, first, to isolate and distinguish his goals of action, and then to employ, impersonaly and deliberatedly, contractual arragements (so as to satisfy his values)." For more information, see Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, P. 34.

3 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Trans. T. Parsons and A. M. Henderson (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1964), P. 341.

4 On the other hand, Maine and Lowie were concerned with the relations between individuals and territory as a primitive unit of social organization. They conceived physical locality as one of the essential links among disparate individuals. See Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London: Murray, 1861), Chapter 5.; Also see Robert H. Lowie, The Origin of the State (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927).

5 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964), P. 187.

6 For more information , see Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), P. 162-238: See also Stein Rokkan, "Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ed., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967).

7 Generally speaking, people in peripheral regions are mainly engaged in primary occupations such as fishing and agriculture, whereas those in central regions are engaged in more secondary (manufacturing) and especially more tertiary (service) occupations. Thus per capita income is lower in peripheral regions than in cental regions.

8 For a reference, see Michael Hetcher, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British Naional Development, 1536-1966 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), P. 6-8.

9 V. I. Lenin was the first writer to use this notion in an empirical investigation of national development. For a reference, see V. I. Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia (Moscow: 1956), P. 172-77. This model was mainly used to account for the experiences of Latin American regions. For details, see A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

10 Hetcher, op cit., P. 9-10.

11 Although the Yungnam region has been said to benefit more in national economic policies than the Honam region, whether Yungnam's economic capacity has been to control Honam so as to ensure high specialization in Honam, remains yet to be seen. Unfortunately, the degree of industrial specialization is not obtainable from the available data.

[12] Rupert B. Vance, Region," in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 13 (1968), P. 377-78. A sociological view of regions and regionalism was long a major interest at the University of North Carolina. For more information, see Howard Odum, An American Epoch (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930); The Regional Aproach to National Social Planning (New York: Foreign Policy Association and Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1935); Southern Regions of the United States (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936); and with Harry Estill Moore, American Regionalism (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938).

[13] Robert E. Dickinson, Regional Ecology: The Study of Man's Environment (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), P. 41.

[14] According to our definition, the Middle region, including the Seoul Metropolitan Area, KungKi, ChungCheong, KangWon Provinces, can not constitute a region. There are no homogeneous cultural, political, or economic attributes in it. Nontheless, We will regard it as a region to differentiate the remainder of Korea from Honam and Yungnam.

[15] For more information, see R. Herberle, "Regionalism: Some Critical Observations," Social Forces, 21 (1943), P. 280-86; See also Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider, and Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14 (1972), P. 328-350.

[16] For details, see Harold H. Kelley, "Two Functions of Reference Groups," in Herbert H. Hyman & Eleanor Singer (eds.), Readings in Reference Group Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1968), P. 77-83.

[17] The linkages between an individual and his reference group can be divided as follows. The first is multiple-membership reference group. In such a complex society, no one can be wholly absorbed into one group. An individual in a social system is located at the intersection of a variety of groups, whether they are religious, social, economic, or political organizations. The equilibrium of the individual consists of adjustments on a large number of institutionalized groups to which he

belongs. "Mutually sustaining reference groups tend to foster similar attitudes and behaviors while conflicting reference groups work at cross purposes." The second is non-membership reference group. Individuals sometimes orient themselves to groups other than their own. Non-membership groups tend to be taken as a reference group where the social system is fluid and open in terms of social mobility. In closed system, individuals tend to confine their comparison to the other members of their group or neighboring social stratra. In an open society, conversely, the positive orientation to the non-membership group serves to prepare the individuals for the future status in their status-sets. The third is negative reference groups. Even those who do not belong to a group can be influenced by the position a certain group takes. A positive reference group involves motivated assimilation of the norm of the group or the standard of the group as a reference point; A negative reference group involves motivated rejection of the norms, not merely non-acceptance of the norms, but the formulation of a counter-norm. In a word, obstensibly individual opinions and behaviors are primarily social in nature. They are the norms of the groups to which be belongs, wishes to belong, or even rejects. For more detailed discussion, see Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), especialy P. 302-303; See also Michael Hooper, "A Multivariate Approach to the Measurement and Analysis of Social Identity," Psychological Reports, 57 (1985), especially P. 323.

18 For details, see David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), P. 225-229.

19 Mildred A. Schwartz, Politics and Territory: The Sociology of Regional Persistence in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Quee's University Press, 1974), P. 9-10.

20 Ibid., P. 5.

21 Ibid., P. 5.

22 Ibid., P. 17-18.

[23] A. B. Birch, Political Integration and Disintegration in the British Isles (London: George Allen & Unwin,1977), P. 32.

[24] For a reference, see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces (Stanford, Calif.; Stanford University Press, 1958), P. 16.

[25] Myron Weiner comments upon several definitions of integration and the importance of five types: National integration, territorial integration, value integration, elite-mass integration, and integrative behavior. For more information, see Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Political Modernization (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), P. 180-96.

[26] James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), P. 9. They substitute the term territorial integration for political integration. On the other hand, they use political integration to refer to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap.

[27] A. H. Birch, op. cit., P. 34.

[28] Ibid., P. 41.

[29] Karl Deutch, for instance, has emphasized the importance of communication and social interaction between citizens in promoting social and political integration. For more discussion, see Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953).

[30] For more information, Joseph Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), Chapter 2 & 3; See also Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (New York: Free Press, 1955).

[31] Moon-Suk Ko, "The Study of the Regional Consciousness of Koreans," (Hankookin-eui Chiyuk-Euisik-eoi dae-han Cheongchisajeog Goechal)

Journal of Social Science Studies, 4 (1985), P. 4.; See also Man-Kil Kang, "Politically Alienated and Economically Exploited," (Kwonryuk-sun Soeoi-si-ki-go Kyoungjeijeog-eu-ron Suetal) Yeio-Hyang, 12 (September 1985), P. 51.

32 The border castle of Koguryo is almost the same as the boundary of North Korea. Also, the Yungnam region is situated in the territory of Shilla, and the Honam region is situated in almost the same territory as Paekche.

33 For details, see Bok-Ryong Shin, "The Social Change after the Battle among the Three Kingdoms," (Samkook-Chunjaeng eihoo-eui Sahwoi-Byundong) in Korean Politics (Seoul: Bak-Yung Inc., 1984), P. 86.

34 For a reference, see Ki-Baek Lee, Nation and History (Minjok-Kwa Yuksa) (Seoul: Iljogak, 1978), P. 86.

35 For more information, see Seong-Do Park, Distortion of Korean History (Hankooksa-eui Woaikok) (Seoul: Min-Ji Inc., 1982), P. 16-17.

36 Some scholars regard the era of the Unified Shilla Dynasty as the origin of regionalism both in name and reality. For a reference, see Li-Hwa Lee, Factions in Korea (Hankook-eui Pabeol) (Seoul: Uo-Moon-Gak, 1984), P. 43.

37 Ibid., P. 11.

38 Since the latter half of the ninth century, the crisis of Shilla society, caused by many social problems, constantly became so serious as to be uncontrollable by any means. Local warlords united themselves into a union for defensive purposes, but this union soon grew into a strong anti-government force. Kyon-Hown, a warlord in the Honam region, rose against the government. In 892, he put the whole of the Honam region under his control, and called himself the king of Later-Paekche. In the meantime, Kung Ye, a bandit leader in Kangwon Province also rebelled, and founded the Kingdom of Later-Koguryo in 901. But he was killed by Wang-Kon and Wang-Kon changed the kingdom's name to Koryo. Thus, the Unified Shilla, Later-Paekche, and Koryo constituted an era of

the Later-Three Kingdoms.

39 The Southern part of Keum River encompasses part of Chungcheong Provinces, and the whole Honam region of today.

40 For details, see Jung-Hyun Song, "The Historical Reasons for Honam's Falling Behind," (Honam-Chibang-eui Yuksajeog Nakhoo-Yoin) Journal of Study on Regional Development of ChunNam University, (Chiyuk-Kaebal-Yunkoo) 6 (1971), P. 23-40.

41 Poong-Su-Ji-Ri-Sul is a belief that man, society, and nation's fate are determined by its geological condition. According to this belief, the people from the Southern part of Keum River were believed to be apt to revolt against present authority, that is, Wang Kon's Kingdom.

42 For the prejudice against the Honam people, see Jin-Sook Lee, "Stereo-type about the Character of People from Eight Different Provinces of Korea," (Paldoin Seonggyuk-eoi dae-han Seonib-Kwannyum) Sa-Sang Gae (December 1959), P. 74-87. For a criticism on stereo-type about the character of Honam people, see Il-Baek Chang,"Absurd Remarks about Honam People," (Heosang-eu-ro Geurin Mangeon-deul) Yeoi-Huang, 12 (September 1985), P. 74-78.

43 The North-West region almost corresponds to today's North Korea.

44 Factionalism among contending groups for power was prevalent after the middle of Yi Dynasty. Factionalism, in terms of political rivalry among the literai class, began during the reign of Sonjo (A.D. 1567-1608) in the Yi Dynasty. In 1575, during the early years of Sonjo, a conflict erupted between the two faction--Tongin (the "Easterners") and Soin (the "Westerners")--over a government personnel appointment. The two factions clashed again over the investment of the crown prince in 1591. At the 24th year of King Sonjo, a split occurred among the Easterners over this issue which gave rise to Namin (the "Southerners") who took a conciliatory position and Pukin (the "Northerners") who strongly opposed the position taken by the Easterners. Meanwhile, Soin (the "Westerners") put Injo (A. D. 1623-1649) on the throne successfully, and thus took political power. Soin then split into two political groups,

Noron (the "Old Doctrine") and Soron (the"New or Young Doctrine"), about A. D. 1680. These four groups, the Tongin, Soin, Noron, and Soron are now called the four major factions. For a discussion of factionalism in the Yi Dynasty, see Woon-Tae Kim, Administrative History of the Yi's Choson Dynasty, (Eissi-Chosun-eui Haengcheongsa) P. 359-365.

45 Kim Yu, Lee Ki, and other people of the Soin group expelled the 15th King Kwang-Hae-Koon and put Injo on the throne successfuly at A. D. 1623. This court-coup is called Injo-Banjung.

46 For a reference, see HongKi Choi, "The Study on the Social Characteristics of Citizens from Taegu," (Taegu-Shimin-eui Sahwoijeog Seong Kyuk-eoi Kwanhan Yunkoo) Administrative Policy Study, (Haengjeong Jeongchaek Yunkoo) 2 (1968).

47 For details, see Man-Kil Kang, op. cit., P. 52.

48 Yong-Mo Kim, The Study of Choson Ruling Class (Chosun Chibaecheung-eoi dae-han Yunkoo) (Seoul: Iljogak, 1977), P. 184-187.

49 Pyongan and Hamgyong constitute the Northern part of Korea.

50 For a reference, see Man-Heum Kim, The Study of Regional Conflicts in Korean Society, with Special References to Inter-regional Strife between Honam and Yungnam (Hankook Sahwoi Chiyuk Galdeung Yunkoo) (Seoul: Research Institute of Modern Society, 1987), P. 11.

51 For a reference, see Moon-Suk Ko, op. cit.

52 Ibid. Regional strains between the Southerners and Northerners became somewhat serious, especially because Lee Seung-Man, the first President of the R.O.K., put Northerners in important positions of his government.

53 For details, see Li-Hwa Lee, op. cit., P. 176.

54 For more information on the prejudice against the Honam people in the recruitment process in the Unified Shilla Dynasty, see Bu-Sik Kim, A Chronicle of 'the era of the Three Kingdms.' (Samkook-Saki) trans.,

Jong-Kwon Kim (Seoul: Dae-Yang Co., 1972), P. 237.

55 For more information, see Suk-Nam Moon, "Study of Regional Differences and Conflicts, with Special Reference to Relations between Honam and Yungnam," (Chiyuk Gyukcha-woa Galdeung-eoi Kwan-han Yunkoo) Korean Journal of Sociology, 18 (Winter 1984), P. 190.

56 For details, see Man-Kil Kang, op. cit., P. 51.

57 For detailed information, see Joon-Ho Song, Honam in the Yi Dynasty (Yicho Sidae-eui Chonlado) (Chunju: Chun-Book University Press, 1971), P. 8-10; See also Jung-Hyun Song, op. cit., P. 23-40.

58 For more information on economic exploitation in the Koryo and Yi Dynasties, see Man-Kil Kang, op. cit.; See also Jung-Hyun Song, op. cit.

59 Suk-Nam Moon, op cit. P. 191.

60 For a reference, see Man-Heum Kim, op. cit., P. 50.

61 For a rererence, see Jung-Hyun Song, op. cit., P. 30.

62 Some scholars contend that regional conflicts between the Honam and Yungnam regions dates back to 'the era of the Three Kingdoms.' For a reference, see Ki-Baek Lee, op. cit., P. 86. Although this may partly explain the conflicts between the two regions, this may not be regarded as the main factor in accounting for today's regional conflicts between the two regions.

63 For instance, it was impossible to obtain the number of military generals from Honam and Yungnam, respectively. Taking into acccount the fact that the military has played a crucial role in Korean politics, the regional background of generals would be a key factor in determining regional imbalances.

64 Primary industry is composed of primitive industry such as agriculture

and fishery. Secondary industry refers to manufacturing industry. Tertiary industry is usually called service industry, composed of transportation, insurance, banking, and the like.

65 In addition, they are appointed politically by the President of South Korea. It is natural, then, to expect that political considerations intervene in the recruitment process.

66 In Korean politics, it is the military, rather than the bureaucracy, which have enormous and powerful impact on the operation of the government. It was impossible to obtain any data indicating geographical patterns of recruitment for generals. However, it is common-place to Koreans to assume that most of the important positions in the military has been occupied by people from Yungnam.

67 Education seems to be most important variable in influencing feelings of regional identity. Decreasing education tends to increase the intensity of regional identity, for ties of loyalty are most prevalent among the low-educated.

Chapter III. The impact of regionalism upon orientations toward the regime and authorities

In this chapter we are concerned with the influence of regionalism as it relates to the regime and authorities; specifically, how citizens from each region evaluate and respond to the basic authority structure of the regime and those who occupy roles in the regime (collectively, the political authorities), focusing on trust. Also, we are concerned with how individuals in each region internalize into their belief systems democratic regime norms. These democratic norms specify the way in which members of a political system are expected to behave in a democratic political system. Democratic norms to be considered in this study are as follows; political efficacy, political information and concern, political participation, and tolerance. Briefly speaking, in most democratic systems, the members are expected to be politically efficacious, to be informed about and interested in, politics, to be relatively active in actual political practices, and to be tolerant to even the nonconformists standing outside of the mainstream of political and social life. The detailed rationale of the selection of each of the norms is given in a section dealing with that norm.

1. Political trust

Political trust is an individual's positive "evaluative or affective orientation toward the government,"[1] and thus relates to an assessment of

government output. Cynicism, the opposite of trust, is the critical or negative evaluation of government and politics. According to one analyst:

> The dimension of trust runs from high trust to high distrust or political cynicism. Cynicism thus refers to the degree of negative affect toward the government and is a statement about the belief that the government is not functioning and producing outputs in accord with individual expectations.[2]

Then, levels of political trust are indication of how well government is perceived to be performing. Without a mimimum level of political trust it is doubtful that a political system would long persist.

Political trust toward a regime itself and toward political authorities, although interrelated, should be differentiated. As Gamson puts it, "It is possible for individuals simultaneously to feel high confidence in political institutions and alienation toward the incumbents who man them."[3]

Political trust, along with political efficacy, has frequently appeared in discussions of political participation. Low political trust, combined by low political efficacy, might lead to apathy or withdrawal from politics, on the one hand, but combined with high political efficacy, might lead to unconventional or radical patterns of political behavior, on the other.[4]

Four items tapping political trust are explored for our survey: Three of them relate to the operations of governmental institutions, which involve an evaluation of the functioning of the Congress and the Government; the remaining one relates to the performance of political authorities. The "trust" items are based on a 5-point scale, and the response categories of an item are as follows; "strongly agree," "agree," "so and so," "disagree," and

"strongly diagree."

The respondents were first asked whether on the whole, the decisions made by the national government are right. The proportion of respondents with positive evaluation of governmental decisions, as may be seen in Table 3-1, are relatively low in both regions. Only 14.3 percent of the Honam sample and 16.5 percent of the Yungnam sample said that the decisions of the national government are right.

Table 3-1: "Government decisions are right."
(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	2.4	3.7
Agree	11.9	12.8
So and so	27.3	39.6
Disagree	39.3	30.6
Strongly disagree	18.8	9.3
Don't know	0.3	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 38.19639$ D.F. = 5 Signifiance = .0000
Contingency coefficient (C. C.) = .21972

Looking at the opposite side of the coin reveals a quite different story; negative responses have been more frequently expressed in Honam than in Yungnam. Roughly about six out of ten Honam citizens (58.1 %), as opposed to four out of ten Yungnam citizens (39.9 %), responded negatively

to the item. Such a remarkable and important regional difference in terms of the frequency of critical responses is due to the different proportion of respondents who remained neutral in the evaluation of the operation of the government. It was 39.6 percent for the Yungnam sample and 27.3 percent for the Honam sample

Overall, political cynicism, the opposite of trust, is, as compared with Yungnam, more widespread in Honam. Such a marked and important regional difference is observed when the responses to other items of political trust are examined.

Respondents were next asked to evaluate the veracity of the reports released by the government. Table 3-2 reveals how two regions differ in judging the credibility of governmental reports. More than half of the Honam citizens doubted the truth of the reports, whereas about one-third of the Yungnam citizens were negative in the evaluation.

Table 3-2: "Credibility of government reports"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	8.0	8.0
Agree	14.9	22.9
So and so	22.3	30.3
Disagree	34.0	25.5
Strongly disagree	21.0	10.6
Don't know	0.0	2.7
Total	100.2	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 38.23516$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0000
C. C. = .21983

Notes: In this and subsequent tables, other than 100.0 % in total percentages are due to rounding errors.

On the other hand, 22.9 percent of the Honam sample were found to be trusting of government reports. It was 30.9 percent for the Yungnam sample. On the whole, negative responses were expressed more frequently in each region than positive ones. However, in terms of credibility of government reports, the Yungnam people, compared with the Honam people, were found out to be more in support of the government.

Respondents were then asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "The Congress reflects the will of the people correctly." Table 3-3 tells the same story: the Yungman citizens were inclined to be more trusting of the activities of the Congress as a spokeman of public opinion, as compared with the Honam citizens. Only 10.9 percent of the Honam sample appeared, as opposed to 22.1 percent of the Yungnam sample, to evaluate the Congress positively in the performance of the task.

Looking at the negative responses, 73.2 percent of the 377 Honam respondents were negative in their evaluation of the Congress in its efforts to reflect public opinion in decision processes. The 376 Yungnam respondents chose this category about 20 percent less frequently. In short, the evaluation of the Congress was strikingly negative in both regions. Nonetheless, a marked and important regional variation was observed again.

Table 3-3: "The Congress as a spokeman of public opinion"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	2.7	3.2
Agree	8.2	18.9
So and so	15.4	21.8
Disagree	46.9	40.2
Strongly disagree	26.3	13.6
Don't know	0.5	2.4
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 41.85665 D. F. = 5 Significance = .0000
C. C. = .22948

We now turn to the attitudes of citizens from each region toward government officials. This item relates to the evaluation of office-holders, rather than governmental institutions.

When asked to evaluate the activities of politicians as spokesmen of public interests, Yungnam respondents gave members of Congress relatively higher ratings on performance than their Honam counterparts (Table 3-4). A relatively large number of the Honam respondents (69.5 %) said that the politicians worked generally for their own interests at the cost of interests of ordinary people. Under 60 percent of the Yungnam respondents (59.5 %) were negative in the evaluation of the activities of the politicians as a protector of public interest.

Table 3-4: "The activities of the politicians as a spokeman of public interest"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	4.2	7.7
Agree	10.9	13.0
So and so	15.1	17.0
Disagree	39.3	40.4
Strongly disagree	30.2	19.1
Don't know	0.3	2.7
Total	100.0	99.9
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 21.77118$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0006
C. C. = .16763

Looking at the opposite side of the story, a small number of the Honam sample (15.1 %) chose the positive response. It was 20.7 percent for the Yungnam sample. The results of Table 3-4 suggest that relative to Yungnam, feelings of cynicism are prevalent in Honam.

Reviewing results in Table 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4, several conclusions may be drawn. First of all, the analysis of each item covering political trust consistently reveals that support for the regime and political authorities was low in Yungnam as well as in Honam. However, Yungnam people appeared, as compared with Honam people, less cynical in terms of the average frequency with which they selected critical responses. It suggests, then, that compared to Honam, generally supportive attitudes toward the regime and political authorities were stronger in Yungnam.

Such a pro-government sentiment in Yungnam might be due to widespread appreciation of Yungnam's advantaged position by its citizens. In contrast, the Honam citizens consistently displayed more cynicism. Such an antiregime sentiment, possibly rooted in the Honam citizens' grievances about Honam's disadvantaged position in the national politics, became an important part of the political orientations shared by them.

It is very interesting to note that there exists a remarkable difference in the evaluation of the executive and the legislative. It turns out that the citizens from each region gave the government (the administration) relatively higher ratings on performance than they did the Congress and the politicians. It suggests, then, that the legislative branch is more discredited in its role as a spokeman of public interests or public opinion than the executive branch.

The question may be posed at this point: Why do the Honam people appear to have developed the perspectives and attitudes so different from their Yungnam counterparts? It could be argued that independently of region, the different composition of the regional populations has caused the particular political orientations, feelings of cynicism in this case, unique to each region. Sex composition, educational attainment, age composition, and types of residence are all known to be closely associated with political trust.[5] We will see whether the patterns observed in the foregoing analyses are still valid even after controlling for these third variables.

As shown in Chart 3-1, all the demographic variables considered are found to be closely related to confidence in governmental decisions. In

each region, citizens with higher educational background are likely to be more cynical of the government than those with lower educational background; those living in urban areas tend to be unsupportive of governmental institutions relative to rural citizens; the younger are more inclined to display cynical attitudes toward the government than the older; and men are slightly more likely to express the critical responses than women.

However, what is striking in Chart 3-1 is the persistent and sharp differences between the Honam and Yungnam regions even after controlling for the third variables. When controls are introduced, the initially observed differences between the two regions does not decrease in size at all but the original differences are retained. All of these facts indicate that region itself does exert direct influence upon confidence in governmental decision.

The relations between four demographic characteristics and the credibility of the government reports, as Chart 3-2 shows, are basically the same as those found in Chart 3-1, with some exceptions in the case of the Yungnam region. In the Honam region, feelings of cynicism increase with high education, living in urban areas, being a man, and being younger. In the Yungnam region, citizens aged in the thirties appear more likely to exhibit critical attitudes toward the government than those aged in other age categories. Also, the relative frequency of expressing political trust rises somewhat markedly with 7-9 years of schooling.

Chart 3-1: "Decisions are right."
(percent disagreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Chart 3-2: "The credibility of government reports"
(percent disagreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

More important than this is that the original differences between the Honam and Yungnam regions do not change at all even after variations due to demographic variables have been considered. It may be proposed, then, that region has acted as a pivotal catalyzer in influencing its citizens' attitudes toward government reports.

Chart 3-3 tells the same story; The initially observed differences between regions hold, even after controlling for the third variables. One of the exceptions occurs when the effects of education have been considered. The originial difference decreases substantially in size only for the high-educated with more than 12 year educational attainment. The original difference of about 20 percent has been reduced to the half, yet the results are not statistically significant. On the whole, region plays a crucial role in influencing regional variations in the attitudes toward the Congress.

The results of Chart 3-4 are also as expected: the four demographic variables considered in this section show strong correlations with evaluations of politicians as protectors of public interests. It would appear, then, that high cynical attitudes toward the politicians are most marked among the better-educated, rural residents, men, and the young. But, as before, the original differences between the two regions hold regardless of sex, age, education, and types of residence when only the statistically significant results are considered.

Chart 3-3: "The Congress as a spokeman of public opinion"
(percent disagreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Chart 3-4: "The activities of the politicians as a spokeman of public interests" (percent disagreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Now, we move to the question of how an individual evaluates the government in its efforts to realize political democracy in Korea. This evaluative dimension, composed of three items, relates to the regime itself, rather than the authorities.

Respondents were first asked to make a judgment regarding the efforts of the government to pursue democratic principles in the past ten years, putting together such democratic principles as freedom of speech and expression, the liberty to criticize policies, and freedom of assembly and association. Each respondent was allowed to give a maximum of 10 points, indicating the best political situation to a minimum of 0, suggesting the worst situation. The scores received from each respondent were recoded into five categories for the convenience of comparison; "1" comprises 0 and 1 points in raw scores, "2" combines 2 and 3, 4 to 6 are included in "3," "4" emcompasses 7 and 8, and finally "5" comprises 9 and 10 points in raw scores. These recoded scores appear on the left side of Table 3-5, 3-6, and 3-7.

As shown in Table 3-5, Yungnam citizens tended to be, as compared with their Honam counterparts, more positive in their evaluation of democratic rules of the game in the past ten years. Less than one-third of the Honam sample (30.0 %), as opposed to 42.6 percent of the Yungnam sample, expressed highly favorable attitudes toward the management of democratic principles of the past. A large number of respondents remained neutral; 52.0 percent for the Honam sample and 40.2 percent for the Yungnam sample. The proportion of respondents who made a negative judgment regarding the political situation of the past were low in both regions (18.0 % in Honam and

17.2 % in Yungnam).

Table 3-5: "Evaluation of the political situation in the past ten years"

	Honam	Yungnam
1	8.5	9.0
2	9.5	8.2
3	52.0	40.2
4	21.0	24.5
5	9.0	18.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$x^2 = 18.58980$ D. F. = 4 Significance = .0009
Contingency coefficient (C. C.) = .15522

Overall, citizens from each region judged the operations of the government of the past to be neither positive nor negative in terms of the realization of political democracy, with large majorities remaining neutral in the evaluation. Yet a remarkable and important regional difference was observed; the Yungnam citizens were inclined to be more supportive of the government of the past than their Honam counterparts.

Respondents were then asked to evaluate the present political situation in terms of the governmental efforts to extend the basic principles of democracy to the people. As may be seen in Table 3-6, respondents from each region appeared less positive in the evaluation of the present

political situation than they did in the evaluation of the past. Only a small fraction of the Honam sample (16.2 %) judged the present government to be fairly concerned with democratic principles, and 21.6 % of the Yungnam sample did the same. As in the question regarding the past political situation, a relatively large number of Honam and Yungnam respondents remained neutral (43.2 % vs 47.6 %).

Table 3-6: "Evaluation of the present political situation"

	Honam	Yungnam
1	20.2	15.4
2	20.4	15.4
3	43.2	47.6
4	14.1	15.7
5	2.1	5.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 12.69397 D. F. = 4 Significance = . 0129
C. C. = .12876

In contrast, 40.6 percent of the Honam citizens were critical of the present political situation, whereas 30.8 percent of the 376 Yungnam respondents were not in support of the operations of the present government. In terms of the frequency of negative responses, the Honam people exhibited a higher level of cynicism than their Yungnam counterparts. This result corresponds to the findings of "trust" items.

Respondents were finally asked to predict the political situation for the next ten years. Table 3-7 reveals that 57.8 percent of the Honam respondents and 52.4 percent of the Yungnam respondents credit the government in its efforts to realize political democracy in the next ten years. Contrary to the preceding results, slightly more Honam respondents than Yungnam respondents judged the future political situation to be encouraging for democracy of Korea.

Table 3-7: "The prediction of the future political situation"

	Honam	Yungnam
1	13.0	21.3
2	2.9	3.2
3	26.3	23.1
4	27.6	28.7
5	30.2	23.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 11.42026$ D. F. = 4 Significance = .0222
C. C. = .12223

Comparing Table 3-7 to Table 3-5 and 3-6, the respondents in both regions were more positive in the evaluation of the future political situation than they were in the evaluation of the past and present political situation. This would reflect Koreans' long-cherished dream of realizing political democracy.

2. Political efficacy

The first democratic regime norm to be considered is political efficacy. Political efficacy is "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process,"[6] that is, the perceived ability of individuals to influence outcomes of the political process. Thus, it relates to the consequence of one's input. The concept of political efficacy is well articulated by one political scientist.

> The concept of political efficacy is used by students of political behavior to identify a citizen's feelings about the effects of his action on political events. It refers to the person's belief that political and social change can be affected or retarded and that his efforts, alone or in concert with others, can produce desired behavior on the part of political authorities. Efficacy has its origins in social psychology and is closely related to "ego strength," "subjective competence," "self-confidence," and "personal effectiveness." The concept has particular relevance for assessing behavior in democratic systems, where a premium is placed on citizen participation and where there are accessible channels for expressing political needs.[7]

Robert Erikson et al. take the view that the presence of a strong confidence among the people that their participation would be effective in influencing the political process assures that political leaders will act in a responsible fashion.[8] A democratic government is, first of all, a system which responds to the wishes of the electorate. Citizens' strongly felt sense of effectiveness in the political process leads to participation and is one of the key factors in ensuring governmental responsiveness.

Furthermore, govermental responsiveness is one of two requirements thatmake governmental structure democratic.[9] Also, Almond and Verba clearly see a strong sense of political efficacy, along with a strong commitment to the norm of active citizenship, as a key element in forming the desired political culture in a stable democracy.[10]

We use three standard items developed by the Michigan team[11] to measure sense of political efficacy. The three "efficacy" items are, as in the "trust" items, based on a 5-point scale which ranges from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Agreement on each item indicates low efficacy; disagreement indicates a high degree of efficacy.

Let us pay first attention to the "complexity of government" item. When asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can not understand what's going on," 59.4 percent of the Honam respondents agreed, indicating large majorities of the Honam citizens felt relatively powerless in their ability to influence the political process (Table 3-8). It was 38.3 percent for the Yungnam respondents.

Looking at the frequency of disagreement responses, about one-quarter of the Honam respondents and less than one-third of the Yungnam respondents appeared to feel politically efficacious. Also, a considerable number of citizens remained ambivalent in their felt sense of effectiveness in politics by answering "so and so." It was 15.9 percent for the Honam sample and 28.2 percent for the Yungnam sample. The findings regarding "complexity of government" suggest that the feelings of efficacy are more

prevalent in Yungnam than Honam. Such noticeable regional differences are observed when responses to other two "efficacy" items are examined.

Table 3-8: "Complexity of government"
(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	29.7	11.4
Agree	29.7	26.9
So and so	15.9	28.2
Disagree	18.0	25.5
Strongly disagree	6.4	6.4
Don't know	0.3	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 52.38187$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0000
Contingency Coefficient = .25503

Next, turning to the "powerlessness of voters" item, respondents were asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "People like me do not have any say about what the government does." As may be seen in Table 3-9, 45.2 percent of the Yungnam citizens, as opposed to 28.1 percent of the Honam citizens, appeared to be politically efficacious.

Looking at the opposite side of the coin tells the same story: the proportion of respondents who said, "strongly agree" or "agree" is higher in Honam than Yungnam (57.5 % vs 31.9 %). This item ranked last in the frequency of agreement among three "efficacy" items, indicating that citizens in each region felt relatively efficacious on this dimension. Marked

regional differences, however, still appeared on the "power" issue. Yungnam citizens exhibited a higher level of subjective political competence than their Honam counterparts.

Table 3-9: "Powerlessness of voter"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	31.8	11.7
Agree	25.7	20.2
So and so	13.8	21.8
Disagree	20.7	32.4
Strongly disagree	7.4	12.8
Don't know	0.5	1.1
Total	99.9	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 60.09367$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0000
C. C. = .27186

We now turn to the "indifference of government" item. Respondents were asked to agree or disagee to the statement: "I do not think officials care much what people like me think." As Table 3-10 reveals, respondents in each region showed a relatively low sense of efficacy. Almost two-thirds of the Honam citizens (64.2 %) and about four out of ten Yungnam citizens (41.3 %) agreed that "I do not think officials care much what people like me think." It is interesting to note that the proportion of agree responses on this item is higher in both regions than that on the preceding two "efficacy" items. What it suggests is that the issue of "indifference of govenment" is unusually troublesome to a large portion of the citizens in

both regions.

Examining the other side of the story, those who disagreed to this statement constituted only 14.9 percent of the Honam citizens and 26.6 percent of the Yungnam citizens, implying that a small number of citizens in each region were politicallly efficacious. However, the results of Table 3-10 show the same regional variations as observed in the other "efficacy" items. Yungnam citizens tend to have a higher sense of subjective political competence than their Honam counterparts, as manifested by an approximately 23 percent discrepancy in the frequency of agreement responses and a nearly 12 percent difference in the frequency of disagreement responses.

Table 3-10: "Indifference of government"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	30.8	12.8
Agree	33.4	28.5
So and so	20.4	28.5
Disagree	12.5	20.7
Strongly disagree	2.4	5.9
Don't know	0.5	3.7
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 56.77417 D. F. = 5 Significance = .0000
C. C. = .26479

As in the case of political trust, some question arises at this point about

whether such marked and persistent regional differences in political efficacy reflect a general political subculture present in each region, or the regional differences are due to differences between the two regions in social structure. A number of studies undertaken in the U. S. show demographic variables including education, age, sex, and type of residence to be closely associated with feelings of efficacy.[12] Among those variables, education is generally believed to be the most important determinant of political efficacy; feelings of subjective competence grows with higher education. Also, it is generally known that men tend to exhibit higher levels of political efficacy than women; urban citizens have a greater sense of efficacy than their rural counterparts. Age does not show a consistent relationship to a subjective political competence, but it may be very important variable in influencing a sense of political efficacy in Korean politics because of the importance of age in general in Korean society.

We will see whether the regional differences do disappear, or decrease in size, or do not change after demographic variables are controlled for. As may be seen in Chart 3-5, on the high levels of education, one generally finds in both regions a uniformly low proportion who agreed on the "complexity of government" item. It suggests, then, that those having higher educational attainment are more likely to feel politically efficacious. Also, men in each region were shown to be more politically efficacious than women. The young are likely to exhibit higher levels of political efficacy than the old, with some exception in the case of Yungnam. It was found out that persons in their 40s felt the least politically efficacious among the

Chart 3-5: "Complexity of government"
(percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statically significance at the level .05.

age groups. A remarkable and interesting difference was also observed between the urban and rural citizens; urban citizens had a higher sense of subjective political competence than their rural counterparts.

More interesting were the findings that the original differences between the Honam and Yungnam regions did not change even after the effects of demographic variables were controlled for, with one small exception in the case of urban residents. It turned out that the initially observed regional difference of 21.1 percent has been reduced to 15.6 percent, implying that the effect of a region has been contaminated with that of urban residence. What it suggests is that urban residence is one of the most important variables in influencing feelings of subjective political competence. It is also interesting to note that as the level of education decreased, the regional differences increased in size, implying that place of residence became more important in determining the level of political efficacy for persons having lower educational attainment.

Turning next to the "powerlessness of voters" item, the results are by and large as expected. The frequency of agreement was lower in both regions with higher educational attainment, as Chart 3-6 shows, implying that feelings of efficacy are more widespread for the high-educated. The only exception was that Honam citizens having less than 6 year educational attainment were more politically efficacious than those having 7-9 year education. The urban residents in each region tended to feel more politically efficacious than their rural counterparts. Age also proved to be strongly associated with the sense of subjective political competence; the

Chart 3-6: "Powerlessness of voters"
(percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

young were inclined to exhibit a higher level of efficacy than the old. One exception was observed in the case of Honam. Honam citizens over 50 were found out to be the most efficacious next to the youngest generation. Remarkable exceptions occur in relation to sex; Yungnam women were more likely to feel politically efficacious than Yungnam men, and Honam men did not show a higher level of subjective political competence than Honam women.

What is striking in Chart 3-6 is that the original regional differences have not been reduced in size even after variations due to demographic variables have been taken into account. Exceptions occurred where comparison between the two regions for the highest educated persons, and for the oldest persons, considered in this study, were made. The original differences have substantially decreased, yet the results are not statistically significant. Thus, place of residence proved to be a powerful independent determinant of political efficacy.

The results of Chart 3-7 went contrary to our expectations and turned out to be somewhat complicated. First of all, the issue of "indifference of government" was shown to be closely associated neither with educational attainment nor with sex composition. Somewhat strong relations between age and political efficacy did appear in the Yungnam region, but not in the Honam region. In Yungnam, the young were more likely to have a high sense of political efficacy than the old. Honam citizens exhibited an equally low level of subjective political competence throughout all the generations. The relationship between types of residence and political efficacy are reversed;

rural citizens in each region appeared to be more politically efficacious than their urban counterparts. Such unexpected results for the relationship between demographic variables and "indifference of government" might be due to the characteristics of the item. The item, originally designed to measure political efficacy, contains overtones of "political trust" to some extent. The interpretation of the item, then, would vary according to respondents; they would accept it as either the "trust" item or the "efficacy" item. Depending on their interpretation, the results could be quite different.

Regardless of this fact, the original relationship between region and political efficacy remained intact even after demographic variables were controlled for. Two exceptional cases occurred where the comparisons between the Yungnam and Honam regions involved the highest educated persons and the oldest persons. The original regional differences substantially dropped, yet the results are not statistically significant.

Chart 3-7: "Indifference of government"
(percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

3. Political interest and information

In this section, we are concerned with how informed citizens from the Honam and Yungnam regions are about governmental affairs and how interested they are in politics.

The level of interest an individual shows in politics is one of the most important dimensions of democratic regime norms. The importance of political interest in democratic political culture is well pointed out in The Civic Culture.

> We may sssume that if people follow political and governmental affairs, they are in some sense involved in the process by which decisions are made. To be sure, it is a minimal degree of involvement The civic culture, as we use the term, includes a sense of obligation to participate in political input activities, as well as a sense of competence to participate. Following governmental and political affairs and paying attention to politics are limited civic commitments indeed, and yet there would be no civic culture without them.[13]

Also, a democratic citizen is supposed to be well-informed about political affairs. He must understand political issues very well if public opinion is to convey intelligible messages to decision makers. The public can not formulate rational and reasonable opinions without sufficient information.[14] The significant role of political information in creating a democratic political system is emphasized in classical democratic theory. One assumption of classical theory is that citizens, first of all, should be

well informed about public affairs in order to be capable of self-government. When citizens are uninformed, they are less likely to play an active and important role in the political process. Consequently, they are unable to exert the influence necessary to keep their leaders responsible, increasing the likelihood of some type of an authoritarian regime coming into the political stage. In short, the more democratic a society is, the more that society depends on an informed citizenry.

Our survey contains two items relating to political information and another two items relating to political interest. Let us pay our first attention to "political interest." Two measures of political interest are explored for our survey: One is based on the frequency of newspaper reading, and the other is related to the matter of discussing issues with other people.

Respondents were first asked how often they followed accounts of political and governmental affairs reported in the newspaper. As may be seen in Table 3-11, 40.1 percent of the Honam citizens answered either "everyday," or "several times a week," and it was 42.1 percent for the Yungnam citizens. Our survey also shows that 24.4 percent of the Honam sample said "once a week," and 14.9 percent "infrequently." It was 30.3 percent and 15.4 percent for the Yungnam sample, respectively.

Looking at the frequency of complete negative responses, 20.7 percent of the Honam sample indicated that they did not read newspaper at all. The 376 Yungnam respondents chose this category 8.5 percent less frequently. The results of Table 3-11suggest, then, that the level of political interest

is relatively low in both regions although there are some regional variations. Yungnam citizens appeared to follow political affairs slightly more frequently than do their Honam counterparts.

Table 3-11: "Reading newspaper"
(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Everyday	14.6	18.4
Several times a week	25.5	23.7
Once a week	24.4	30.3
Infrequently	14.9	15.4
Never	20.7	12.2
Total	100.1	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 12.48687$ D. F. = 4 Significance = .0141
C. C. = .12772

A similar pattern is reported in Table 3-12 containing the data on the frequency of discussing political affairs. Only a small fraction of the Yungnam citizens (6.1 %) said that they talked" very frequently" about political affairs to other people; an additional 22.6 percent said "frequently." It was 8.5 percent and 16.4 percent for the Honam sample. A considerably large number of the Honam citizens (39.8 %) and Yungnam citizens (44.1 %) said that they discussed issues "from time to time" with others.

Looking at the frequency of completely negative responses, the proportion of respondents who never discussed politics with others is

smaller in Yungnam (9.0 %) than Honam (15.1 %), and obviously the regional difference is significant statistically.

Table 3-12: "Discussing politics with others"

	Honam	Yungnam
Very frequently	8.5	6.1
Frequently	16.4	22.6
From time to time	39.8	44.1
Infrequently	20.2	18.1
Never	15.1	9.0
Total	100.0	99.9
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 12.13780 D. F. = 4 Significance = .0164 C. C. = .12595

We now turn to the cognitive dimension of political information. Two measures of political information were constructed for our survey: One is intended to measure awareness of the existing four largest parties in Korea and the leader of each party, and the other is concerned with the ability to identify the existing 20 cabinet departments in Korea at the time of our survey. The results of both questions are reported in Tables 3-13 and 3-14.

The citizens in each region, as Table 3-13 shows, exhibited an equal level of ability to identify political parties and the leader of each party. Moreover, it turned out that correct information on political parties and the leader was low in both regions.

Table 3-13: "Awareness of political parties"

	Honam	Yungnam
5[a]	22.3	25.5
4	21.5	18.1
3	16.7	15.4
2	15.9	17.0
1	23.6	23.9
Total	100.0	99.9
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 2.27413$ D. F. = 4 Significance = .6855
C. C. = .05487

Note: a) The numbers refer to the following; "5"--those who could identify correctly all of the four parties and the leader of each party, "4"--those identifying correctly three out of four, "3"--those identifying correctly two parties and the leaders of those two parties, "2"--those identifying correctly only one of four parties and the leader of the party, and "1"--those who could not identify any of the four parties and the leader of any party.

Greater ignorance was, however, revealed with respect to cabinet offices. The citizens from each region, as Table 3-14 shows, appeared to be surprisingly ill-informed about cabinet offices, and obviously no regional difference is observable.

Table 3-14: "Awareness of cabinet offices"

	Honam	Yungnam
5a	5.8	8.2
4	10.6	9.6
3	24.9	25.3
2	19.4	17.6
1	39.3	39.4
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 2.09531 D. F. = 4 Significance = .7182
C. C. = .05268
Note: a) The numbers refer to the following; "5"--those who could identify 9 cabinet offices or more among the 20 existing cabinet offices at the time of our survey, "4"--those identifying 7 or 8 cabinet offices, "3"--those identifying 4 to 6, "2"--those identifying 2 or 3 cabinet offices, and "1"--those who could identify only one cabinet office or could not identify any of the cabinet offices.

Related to political interest is how an individual feels about political affairs. When asked about their emotional attitudes toward politics, as Table 3-15 shows, roughly 65 percent of the 377 Honam respondents, as opposed to 48 percent for the Yungnam sample, were negative about it.

Examining the frequence of agreement responses, whereas 28.2 percent of the Yungnam citizens evidenced a fascination with politics, only 13.5 percent of the Honam citizens did so. It was found , then, that a large number of citizens from each region had an uninvolved attitude toward

political affairs, although an important and remarkable regional difference was observable.

Table 3-15: "Politics is fascinating to me."

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	2.4	8.8
Agree	11.2	19.4
So and so	19.9	21.3
Disagree	38.7	34.8
Strongly disagree	27.1	13.3
Don't know	0.8	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 43.83260 D. F. = 5 Significance = .0000
C. C. = .23454

More interesting is the finding that political fever was stronger in Yungnam than Honam. Such a striking regional contrast reflects the political environments particular to each region. The Honam people tend to be withdrawn from politics, because they have a strikingly felt sense of distrust in the government. Conversely, relative to the Honam people, the Yungnam citizens are inclined to have a favorable impression about politics possibly as a result of Yungnam's privileged political position. A scientific study, however, requires more than such an inference. We will see again whether the observed differences are a mirror of regional political culture or they are due to differences in social structure. The results are reported

in Chart 3-8. First of all, educational attainment, sex, and types of residence showed themselves to be correlated with the "fascination" item. Feelings of fascination about politics increase with high education, living in urban areas, and being a man. One small exception occurs for those having less than 6 years of schooling in the case of Yungnam. Age composition does not show a consistent relationship to the item. Persons in their 30s in Yungnam appeared to feel most fascinated by politics, and it was the youngest generation considered in this study for the Honam sample.

It would be more interesting to note that the initially observed differences, by and large, have not reduced in size even after effects of demographic variables have been considered. Yungnam citizens exhibited a higher level of enthusiasm toward political affairs regardless of education, age, sex, and types of residence. Thus a region itself seems to be an independent determinant of political fever. What it suggests is that differential feelings about politics stem from the peculiar political environment of each region.

Chart 3-8: "Politics is fascinating to me."
(percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level .05.

4. Political participation

In this section, we are going to examine the amount of political participation engaged in by citizens of the Honam and Yungnam regions. Specifically, some forms of participation in elections other than voting which are usually permissible under the law, are considered. Related to such political acts of a conventional and legal sort is how citizens from each region view illegitimate and unconventional political participation. Different views of use of coercion by the government to restore political stability is touched on in this section.

Political participation, first of all, involves the frequency with which an individual participates in civic life to influence politics. Verba and Nie single out the importance of participation in the political process as follows.

> Participation is important not only because it communicates the citizen's needs and desires to the government, but because it has other, more direct benefits. Some have argued that it is, in itself, a prime source of satisfaction--satisfaction with the government and satisfaction with one's own role. Furthermore, it has been viewed as an educational device through which "civic virtues" are learned.[15]

They define political participation as "activities by private citizens that are more or less aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take."[16]

However, the definition given by Verba and Nie restricts the scope of

political participation to those kinds of activities that are generally recognized as legitimate. There could be other forms of activities that are usually considered illegitimate, directed at the regime itself. Such participation at least potentially can have dangerous consequences for a regime, threatening its stability or persistence. It is difficult, however, to obtain any reliable information regarding anti-government political activities through survey reseach. Respondents are unwilling to reveal past experiences of any anti-regime activities to interviewers, epecially in an authoritarian government as is found in the Korean political context. Moreover, they are unlikely to respond frankly to any items dealing with their predispositions to illegitimate forms of political participation in the future. Given this situation, it is necessary to develop indirect measures touching orientations toward antiregime activities. Our survey contains three indirect agree-disagree items of antiregime activities. This is done by asking respondents their opinions about political development in terms of the realization of democracy and a question regarding attitudes towards the means a government employs to meet political disturbances.

First of all, we are concerned with political participation of a legitimate sort. Respondents were asked about their experiences in electoral political participation other than voting. The political activities include political acts of a conventional and legal sort such as joining political groups, money contribution, attending a meeting to support or demonstrate against a party or party policies, campaign activities, and running for public offices. The results of our survey are reported in Table

3-16. Most of the Honam citizens (82.0 %) as well as the Yungnam citizens (89.6 %) indicated that they have never participated in any of the above political activities. Only a small fraction of citizens are shown to participate, in one form or another, in electoral politics. It was 18.0 percent for the Honam sample and 10.4 percent for the Yungnam sample; obviously, the difference is significant statistically. The results of our survey indicate that the rate of political participation is strikingly low in both regions although there are some regional variations. It was found that the proportion of citizens who reported participation in any legal political activity other than voting is higher in Honam than Yungnam.

Table 3-16: "The frequency of electoral political participation"

(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
1[a]	82.0	89.6
2	18.0	10.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

Corrected X^2 = 8.45427 D. F. = 1 Significance = .0036
Raw x^2 = 9.07210 D. F. = 1 Significance = .0026
Phi = .10976

Note: a) The number refers to the following; "1"--respondents who said that they have never participated in political activities other than voting, and "2"--respondents who reported that they participated in at the least one legal political activity other than voting.

We are faced with a paradoxical result regarding political participation. It is generally those with high educational achievement and a high sense of political efficacy who are likely to be active in political acts of demanding sort. It was naturally expected, then, that the Yungnam citizens would be more active in the practice of politics than their Honam counterparts due to the Yungnam people's higher educational attainment and higher sense of subjective political competence. The results of Table 3-16 are reversed; the Honam people appeared to be slightly more active than the Yungnam people. Such unexpected results might be due to the peculiar political situation present in Korean society. Political participation by the Korean mass public is largely a result of a government mobilization policy. It follows, then, that the Honam people are more liable to be susceptible to government pressures than the Yungnam people because of the Honam people's low level of educational attainment, thus leading to a higher rate of political participation. The Honam people's political acts in this sense are not likely to grow out of their feelings of efficacy or explicit personal interest. Such self-assertive types of behaviors are not widespread in Korean politics. Thus, these regional differences would be accounted for in terms of susceptibility to government pressures rather than being a function of personal factors.

We shall now examine views of political activities that are usually regarded as illegitimate. Two indirect items have been developed for our survey to measure orientations toward antiregime activities. Each item is based on a 5-point scale which ranges "strongly disagree" to "strongly

agree."

Respondents were first asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "Student demonstrations against the government do not contribute anything to the political development of Korea." As may be seen in Table 3-17, most of the Honam citizens (79.3 %) said that student demonstrations would contribute to political development of Korea. 65.5 percent of the Yungnam citizens were positive in their evaluation of student demonstrations with respect to the realization of democracy.

Table 3-17: "The consequence of student demonstrations on the realization of political democracy"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	5.6	7.7
Agree	6.1	12.0
So and so	8.2	13.3
Disagree	39.5	39.9
Strongly disagree	39.8	25.5
Don't know	0.8	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 25.71016$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0001
C. C. = .18170

Looking at the frequency of agreement responses, roughly one out of ten Honam citizens and two out of ten Yungnam citizens replied that student antiregime activities might not contribute positively to political

democracy in Korea. The results of our survey indicate that student demonstrations are generally judged to be positive for the country's democracy, showing, however, marked regional variation, with the rate of approval higher in Honam Such high ratings on student demonstrations in both regions might be due to the historical facts that students played an active and important role in overthrowing the dictatorship twice.

It is generally known that the potential for political violence is strongly associated with the likelihood of relative deprivation; the more severe relative deprivation, the greater its potential for political violence.[17] The relatively high rate of respondents in Honam who were positive in the evaluation of student antigovernment activities, then, might be due to the Honam people's felt sense of relative deprivation.

Respondents were next asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "The political development of our country should be based only on the legal activities of the party or Congress." Large majorities of the Yungnam citizens (70.5 %), as Table 3-18 shows, agreed that the democratization of the political system should be based only on the legal activities of the party or Congress, and 67.1 percent of the Honam citizens did so.

Negative responses have been more frequently expressed in Honam than Yungnam. 22.6 percent of the Honam people clearly disapproved of legal activities of the party or Congress as the sole factor in creating democratic life in Korea. The 376 Yungnam respondents chose this category 6.3 percent less frequently. A marked and important regional difference is again observed. It suggests, as in the item on "student demonstrations,"

that Honam citizens might recognize the necessity of antiregime activities in the creation and maintenance of political democracy more often than their Yungnam counterparts.

Table 3-18: "Legal activities of the party or Congress in realizing democracy of Korea"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	49.9	49.2
Agree	17.2	21.3
So and so	9.5	10.6
Disagree	17.0	14.4
Strongly disagree	5.6	1.9
Don't know	0.8	2.7
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 13.40176 D. F. = 5 Significance = .0199
C. C. = .13224

The question may be posed here again about whether the observed regional differences reflect the characteristics of political culture present in each region or are they simply due to differences in social structure between the two regions. We will see whether the original differences substantially decrease in size or do not change after demographic variables including schooling, sex, age, and types of residence, are controlled for. Chart 3-9 shows that views on "student demonstrations" to be closely associated with educational attainment, sex, and age composition. The

positive view of "student demonstrations" is most marked among the high-educated, the younger generation, and the men. The types of residence, however, were not correlated with the view on "student demonstration."

What is striking in Chart 3-9 is persistent and marked regional differences even after controlling for the third variables. When controls are introduced, the original differences did not decrease in size. All of these facts indicate that region itself does exert direct influence upon the attitudes toward "student demonstration."

Chart 3-10 does not reveal consistent patterns of relations between demographic variables and the view on "the legal activities of the party or Congress." The four demographic variables considered in this study were not shown to be significantly associated with this item.

However, Chart 3-10 reveals the similar trend for regional differences which is manifested in the item on "student demonstration." Considering only the statistically significant results, the initially observed differences did not substantially drop even after variations due to demographic characteristics have been taken into account. One exception occurs when the effects of the education have been considered. The original differences were reversed only for the lowest-educated considered in this study: the Yungnam citizens with less than 6 years of schooling appeared to be more supportive of antiregime activities than their Honam counterparts. Save for this, the original differences remained intact. Thus place of residence proved to be an important and independent predictor of the propensity of citizens to illegitimate political participation.

Chart 3-9: "The Consequence of student demonstration on political democracy of Korea"
(percent disagreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Chart 3-10: "Legal activities of the party or Congress in realizing democracy in Korea"
(percent disagreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Related to views of illegitimate and unconventional political participation are views of the use of coercion by the government to restore political stability.[18] Respondents were asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "The government should restore political stability by any means when political disturbance appears." A large number of the 376 Yungnam respondents (67.3 %) said, as Table 3-19 shows, that some degree of coercion is essential to the establishment of social order. The 377 Honam respondents chose this category about 10 percent less frequently.

Table 3-19: "Use of coercion aimed at quelling political disturbances"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	44.6	48.9
Agree	11.9	18.4
So and so	6.4	7.4
Disagree	19.1	15.4
Strongly disagree	17.5	7.4
Don't know	0.5	2.4
Total	100.0	99.9
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 =27.41026 D. F. = 5 Significance = .0001
C. C. = .18741

Negative responses are more often expressed in Honam than Yungnam. Whereas 36.6 percent of the Honam people did disapprove of the use of coercion in putting down political disturbances, only 22.8 percent of the Yungnam people did the same. A moderate but important regional

difference is again observed.

We will see now whether such marked regional differences do not change when controlling for demographic variables. The results are reported in Chart 3-11. First of all, four demographic variables were shown to be somewhat associated with the "political coercion" item. Some exceptions occur for the lowest-educated in both regions and for the persons aged in over 50s for the Honam sample. Save for these cases, the recognition of use of coercion is generally most prevalent among the lower-educated, the women, the older generation, and rural residents.

More important than this is that the orginal differences did not decrease in size when introducing the third variables. Yungnam citizens consistently exhibited a higher level of tolerance toward the use of coercion regardless of education attainment, sex, age, and types of residence. Thus, place of residence proved to be an independent determinant of the attitudes toward political coercion.

Chart 3-11: "Political coercion aimed at quelling political disturbances"
(percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

5. Tolerance

A democratic system, from a cultural point of view, is one in which the public's beliefs and behaviors both exhibit and foster an openness to others in a society.[19] Democratic society is inconceivable when people tend to hold hostile attitudes towards one another due to a lack of tolerance. For in such a society political divisiveness may not be managed in a way to contribute to the cohesion of a polity. The continued functioning of democracy depends on the willingness of the citizenry to tolerate even the nonconformists who differ from the majority of the public in attitudes toward social and political issues.

Political tolerance is ordinarily defined in terms of support for freedom of expression (e.g. freedom of speech).[20] For instance, John Pierce et al. define political tolerance as "the willingness of the individual to extend certain fundamental procedural rights and civil liberties to others, even to those groups and individuals with whom one disagrees or that stand outside of the mainstream of political and social life."[21] Nunn et al. give the same meaning to political tolerance by saying that tolerance refers to "the willingness to grant civil liberties to fellow citizens, including those whose beliefs and opinions differ from society's mainstream."[22] Along these same lines, Sullivan et al. define political tolerance as "a willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or intersts that one opposes ."[23] What all of these definitions imply is that important rights of democracy such as freedom of speech should be extended to nonconformists regardless

of their beliefs and demographic characteristics such as race, sex, and ethnic background. Thus tolerance only has significance in a situation of disagreement or opposition.

However, political tolerance may be defined in terms of support for equality (such as racial or regional equality). Michael Corbett has clearly drawn on the "equality" dimension of political tolerance to discuss the attitudes of Americans toward women and blacks.[24] "Political tolerance in terms of support for equality," according to him, "refers to a willingness to reject unjustifiable discrimination against people."[25] The key term in this definition is "unjustifiable discrimination." According to Michael Corbett:

> Unjustified discrimination refers here to discrimination against persons on the basis of characteristics (biological/physical, social, or belief characteristics) which are not fundamentally relevant to the situation. Discrimination against people can be justifiable or unjustifiable, depending upon whether the basis on which it is done is truly relevant to the situation.[26]

For instance, it is not justifiable to refuse to hire a person simply because the person is black or fee; but an employer is certainly justified in discriminating against a person who is not capable of performing a job.

The term "political tolerance" will be used here to refer to support for regional equality.[27] Considering that this study is mainly concerned with regional conflicts, knowing how individuals within specific region internalize into their belief systems support for equality regardless of regional differences will be essential in measuring the degree of regional

conflicts, and hence the democratic nature of the Korean political system. A tolerant Korean is, then, conceived as one who is willing to support equality for a person in a very wide range of political, social, and economic situations, despite the fact that the person is from an other region. In contrast, an intolerant person might feel, for instance, that people from an other region should not be allowed to hold certain jobs, or to run for public office.

The existence of the sense of inter-exclusiveness (or the lack of tolerance) stems from the assumption that citizens of each region will internalize perceptions of regional imbalances between the Honam and Yungnam regions, and, thus, that the way in which citizens relate themselves to people from other region will reflect the strength of regional forces. It is anticipated, then, that territorial strains between Honam and Yungnam would foster discrimination against people on the basis of regional background, serving to influence continued territorial divisiveness.

Our survey contains six items relating to tolerance: Two of them are directly concerned with tolerance in terms of politics, the other three items, which might be termed "social tolerance," are related to the social life of individuals--for instance, friendship, interregional marriage, and employment. The remaining one is concerned with the economic situation. All items directly concern the question of equal treatment for the people from other region.

1) Social tolerance

First of all, we are going to examine how tolerant citizens from one region are toward citizens from the other region in terms of friendship. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement: "The fact that a person is from other region prevents me from making a true friendship with him or her."[28] As may be seen in Table 3-20, 18.4 percent of the Yungnam respondents replied "strongly agreee," and additional 43.9 percent said "agree," implying that a fairly large number of Yungnam citizens (62.3 %) feel hesitant to make friends with citizens from Honam.

Table 3-20: "Making a good friend"
(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	8.8	18.4
Agree	25.7	43.9
So and so	6.6	10.9
Disagree	36.6	19.7
Strongly disagree	22.3	7.2
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 82.82337 D. F. = 4 Significance = .0000
Contingency Coefficient (C. C.) = .31479

In contrast, a relatively small number of Honam respondents were found to be intolerant. Only 34.5 percent of the Honam citizens answered "strongly agree" or "agree." Thus, Honam people were, as compared with

Yungnam people, more tolerant by far in terms of friendship.

We are next concerned with attitudes of citizens from each region toward interregional marriage. Respondents were given a hypothetical situation regarding the marital choice of their daughters or sons. They were asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "I would be displeased if my son or daughter were getting married to a person from other region (Table 3-21)." A large number of the Yungnam citizens expressed displeasure over interregional marriage with Honam poeple. 20.5 percent of them said "strongly agree" and additional 34.0 percent replied "agree." In contrast, large majorities of the Honam people expressed indifference to the interregional marriage. It turned out that 70 percent of them said "disagree," or "strongly disagree." Here again, Honam people appeared to be more tolerant than Yungnam people.

Table 3-21: "Inter-regional marriage"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	6.9	20.5
Agree	16.2	34.5
So and so	6.9	11.7
Disagree	33.7	21.5
Strongly disagree	36.3	11.4
Don't know	0.0	0.8
Total	100.0	99.9
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 115.89316$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0000
C. C. = .36521

Turning next to the issue of employment, respondents were given a hypothetical situation regarding employment. They were asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "If I were a president of some company, I would not employ a person from other region." As Table 3-22 shows, Honam people expressed indifference to the employment of people from Yungnam more frequently than Yungnam people did. 53.6 percent of the Honam respondents said "strongly disagree," or "disagree." It was 40.7 percent for the Yungnam sample.

Looking at the "agreement" responses (including "strongly agree" responses), Yungnam citizens appeared to be slightly more negative regarding equal opportunity of employment based on ability than their Honam counterparts (45.8 % Vs. 39.3 %). Thus, Yungnam citizens were found to be less tolerant in relation to employment than Honam citizens.

Table 3-22: "Employment"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	17.0	18.1
Agree	22.3	27.7
So and so	7.2	12.0
Disagree	29.7	28.2
Strongly disagree	23.9	12.5
Don't know	0.0	1.6
Total	100.1	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 26.40908$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0001
C. C. = .18407

The results in Table 3-20, 3-21, and 3-22 may be summarized as follows. Yungnam people consistently exhibited a higher level of intolerance than Honam people. Astonishingly enough, Honam people tended to be willing to accept the Yungnam people as a friend, a marital mate, or an employee. Such regional differences may be partly explained in terms of social mobility. Honam people tend to view assimilation with Yungnam people as upward social mobility, because Honamers are generally low-educated and thus constitute a lower class of Korean society, whereas Yungnamers tend to be higher-educated and thus occupy a higher class. The reverse is true for the Yungnam people: they tend to view an assimilation with the Honam people as a social step down, and thus, they regard disassimilation as a way of preserving their status quo. As a result, they tend to exhibit a relatively high level of intolerance toward the Honam people.

Before moving to political tolerance, a question arises at this point: Do such regional differences reflect different social factors such as education, sex, age, and type of residence, or do they reflect the specific political circumstance present in each region? As may be seen in Chart 3-12, 3-13, and 3-14, regional differences remained intact when variations due to social variables have been taken into account. What it suggests is that the place in which a citizen resides is an important determinant of social tolerance, regardless of education, age, sex, and type of residence.

Chart 3-12: "Making a good friend"
(Percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Chart 3-13: "Inter-regional marriage"
(Percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Chart 3-14: "Employment"
(Percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

2) Political tolerance

Now, we move to the question of political tolerance. Two items were designed to measure political tolerance; they are based on the importance of place of residence as it relates first, to a Congressional candidate, and, secondly, to a Presidential candidate.

When first asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "The candidate for Congress who runs in this region may not be from other region," most respondents from each region expressed strong ill feeling against a candidate from the other region (Table 3-23). Negative responses were, however, more frequently expressed in Honam than in Yungnam. 87.6 percent of the Honam citizens, as opposed to 74.2 percent of the Yungnam citizens, appeared to be unwilling to accept the Congressional candidate from the other region.

Table 3-23: "Candidacy of Congressman"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	65.3	42.3
Agree	22.3	31.9
So and so	5.6	9.3
Disagree	4.8	12.5
Strongly disagree	1.9	4.0
Don't know	0.3	0.0
Total	100.2	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 45.38813$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0000
C. C. = .23843

Looking at the"strongly agree" responses, more marked regional differences are observable. 65.3 percent of the Honam people exhibited extremely antagonisic attitudes against the candidate from other region. But it was 42.3 percent for the Yungnam people. In brief, Honam people were more intolerant than Yungnam people when "tolerance" is specified in terms of a Congressional candidate.

Turning next to the "presidential candidate" item, respondents were asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "The President of Korea may not be from the other region." Table 3-24 reveals that Honam people were more intolerant toward a President from Yungnam than Yungnam people were against a President from Honam. About half of the Honam citizens (50.1 %), as opposed to 31.7 percent of the Yungnam people, were ready to reject a person from the other region as the President of South Korea.

Table 3-24: "President of South Korea"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	22.8	13.6
Agree	27.3	18.1
So and so	11.4	9.3
Disagree	24.4	31.4
Strongly disagree	14.1	27.7
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 36.71052 D. F. = 4 Signicance = .0000
C. C. = .21561

To summarize the findings of Table 3-23 and 3-24, Honam people consistently exhibited a higher level of political intolerance toward the Yungnam people than the Yungnam people did toward the Honam people. Initially observed regional differences did not decrease in size after the effects due to demographic variables have been considered, as may be seen in Chart 3-15 and 3-16. By and large, Honam people appeared to be less politically tolerant than the Yungnam people, regardless of education, age, sex, and type of residence.

Chart 3-15: "Candidacy of Congressman"
(Percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Chart 3-16: "President of South Korea"
(Percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

3) Economic tolerance

Now, we are going to examine different patterns of tolerance present in the economic sphere. One item was constructed for this purpose. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "I do not purchase merchandise which is produced by the company whose owner is from the other region." As may be seen in Table 3-25, Honam people tend to be anti-Yungnam regarding the purchase of merchandise more frequently than Yungnam people are anti-Honam. About 70 percent of the Yungnam people, as opposed to about 52 percent of the Honam people, do not consider the native place of the owner of the company producing certain merchandise when they purchas it. In brief, Honam people appeared, as compared with Yungnam people, to be less tolerant in terms of the purchase of merchandise.

Table 3-25: "Purchasing merchandise"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	14.9	5.3
Agree	26.5	12.5
So and so	6.4	12.0
Disagree	32.6	34.3
Strongly disagree	19.6	35.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 60.49824$ D. F. = 4 Significance = .0000
C. C. = .27270

Such regional variations persisted even after variations due to demographic variables have been considered, as Chart 3-17 shows. Thus, region proved to be an independent variable in influencing the level of economic tolerance.

To conclude the findings regarding tolerance, the results examined in this section indicate that the level of tolerance varied quite a bit depending on item content. Honam people consistently exhibited a higher level of intolerance regarding candidate origin and the purchase of merchandise than Yungnam people. In contrast, Yungnam people appeared to be less tolerant in terms of social relations than their Honam counterparts.

Chart 3-17: "Purchasing merchandise"
(Percent agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Endnotes

1 Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," American Political Science Review, 68 (September 1974), P. 952

2 Ibid., P. 952.

3 William A. Gamsom, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), P. 49.

4 A number of studies show social variables to be related to political trust. For relations between sex and trust, see Ada W. Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970), P.389-410; See also Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). For relations between age and trust, see Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, 23 (1961), P 477-506; See also Arthur Kornhauser, William Harold Sheppard, and Albert J. Mayer, When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers (New York: University Books, 1956).

5 For more discussion, see Robert S. Erickson, Norman R. Luttbeg, and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), P. 103-104; See also John C. Pierce, Kathleen H. Beatty, and Paul R Hagner, The Dynamics of American Public Opinion (Glenview, Ill.: Scot, Foresman, 1982), P. 225-226.

6 Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), P. 187.

7 Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Efficacy," International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Vol. 12 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), P. 225.

8 For a reference, see Erikson et al., op cit., P. 94-104. It is generally believed that the more a person is efficacious, the more he is likely to

participate positively in political activities, especially in political activities of a demanding sort. It seems apparent that those high on political efficacy tend to pay more than casual attention to political affairs, and try to enhance their capacity to deal with complex and abstract matters like those found in the political world. Through this process, those high on political efficacy can find some effective means to influence government, which may finally lead to active participation in politics. It is also self-evident that well-educated person should feel greater confidence in his effect on the political process because his education is likely to ensure him greater community influence through his direct contact with influential politicians or government officials. For more information, see Angus Campbell et al., The Voter Decides, P. 190-194; See also Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), P. 103-105, 475-481.

9 Eckstein views a balance between governmental power and responsiveness as the ideal state of a stable democratic government. As a government, it must be able to lead. A sufficiently wide scope of governmental authority within which the government could exercise its leadership is essential to existence and survival of a democratic government. Without this leeway, the government's effectiveness will be impaired, in turn leading to governmental instability. At the same time, a democratic government must act in ways that are responsive to its citizens. Otherwise, the democratic system would be no more than a facade. In short, if a balance between governmental power and responsiveness is not maintained, the government will be either ineffective in its performance or unresponsive to the wishes of the electorate. For more details, see Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1961), P. 28-33.

10 For details, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), P. 481.

11 For a detailed discussion of the concepts and its measurement, see Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, op. cit., P. 187-94. I excluded one of four items developed by the Survey Research Center, pertaining to the

importance of voting: "Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things." This item relies totally on the signicance of the word "only" attached by respondents. If they did not attach great importance to it, then agreement with the statement could well indicate political efficacy. Largely because of this shortcoming, I abondoned using the item.

12 For relations between education and political efficacy, see Almond and Verba, op. cit.; see also Campbell et al., The Voter Decides; Campbell et al., The American Voter; Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).; Marvin E. Olsen, "Two Categories of Political Alienation," Social Forces, 47, P. 288-99.

13 Almond and Verba, op cit., P. 88.

14 The most familiar fact to arise from sample surveys in all countries is that popular levels of information about political affairs are astonishingly low. With regard to this low level of informaion, Converse argues that because the average citizen is largely inattentive to the broader political affairs of the nation as a result of excessive preoccupation with the events of daily life, he rarely becomes very well informed. For detailed disccusion, see Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," in Fred I. Greestein and Nelsen W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), P. 93. On the other hand, Bennett argues that there is a constant political bias against the normal flow of informaion towards the public. In other words, the responsibility for the low levels of information should not be placed on the public, but on the political system itself. For more information, see W. Lance Bennett, Public Opinion in American Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc., 1980), P. 28-30.

15 Verba and Nie, op. cit., P. 5.

16 Ibid., P. 2.

17 For detailed discussion, see Thomas H. Green, Comparative

Revolutionary Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974).

18 Easton views coercion as another measure to meet a decline in support for the regime. For a reference, see Easton, op. cit., P. 296.

19 For a reference, see Pierce et al., op. cit., P. 189.

20 When political tolerance is defined in this way, it is equivalent to the first condition vital for democratic stability posited out by Robert Erikson et al., consenseus on the procedural norms of democratic principles. For a detailed discussion, see Erikson et al. op. cit., P. 84-92.

21 Pierce et al., op. cit., P. 189.

22 Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett, Jr., and J. Allen Williams, Jr., Tolerance for Nonconformity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978), P. 1.

23 John L. Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus, "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s--1970s," American Political Science Review, 73 (September 1979), P. 784.

24 Michael Corbett, Political Tolerance in America: Freedom and Equality in Public Attitudes (New York: Longman Inc., 1982), Chapter 4, 5.

25 Ibid., P. 5.

26 Ibid., P. 47-48.

27 Most of the research on political tolerance undertaken in the United States has focused on the examination of support for norms such as freedom of speech. Relatively little political research has been devoted to the systematic examination of political tolerance in terms of support for equality.

28 If a person from Honam is interviewed, the other region is Yungnam. On

the contrary, if a person from Yungnam is interviewed, the other region is Honam.

Chapter IV. The impact of regionalism upon the party system and voting behavior

Regional tensions present between Honam and Yungnam are reflected in the party system and voting patterns unique to each region. The party system and electoral patterns of voting, in return, are linked in a mutually reinforcing network, operating to strengthen existing regional cleavages. Thus the relations between regionalism, and party system and electoral politics are inter-dependent.

1. Electoral politics

This section examines regional variations in political behavior as a function of territorial cleavages, with special references to voting patterns in Korean presidential elections. It is assumed that the choices a voter makes are necessarily responsive to the special political environments present in each voter's region. Electoral behavior is considered, in this sense, with respect to the way in which specific patterns of voting behavior perpetuate regional differences. To analyse this question, the results of the past four presidential elections will be examined in terms of territorial divisiveness. The presidential elections of Korea are likely to create an environment that arouses regional group-consciousness, for each candidate is usually geographically, rather than ideologically, identified. Especially when presidential candidates

attempt to appeal to regional sentiments and predispositions in their favor, no other issue seems as important for the Korean electorate as the geographical attachment of a candidate. Thus, regionalism, in terms of electoral politics, refers to "the voter's affective identification with and support of candidates from their region."[1]

The potency of regionalism emerged first in the field of electoral politics when General Park Chung Hee, Yungnam's native son, vied with Yun for the presidency of South Korea in 1963. Table 4-1 shows several noteworthy findings. In 1963, Yungnam voted heavily for General Park, and this fact played a decisive role in his narrow victory. Also, the support by Honam voters for Park was very substantial. As expected, KyungKi and Seoul voted heavily for Yun Po Sun, their native son. In the end, the 1963 presidential election can be characterized as a contest between the geographical bases of the candidates. Yet the issue of regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam did not appear, as seen in the Honam people's support for Park.

A strong regionalism continued to influence the electoral outcome of the 1967 presidential election (Table 4-1). In that year, the enthusiasm of Yungnam voters for their regional candidate, Park, increased sharply. At the same time, the support by KyungKi and Seoul voters for Yun Po Sun, their native son, declined substantially, which, combined with Park's impressive gains in the Yungnam region, contributed to Park's big victory. Honam voters, on the other hand, shifted their support from Park to Yun, which suggests that Honam people began to realize that they were being

deprived of the benefits of modernization programs as a consequence of Park's bias in favor of Yungnam. The 1967 presidential contest seemed to signal the arrival of severe regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam.

Table 4-1: Regional Votes in the Presidential Elections of 1963, 1967, and 1971

(in percentages)

	1963		1967		1971	
	Park	Yun	Park	Yun	Park	Kim
Middle region						
Seoul	32	68	47	53	40	60
KyungKi	37	63	44	56	50	50
KangWon	45	55	55	45	61	39
ChungBuk	45	55	52	48	58	42
ChungNam	45	55	49	51	55	45
Honam region						
ChunBuk	54	46	46	54	37	63
ChunNam	62	38	49	51	35	65
Yungnam region						
KyungBuk	61	39	71	29	76	24
KyungNam	67	33	75	25	74	26
Pusan	50.4	49.6	67	33	56	44
Cheju[a]	66	34	64	36	58	42
Total	50.8	49.2	55	45	54	46

Source: Shindonga, June, 1971, P. 88.

Note: a) Cheju, located on the island off the southern coast of Peninsula of South Korea, has been excluded from the consideration of a region.

In terms of voter alignment, the 1963 and 1967 presidential elections

are quite different. Support by Yungnam voters for Park, their native son, grew in strength, whereas the enthusiasm of KyungKi and Seoul voters for their native son, Yun, decreased markedly. Also, there was a striking shift in the pattern of support by Honam voters for the incumbent candidacy of Park, as manifested by their switch of support form Park in 1963 to Yun in 1967.

The 1971 presidential election produced a striking contrast between the Honam and Yungnam regions (Table 4-1). The emergence of an opposition candidate with distinct regional ties to Honam was enough to arouse a sense of regional group-consciousness. As the fever of the election became ripe, two major contestants, Park and Kim, were more and more geographically identified with Yungnam and Honam, respectively. Thus, the Honam and Yungnam voters voted heavily for their native son, Kim and Park, respectively. It might be argued, then, that regional alignment was one of the most important factors in influencing voting behavior of the 1971 contest.

As a way of further understanding and explaining the patterns of regional support by Honam and Yungnam voters in the 1971 presidential election, Table 4-2 is presented. As may be seen in Table 4-2, Park, running for his third term as president, once again enjoyed a concentration of support in his native Yungnam region (72%), but he drew only 36 percent of all the votes cast for the two major candidates in Honam. Indeed, Park has increased his strength in his native Yungnam region since 1963. Also, Park's principal opponent, Kim Dae Jung, regarded in Honam as a favorite son against Park's geographical identification with the Yungnam region,

generated massive support in his region (64%), but lost heavily in the Yungnam region (28%).

Table 4-2: Votes by Honam and Yungnam Voters in the 1971 Presidential Election

(in percentages)

		Park	Kim
YungNam	KyungBuk	76 (1,333,051)	24 (411,116)
	KyungNam	74 (891,119)	26 (310,595)
	Pusan	56 (385,999)	44 (305,452)
	Total	72 (2,610,169)	28 (1,024,163)
Honam	ChunBuk	37 (308,850)	63 (535,519)
	CHunNam	35 (479,737)	65 (874,974)
	Total	36 (788,587)	64 (1,410,493)

Source: Shindonga, June, 1971, P. 89.

Although Park and Kim drew heavily from their native regions, Yungnam and Honam, respectively, important and remarkable regional differences should be noted in terms of the electoral strength enjoyed by each candidate. Park won in the Yungnam region by more than a 2 to 1 margin, whereas he lost in the Honam region by less than 2 to 1 margin. These results suggest that the regional identifications of Yungnam voters were stronger than those of Honam voters in the 1971 presidential contest. On the whole, Yungnam voters' apparant identifications with their regional candidate have become sharper over those three elections, as a steady increase in the region's electoral support for Park indicates (Table 4-1).

The peak of regionalism as a political force was reached in the 1987

presidential election, the first held in 16 years.[2] In that year, four major presidential candidates with distinct regional ties vied for the nation's highest executive position. Each candidate was known to have a firm base of support in certain region: Roh from the government party was regarded as a favorite son in KyungBuk (North of Yungnam); Kim, Y. S. from the Reunification Democratic party was representive of KyungNam (South of Yungnam) voters; Kim, D. J. from the Peace Democratic party, who ran for the presidency in the 1971 contest, once again was the rallying point of the Honam voters; and Kim, J. P., the former prime minister, was geographically identified with the ChungNam (South of ChungCheong Province) area.

Table 4-3: Regional Votes in the 1987 Presidential Election
(in percentages)

	Roh	Kim, Y. S.	Kim, D. J.	Kim, J. P.	Other
Middle region					
Seoul	30 0	29.1	32.6	8.2	0.1
KyungKi	41.0	28.1	22.1	8.7	0.2
KangWon	59 3	26.1	8.8	5.4	0.3
ChungBuk	46.9	28.2	11.0	13.5	0.4
ChungNam	26.2	16.1	12.4	45 0	0.3
Honam region	9.9	1.2	88.4	0.5	0.1
Yungnam region					
KyungBuk	68.1	26 6	2.5	2.4	0.4
KyungNam	36.6	53.7	6.9	2.6	0.3
Chuju	49.8	26.8	18.6	4.5	0.3
Total	36.6	28.0	27.1	8.1	0.2

Source: Chosun Newspaper Co., Statistical Data of the 13th Presidential Election, (seoul: 1988), P. 92-93.

The results in Table 4-3 indicate that regionalism was more fragmenting in the 1987 presidential contest than any previous election. Each candidate drew heavily from his native region, but lost in other regions. Roh made an impressive showing in his native region, polling 68.1 percent of all votes cast for the four major candidates and one unimportant candidate. Kim, Y. S. defeated his opponents in his region, polling 53.7 percent of the votes. Both Roh and Kim, Y. S., who might, in a broad sense, be regarded as geographically identified with Yungnam voters, lost heavily in the Honam region. D. J. Kim's candicacy once again provided an occasion to stimulate regionalism in his native region, Honam. He could capture the fancy of Honam voters who felt alienated from national politics. In reality, he generated massive support in Honam (88.4%). Kim, J. P. also actively campaigned, particularly among ChungNam voters, polling 45.0 percent of the vote. The results of Table 4-3 suggest, then, that the electoral politics of regionalism has become more complicated and varied, with the emergence of four major candidates with distinct ties of regional identity. The political milieu so emphasized localism that voters apparently cast their ballots on the basis of a recognized and overt regional affiliation. In the end, the 1987 presidential contest was a contest among the four geographical bases of the candidates.

It should be noted that the voting patterns of the KyungBuk and KyungNam people were quite different in 1987 from those of the 1963, 1967, 1971 presidential elections. Unlike the widespread support which

Park--who is, strictly speaking, from KyungBuk (North of Yungnam)--enjoyed in Yungnam in the previous three presidential contests, Roh lost ground in KyungNam (South of Yungnam) in the 1987 presidential contest due to the emergence of Kim, Y. S. who is geographically identified with KyungNam voters. The KyungNam and KyungBuk people are generally known to share patterns of political orientation under the influence of the same local political culture. For this reason, KyungBuk and KyungNam could be grouped into one region of Yungnam. To be sure, they are homogeneous, as manifested by distinct and common political, social, and economic attributes present in Yungnam As revealed in the foregoing analysis, however, KyungNam and KyungBuk people are heterogeneous enough to exhibit specific behavioral patterns, especially when the political milieu arouses regional group-consciousness as in the 1987 presidential contest.

Also, it would be interesting to note that regional loyalties and sentiments were much less salient in KyungNam and ChungNam than they were in Honam and KyungBuk. The intense regional effect in Honam seems related to the Honam people's strikingly felt sense of their disadvantaged positions in Korean society, and the marked and persistent presence of objective conditions indicating regional imbalances between Honam and Yungnam, as discussed in Section 3 of Chapter 2. Honam people had a focus for their complaints in the candicacy of Kim, D. J. , and thus, Kim could generate massive support in Honam by arousing the salience of the Honam region.

This analysis can be extended to the results of the congressional election of 1988. Contrasts among the four geographical bases of the

candidates, not apparent in previous congressional elections, soon found expression in alignments within the legislature. In short, the results of 1988 Congressional Election correspond to those of the 1987 Presidential Election. Each party generated massive support in the leader's native area, but lost heavily in other regions, in terms of Congressional seats won by each party (Table 4-4) and percentages of votes polled by each party (Table 4-5). As expected, KyungBuk voted heavily for the Democratic Justice

Table 4-4: Congressional Seats Won by Four Major Political Parties*: 1988 Congressional Election

	D. J	R. D.	P. D.	N. D. R.	Others	Total
Middle region						
Seoul	10	10	17	3	2	42
KyungKi	22	5	1	6	1	35
KangWon	8	3	0	1	2	14
ChungBuk	7	0	0	2	0	9
ChungNam	2	2	0	13	1	18
Honam region	0	0	36	0	1	37
Yungnam region						
KyungBuk	25	2	0	2	0	29
KyungNam	13	23	0	0	1	37
Chuju	0	1	0	0	2	3
Total	87	46	54	27	10	224

Notes: 1) *D. J.--Democratic Justice Party led by Roh,
R.D.--Reunification Democratic Party led by Kim, Y. S.,
P. D.--Peace Democratic Party led by Kim, D. J., and
N. D. R.--New Democratic Republican Party, led by Kim, J. P.

In the following Table 4-5, the abbreviations indicate the same party.

2) In 1988 Congressional Election, single district system was used .

Source: The Shindonga, June 1988, P. 167.

Table 4-5: Percentages of Votes Polled by the Four Largest Political Parties: 1988 Congressional Election

	D. J.	R. D.	P. D.	N. D. R.	Others
Middle region					
Seoul	26 2	23.4	27.0	16.1	7.4
KyungKi	36 4	24 1	15.5	17.6	6.4
KangWon	43 6	21 6	4.0	20.2	10.6
ChungBuk	43 7	16.0	1.4	33.3	5.7
ChungNam	30 2	15.0	3.8	46.5	4.6
Honam region	23 0	0.9	69.1	1.6	5.4
Yungnam region					
KyungBuk	49.9	26.0	0.8	14.9	8.4
KyungNam	36.1	45.7	1.5	8.6	8.1
Cheju	36.0	27.1	6.0	3.4	27.5
Overall Per.	34.0	23.8	19.3	15.6	7.4

Source: The Shindonga, June 1988, P. 167.

Party, helping the D.J.P. to win 25 Congressional seats out of 29 alloted to KyungBuk and polling 49.9 percent of all the votes cast for the four major parties and minor parties. Also, support by KyungNam voters for the Reunification Democratic Party was very substantial.[3] It drew 45.7

percent of all the votes and captured, out of a possible 37, 23 Congressional seats.

The two parties, especially the Reunification Democratic Party, which have a base of support in the Yungnam region, however, lost heavily in the Honam region, suggesting that the antagonism of the Honam people toward Yungnam is extremely severe. The Peace Democratic Party enjoyed massive support in the Honam region, drawing 69.1 percent of all votes, and winning 36 Congressional seats out of 37. Such huge support once again reflects intense regional effects. But it lost heavily in Yungnam. Also, the New Democratic Republican Party made an impressive showing in ChungNam Province (13 seats out of 18, and 46.5 percent of the votes). In brief, regional alignment was a key factor in influencing voting behavior in the 1988 Congressional contest.

Various voting studies in the U. S. have shown that party identification is the most important source of voter choice.[4] Most strong party identifiers are much more likely to vote for their party, while most independents tend to vote for different parties, depending on the political situation. The individual may sometimes vote for the other party but his party identification remains the long-term factor affecting the vote, which, in turn, influences his attitudes toward the short-term candidates and issues.

In the Korean political context, no loyalty to party can materialize as yet, given the short history of the party system in the Western sense. Instead, in this vacuum, Korean voters tend to identify with their native candidates. For a majority of the Korean electorate, geographical

attachment to a candidate, rather than party identification and issue positions of a candidate, plays a determinant role in influencing the vote decision.

2. Political party system

The patterns of party politics are another mirror of territorial cleavages in Korea, and of regional conflicts betwen Honam and Yungnam in particular. Tensions present between the two regions have affected the adaptations of the party system in the regions recently.

Political parties have existed in Korea since Korea's republican inception in 1948. Since then, Korean politics has been dominated by two parties until fairly recently. There were, it is true, some instances of third parties during this period, but never of sufficient appeal or durability to challenge the two-party system. The two-party system itself, although the parties have changed in name and organization structure after a series of political reforms, remained a primary mechanism of Korean politics. The parties have been a type of national organization in structure, and hence, have acted presumably as vehicles for mobilizing and organizing the demands and needs of South Koreans as a whole, and were not limited to a specific region, at least in name.

This prevalent two party system, however, completely collapsed just before the presidential election of December, 1987. The major opposition party split up to nominate different candidates for the presidency.[5] The political milieu so emphasized localism that Kim, D. J., one of the co-leaders of the opposition party, finally decided to withdraw from the

Reunification Democratic party and create a new party, named the "Peace Democratic party." Accordingly, he was able to run for the presidency with no need to compete with Kim, Y. S. in a primary election. The result is the emergence of a separate and independent political party which differs from the Reunification Democratic party only in its geographical base of support, not in party ideology or programs. Another opposition party, named the "New Democratic Republic party," was created by Kim, J. P. who is the former prime minister under Park's administration. Thus, two large opposition political parties emerged just before the presidential election.

It is well known that, in Korean politics, political parties have a tendency to become identified with leadership personalities at the expense of party ideology or programs.[6] It seems only natural, then, that each party would attract a somewhat different base of support in a region, depending on the native place of the leader of each party. The government party led by Roh is regarded as representative of KyungBuk (North of Yungnam) voters. The Reunification Democratic party led by Kim, Y. S. bases its support in KyungNam (South of Yungnam). Honam people generally support the Peace Democratic Party whose leader is Kim, D. J. Finally, the New Democratic Republic party led by Kim, J. P. is geographically identified with the ChungNam people. Thus, the party system of Korea presents itself according to regions. Korean publics are identified with a party, not because of an existing set of principles, or issues, but for geographical reasons.

As mentioned before, contrasts between those regions found expression in the alignments within the legislature. The sense of unity each party

produced in its region enabled it to capture an enormous number of Congressional seats alloted to each region in the1988 Congressional election: the government party captured, out of a possible 29 seats in its region, 25seats; the Reunification Democratic Party and Peace Democratic party won 23 and 36 seats, respectively, out of 37 and 37, respectively; the New Democratic Republic party captured, out of a possible 18, 13 seats.

Thus, in summary, political parties in Korea sustain, or even foster, regional cleavages. Regionalism is stimulated when a party acts as the spokesman of regional interests or presents itself as the advocate for a certain region. As Schwartz puts it, "The importance of national political parties in regionally-divided societies lies in their potential for setting in motion nationalizing movements."[7] Political parties in contemporary Korea, however, emerged as vehicles for mobilizing and organizing individuals and groups living in specific regions, rather than as avenues for channeling the public opinion of the whole population. They act as mechanisms for aiding the continuity of regionalism rather than as potentially consensus-building mechanisms. Thus, the very recent phenomenon of a geographically fragmented party system is another mirror of regional cleavages in Korea, which would affect "the development of not only each nationwide party organization but, even more, of the entire system of party oppositions and alignments."[8]

Our survey contains two items related to partisanship. It should be noted beforehand that the party system changed drastically after Roh's 6.29 declaration in 1987 and thus our survey items designed to measure partisan

affiliation at the time of our survey do not reflect the particularistic tendency of people living in a certain area to identify with the specific political party whose leader is from that area.

Respondents were first asked whether they had any party with which they were psychologically identified. As may be seen in Table 4-6, a large number of citizens from each region answered "no." Slightly more Yungnam respondents (65.2 %) than the Honam respondents (59.4 %) indicated they did not have any partisan affiliation, yet obviously the difference is not statistically significant. No marked regional variation was observed with respect to partisanship.

Table 4-6: "Party identification"

	Honam	Yungnam
Yes	39.0	34.6
No	59.4	65.2
N. A.	1.6	0.3
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 5.55373 D. F. = 2 Significance = . 0622
Cramer" S V = .08588 C. C. = .08557
Note: a) N. A. indicates respondents who refused to answer this item.

When respondents expressed feelings of partisanship, they were further asked to identify the name of the party. The results are reported in Table 4-7. Citizens from each region generally listed the "New Democratic

Party."[9] It was 62.6 percent for the Honam sample and 60.8 percent for the Yungnam sample. The government party received the next largest proportion of identification in the Yungnam region, which constituted 20.0 percent of the Yungnam sample. Only 12.2 percent of 147 Honam respondents named the "Democratic Justice party." Yet the difference between Honam and Yungnam is not significant statistically. The results of our survey indicate that the three opposition parties, in combination, received a greater mention from each region than the government party did at the time of our survey. More interesting is the finding that the preference for a specific party did not vary appreciably according to a place of residence, although more Yungnam people than the Honam people tended to be in support of the government party. Remember again that our survey items do not reflect the drastic change in the political party system which took place after the survey had been undertaken.

Table 4-7: "The name of the party"

	Honam	Yungnam
Democratic Justice party	12.2	20.2
New Democratic party	62.6	60.8
Reunification Democratic party	17.0	7.7
Korean People's party	4.8	7.7
Others	2.0	2.3
N. A.[a]	1.4	1.5
Total	100.0	100.0

$X^2 = 9.93284$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0772
C. C. = .11410

Note: a) N.A. indicates respondents who refused to identify the name of the party. At the time of our survey, the government party was the Democratic Justice party, and the three largest opposition parties comprised the New Democratic party, the Reunification Democratic party, and the Korean People's party.

Endnotes

1 Chong Lim Kim, ed., Political Participation in Korea (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio Books, 1980), P. 67.

2 The Korean public lost the authority to elect a president due to an amendment to the Constitution in 1972, which instituted indirect election. But the direct election system was introduced once again just after Roh's 6.29 declaration in 1987.

3 Strictly speaking, the Reunification Democratic Party (R. D.) generated massive support in Pusan, a Special City located in KyungNam, but lost to the Democratic Justice Party (D. J.) in other areas. In Pusan, the R. D. captured, out of a possible 15, 14 Congressional seats. But, in other areas of KyungNam, it won just 9 seats out of 22, losing to the D. J., which captured 12 Congressional seats. It may be proposed, then, that the Reunification Democratic Party has a firm basis of support only in Pusan, rather than KyungNam as a whole.

4 For more information on party voting, see Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960). This conception of party identification as a direct cause of the vote formed perhaps the major theme of voting studies in the mid-1960s. V. O. Key was the first to modify this popular view. He argued that issues were important in a very particular sense: that the vote decision was made, depending on satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent administration (see The Responsible Electorate). Generally speaking, to make issue voting possible, a number of conditions should be fulfilled. As explained below, those conditions are not usually met in the American political system. Firstly, political candidates should present their issue positions to the electorate clearly. Candidate policy proposals should be specific, visible, clear, and differentiated from those of the opposition. However, this requirement is not met often due to candidates' electoral strategies. The strategies of both candidates in a two-candidate race usually lead them to adopt roughly equivalent issue positions (see Anthony Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy).

Moreover, campaign news coverage tends to focus on the horse race aspect of the campaign, neglecting campaign substance such as candidates' issue positions. Secondly, citizens should possess policy preferences, be attentive to the proposals presented by competing candidates, and accurately perceive the policy alternatives that each candidate represents. Most people, however, do not possess policy preferences about what the government should do. They are not attentive to policy proposals, either, as a result of their preoccupation with private affairs. Moreover, although political candidates may present their specific issue positions to them, citizens have ample opportunity to project their own preferences onto their favored candidates and rationalize their preferences into agreement with those of their candidats. Also, citizens usually pay attention to the positions of candidates whom they support, which is called selective perception. Consequently, citizens usually can not accurately perceive policy alternatives. Thirdly, citizens should base their candidate choice on their accurate perceptions of candidate policy preferences and vote for the candidate who best approximates their own policy preferences. This requirement can not be met given the unreality of the preceding two conditions.

5 The opposition party was led by co-leaders, Kim, Y. S. and Kim, D. J.

6 This tendecy has already been shown in the analysis of the 1988 Congresional Election. For a full discussion of the Korean party system, see C. I. Eugene Kim and Young Whan Kihl (eds.), Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Spring, Maryland: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976).

7 Mildred A. Schwartz, Politics and Territory (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974), P. 134-35.

8 Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press, 1967), P. 41.

9 At the time of our survey, the "Reunification Democratic" Party was being led by Kim, Y. S. and Kim,. D. J., and thus should be regarded as the traditional opposition party. But our survey indicates that the party did not enjoy wide support, even less than the "New Democratic" Party did. Such unexpected results seem understandable, taking into account the drastic change in the political situation which took place in May, 1988. In the midst of turmoil, largely caused by the student movement, the "New Democratic" Party collapsed and a new party named the "Reunification Democratic" Party was suddenly created. Thus most of the respondents seemed to be confused about the name of the traditional opposition party.

Chapter V. The impact of regionalism upon orientations toward the political community

Viewed from the standpoint of political development, the problem of support for the political community is equivalent to creating a sense of national identity.[1] National identity refers to the emotional attachments that an individual has to the nation-state. The sense of national identity provides a base for the individual to orient himself politically. As Easton puts it, "At least in modern societies, especially where cultural diversity prevails, national identification does have a strong political coloring, of necessity."[2] Also, Sidney Verba argues for the crucial importance of national identity among members of a system. According to him:

> It is the sense of identity with the nation that legitimizes the activities of national elites and makes it possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of their followers. The most potent kind of commitment that political elites can arouse is to the political system per se--that is , a commitment to it over and above its actual performance. It is only such a rain-or-shine commitment that will allow a system to survive the many kinds of crises that are likely to arise during processes of rapid social change.[3]

Certainly, any sort of political development would be inconceivable without securing first among members of a political system the consciousness of belongingness to a nation-state. This sense of loyalties to a nation as a whole, helps to keep the affective attachments to subnational groupings from threatening the stability of a system.

At some point in the history of any nation, however, emotional commitments to a particular political subgroup threaten national unity, creating a major political crisis. Breton and Corsican separatism in France, the recent emergence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism in Great Britain, Basque and Catalonian separatism in Spain, and the serious eruption of Quebecois separatism in Canada are current examples of severe political fragmentation. Especially in the process of modernization, a nation is likely to be faced with a problem of conflicting loyalties to the nation and subnational groups, with parochial loyalities usually prevailing over the sense of national identity.

> In modernizing societies, where the tradition of civil politics is weak and where the technical requirements for an effective welfare government are poorly understood, primordial attachments tend...to be repeatedly, in some cases almost continuously, proposed and widely acclaimed as preferred bases for the demarcation of antonomous political units.[4]

In fact, Lucian Pye views the thinness of support for a nation because of higher allegiances to subgroups as one of major identity crises occurring in the process of political development.[5]

> This is the identity crisis that arises when the "state" functions of the "nation-state" cannot be satisfactorily carried out because they are not supported by a full sense of a "nationhood.[6]

Applied to the current Korean political context in which regionalism has been an important primordial factor in national politics, this means that

identifications as Honamers or Yungnamers, if they supercede identifications as Koreans, would constitute a major threat to the maintenance of national unity.

Sidney Verba suggests several ways of resolving conflicts between community loyalty and loyalty to some subnational unit.[7] One form of resolution may be an intense nationalism, suggesting that commitment to a nation-state may replace other loyalties. This solution emphasizes a nation-state as the one and only object of individual commitment. However, where primordial ties are strong enough to resist any enforcement of unique loyalty to a nation, this solution would most likely exacerbate national fragmentation.

Another possibility is a balance between community loyalties and parochial commitment in which the former is added to but does not replace the latter. Here, a large portion of the population need have a strong and positive identification with their nation. At the same time they develop a multiple set of loyalties and identifications to other social groupings. This sort of co-existence of national identifications and parochial loyalities would be made possible because demands on members of local communities for national loyalty are not perceived to be threats to the survival of their communities. However, the nation comes first when loyalty and commitment to the nation-state is in conflict with commitments to other social units. For Verba, this latter solution is most suited to the creation of a democratic political culture. Also, Walter Rosenbaum conceives the existence of a "relatively consistent and hierarchical political identification" as one of the core elements of an integrated political

culture conducive to democratic life.[8] In the current Korean political context in which regionalism as a political force is powerful, the maintenance of a balance between loyalties to the nation and parochial commitments to a specific region, rather than the enforcement of exclusive commitments to the nation, seems to be the best political strategy for achieving national unity.

Another dimension of support for community is what Easton has called the sense of community--"the amount of affective orientation the member of a political system has toward the other members of the community.[9] Thus the sense of community relates to the horizontal identification with one's fellow citizen; that is, the sense of integration psychologically embraced as "we" and "us." As Devine has pointed out, the diffusion of a cooperative attitude of trust among members of a political system is essential to the enhancement of a sense of community.[10] The diffusion of trust among members of the system strengthens the willingness of certain groups to work with other social groups in seeking collective goals, because the political ascendency of other groups would not be perceived to threaten one's own group's interests, thereby strengthening the horizontal dimension of community. In this regard, Rosenbaum embraces "diffuse political trust among social groups" as one of the principal characteristics of an integrated political culture.[11]

So far we have described two different ways in which an individual relates to the political community--sense of national identity and sense of

community identity. The next question to be asked is : How does regionalism in Korea affect these two aspects of support for community. Our survey deals with only how the citizens in each region feel about their nation, Korea. The "national identity" items are comprised of three questions touching different sentimental aspects of love for their country. The first two items directly relate to emotional commitment to the nation, and the other relates to the behavioral dimension of national identity.

Firstly, respondents are asked to agree or disagree to the statement: "I am proud of being born in Korea." As Table 5-1 shows, 73.5 percent of the Honam citizens said "strongly agree," and an additional 9.3 percent said

Table 5-1: "Pride in being born in Korea"
(in Percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	73.5	62.8
Agree	9.3	21.5
So and so	11.4	11.2
Disagree	4.8	3.7
Strongly disagree	1.1	0.3
Don't know	0.0	0.5
Total	100.1	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 25.82866$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0001
C. C. = .18211

"agree," demonstrating that a large majority of Honam citizens (82.8 %) feel very proud of being born in their country. Respondents who answered

"strongly agree," or "agree" constituted 62.8 percent and 21.5 percent of the Yungnam people, respectively. Thus, 84.3 percent of the Yungnam people took pride in their country.

Only a small fraction of citizens in each region thought it a shame to be born in their country. It was 5.9 percent for the Honam sample and 4.0 percent for the Yungnam sample. Looking at the proportion of respondents who expressed pride in their country and disregarding the strength of feelings, no difference is observed between the Honam and Yungnam regions. Some differences, however, can be discerned between the two regions in terms of the intensity of national identity. "Strongly agree" responses were more frequently expressed in Honam (73.5 %) than Yungnam (62.8 %). It follows, then, that intensity of national identity is stronger in Honam. Such regional differences are observed again even after the

Chart 5-1: "Pride in being born in Korea"
(Percent strongly agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

variations due to education have been taken into account (See Chart 5-1). Initially observed differences do not decrease after controls are introduced.

Respondents were next asked to evaluate fellow Koreans in ability relative to people of other countries. Similar patterns of national identity are observed in the item asking to disgree or agree to the statement: "Korean people are superior to people of other countries." 76.4 percent of the Honam people said, as may be seen Table 5-2, that their people are superior relative to other peoples, and 75.6 percent of the Yungnam people did the same.

Table 5-2: "Superiority of Koreans"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	57.0	46.3
Agree	19.4	29.3
So and so	15.4	17.3
Disagree	6.9	6.6
Strongly disagree	1.3	0.3
Don't know	0.0	0.3
Total	100.0	100.1
(N)	(377)	(376)

X^2 = 15.88556 D. F. = 5 Significance = .0072
C. C. = .14374

Looking at the "disagreement" responses, barely more than 8 percent of the Honam citizens and less than 7 percent of the Yungnam people disagreed with the statement. Thus, large majorities of the Honam and Yungnam citizens showed a strong belief in their people's superiority. As in the case of the "pride" item, regional differences could be observed in terms of the intensity of positive responses. More Honam respondents (57.0 %) than Yungnam respondents (46.3 %) said "strongly agree," implying that feelings of love of a country is, as compared with Yungnam, more intense in Honam. Such regional differences did not disappear when the effects of education has been considered (See Chart 5-2), but most of the results are not statistically significant.

Chart 5-2: "Superiority of Koreans"
(Percent strongly agreeing)



Note: "*" indicates statistically significance at the level of .05.

Finally, national identity is measured in behavioral terms regarding displays of reverence for the national flag. Respondents were asked whether they paid their respects to the national flag. As may be seen in Table 5-3, a clear majority in each region agreed to the statement: "I stop to salute the national flag when it is being lowered." Most Yungnam citizens (81.4 %) were found to revere the national flag. Also, a large number of the Honam citizens (76.7 %) showed a considerable respect toward the flag.

Examining the frequency of disagreement responses, around 14 percent of the Honam respondents and 10 percent of the Yungnam respondents appeared to insult the national flag. On the whole, the results of Table 5-3 are somewhat different from those of Table 5-1 and 5-2; Yungnam people tended to feel reverence for the national flag slightly more than their Honam counterparts, but the regional differences are not statistically significant.

Table 5-3: "Reverence for the national flag"

	Honam	Yungnam
Strongly agree	53.6	51.3
Agree	23.1	30.1
So and so	9.0	8.2
Disagree	10.9	9.0
Strongly disagree	3.4	1.1
Don't know	0.0	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(377)	(376)

$X^2 = 10.14025$ D. F. = 5 Significance = .0714
C. C. = .11527

To summarize these findings, a sense of national identity has been found to be widely diffused among the members of the Korean political system. Koreans' national identification is both salient and intense. There is an extremely small number of citizens who do not positively identify with their nation.

Such a strong national identification may be due to the homogeneity of Korean society in terms of language, religion, and ethnicity. Contemporary Koreans also inherit a myth of national unity at least twelve hundred years old. Despite the fact that much of Korean history was marked by localism and civil strife, the tradition and forms of national unity have always been maintained. Counting from the era of the Three Kingdoms, for instance, Koguryo lasted 705 years, Paekche, 679 years, and Shilla, 992 years (including 274 years of the era of the Unified Shilla dynasty). The next dynasty, Koryo survived 479 years and Yi's Choson, which succeeded to Koryo, 518 years. Looking at recent history, the Japanese Occupation for 35 years between 1910 to 1945 provided a golden opportunity for Koreans to unite themselves so that they might be able to withstand disturbing influences from the outside and overcome internal dissension. In addition, potential cleavages were rather quickly minimized in South Korea through the unifying effects of the Korean War. The overall effect is that feelings of national identity are widespread in Korea.

Before closing this chapter, several conclusions may be drawn.

First of all, regional tensions present between Honam and Yungnam have

not yet operated to have a divisive impact on the community. Despite severe regional antagonism, the consensus on the community level is found among members of Korean political system, as evidenced in the high level of national identity. Thus, Koreans have developed loyalties and commitments to their nation along with strong regional group consciousness, producing a system which is termed "incorporative" by Verba.[12] The high level of national identity on the part of the Honam people seems to explain the absence of any separatist movement by them up to the present.

However, there is one definite shortcoming of our survey, arising out of the fact that no items were constructed to measure a sense of community identity, which is another affective dimension relating to the community level. The problem lies in whether consensus on the community level can be considered to be widespread among Koreans. It is likely that the two different components of support for the community are quite closely related.[13] A man who has a strikingly felt sense of belongingness to his nation tends to develop strong confidence in his fellow citizens as well. It is anticipated, then, that Koreans would exhibit a cooperative attitude of trust in their fellow political actors due to their strong bond of national identity.

Endnotes

1 For a reference, see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), P. 33.

2 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), P. 185.

3 Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), P. 529-530.

4 For a reference, see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Political Modernization (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971), P. 199.

5 For details, see Lucian W. Pye, "Identity and Political Cultures," in Leonard Binder et al., eds., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), P. 115-118.

6 Ibid., P. 115-116.

7 Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, op. cit., P. 533-534.

8 Walter Rosenbaum, Political Culture (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), P. 52-53. On the contrary, he views "a dominance of parochial political loyalities over national ones" as one crucial manifestation of a fragmented political culture leading to unstable political communities (P. 43).

9 For details, see Donald J. Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), P. 96. "The we-feeling or sense of community which indicates political cohesion of a group of persons regardless of regime they have or may develop," Easton writes,

"consists of the feeling of belonging together as a group which, because it shares a political structure, also shares a political fate." For a reference, see Easton, op. cit., P. 185.

10 For a reference, see Devine, op. cit., P. 96.

11 For details, see Rosenbaum, op. cit., P. 54-55. On the contrary, Rosenbaum views "the prevalence of political distrust between social groups" as one of main elements of fragmented political culture (P. 46).

12 Sidney Verba, "Comparative Politcal Culture," in Pye and Verba, op.cit., P. 533. He conceives this system as most conducive to the creation of democratic politcal life.

13 For details, see Ibid., P. 536-537.

Chapter VI. Conclusion

The topics raised in this study are twofold: Firstly, what factors contribute to the salience of a region?; Secondly, what impact do regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam have upon the political system?

Referring to factors leading to territorial strains, much evidence was used to demonstrate regional imbalances between the Honam and Yungnam regions. Economic, political, social attributes of a region were regarded as key factors in fostering territorial cleavages between the two regions. It turned out that the Yungnam region has enjoyed more economic, social, and political rewards than the Honam region.

No evaluation of the relative contribution of those objective conditions to territorial strains was made. Yet political differentials could be regarded as the most important independent variable in promoting the territorial tensions. As in other nations, the dynamics of Korean society is largely dependent on political factors. Political ingredients determine the economic, social, and even cultural characteristics of Korean society. Regional imbalances could in this sense be traced to the dominance of the Yungnam region on the political stage. Such political differentials have been documented throughout the history of Korea, as may be seen in Section 2 of Chapter 2. Especially since 1961, when General Park, a native son of Yungnam, took political power, Honam people have been persistently disadvantaged in political rewards, whereas Yungnam people have dominated the political stage.

However, psychological factors, even without the presence of objective conditions, were considered to be a more important determinant in influencing continued regional divisiveness. Because ordinary citizens are preoccupied with their private affairs, they rarely become informed about political affairs. As a result, they are not likely to be involved in a complicated process of scientific analysis of objective conditions. Self-perceptions in this sense play a more important role in arousing the salience of a region. As a way of demonstrating the significant role of psychological factors in territorial politics, the results of our survey were used. They illustrate that Honam residents tend to feel that they are deprived in the distribution of wealth, compared to Yungnam. They even attribute the causes of disparities in the economic well-being to the problem of the political system favoring the Yungnam region at the cost of their region, rather than their lack of effort. Also, residents from Honam tend to feel that it is important for success in life where one was born. This sort of pessimistic view has grown in Honam as the result of Honamers' recognition of disparities in the distribution of power which is weighted in favor of people from Yungnam. Such feelings about one's own region is a precondition for political alienation, which can lead, in turn, either to extremist movements or to withdrawal from politics.

In contrast, Yungnam people are reluctant to acknowledge their advantage in economic rewards. Regional equality in the distribution of wealth is their way of viewing the economic situation. Also, Yungnam people are firmly convinced that ability is all it takes to make one a success in the world, overtly denying the importance of native place. They

do not admit the importance of the native place in success in life. As a result, they tend to take the position that promotion to a high social position is due to ability. All of these considerations reflect the advantaged political situation of Yungnam people.

The sense of regional group consciousness is based on the felt sense of the salience of a region. Our survey shows that regional identity in both regions is extremely high. The strong regional identity in the Honam region is related to the Honam people's felt sense of alienation, whereas that in the Yungnam region is associated with their feelings of superiority. It has been assumed that the likelihood of interregional tension and conflict increases where regional identity is strong. Thus, the high sense of regional identity creates a potential for the emergence of regional tensions and even for group activities based upon narrow regional group interests, as opposed to widespread concern for the well-being of whole nation.

The dynamics of regionalism in South Korea are manifested along three interrelated and interacting dimensions--perceptions rooted in objective conditions, the emergence of regional group consciousness, and the influence of regionalism upon the political system. Through this whole interrelated process, regional cleavages between Honam and Yungnam are produced, maintained, and even fostered. Given these factors, what impact do such regional tensions have upon the operation of the Korean political system?

Drawing heavily upon Easton's classification, we have analyzed the impact of regionalism upon the three different levels of the political system--the community, the regime, and the political authorities. It was

found that regional tensions present between Honam and Yungnam affected the two regions quite differently. Confidence in the regime structure and political authorities is by and large low in both regions. But distinct regional patterns could be observed. We recall from Section 1 of Chapter 3 that critical views are more prominent in Honam than in Yungnam. The antiregime sentiment in Honam might reflect Honam citizens' grievances about Honam's disadvantaged position in national politics. Thus, Honam people regard political democracy as the most imminent and important issue to be pursued. And that is why they expect the future political situation to be more democracy-oriented than ever. In contrast, a relatively pro-government sentiment in Yungnam might be due to widespread appreciation of Yungnam's advantaged position among Yungnam citizens.

Also, consensus on democratic regime norms was found to be relatively low in both regions. Citizens in both regions generally appeared to be politically inefficacious, politically uninformed and uninterested, relatively inactive in actual political practice, and politically intolerant. Nonetheless, marked and persistent regional differences were observed. Of all the dimensions we considered, Yungnam people persistently exhibited a higher level of support for democratic norms than Honam people.

Despite the low level of consensus on the regime and political authorities, citizens in both regions show an extremely high sense of national identity. Through the sharing of common ethnic, racial, and linguistic identifications, a deep sense of national identity has not been diminished by specific disagreements on the authorities and regime. This

result suggests that territorial cleavages have not affected orientations toward the political community. Such widespread consensus on the community accounts for the absence of separatist movements in Korean politics. In other words, the strong sense of regional affiliation on the part of the Honam people does not lead to separatist tendencies, because their identifications involve a strong commitment to Korea as well.

However, we judge the potential for political unrest to be great in the Honam region. In this regard, regional patterns of participation in non-electoral politics--that is, of illegitimate political activities--deserve a special attention. Our survey demonstrates distinct regional differences in the propensity of citizens to support anti-regime activities. The Honam people, because of their strikingly felt sense of alienation from national politics, view electoral participation to be ineffectual in realizing regional equality, and thus in improving their disadvantaged position. That is why they regard mass movements as the important way of approaching political democracy of Korea. The Honam people appeared, as compared with Yungnam people, to be more supportive of student demonstrations which can be regared as one form of antigovernment activity. Also, Honam citizens tend to deny that legal activities of the Congress or political parties are the only ways of realizing political democracy in Korea. As mentioned before, however, a strong sense of national identity seems to prevent Honam people from involving themselves in a separatist movement. Yungnam people, in contrast, tend to be unsupportive of illegitimate political activities as channels for expressing discontent.

Also, regional cleavages between Honam and Yungnam are manifested in the electoral behavior and party system unique to each region. Regional patterns of electoral behavior, as may be seen in Section 1 of Chapter 4, reflect political circumstances surrounding people's place of residence. The results of the past four presidential elections of South Korea revealed the tendency of voters to cast their ballots according to regional affiliation. For a majority of the Korean electorate, geographical attachments to a candidate have played a determinant role in the vote decision. Thus, each candidate tried to project a strong regional image, rather than appeal to issues. Such regional voting can have serious dysfunctional consequences with respect to the political integration of South Korea.

The political party system was examined as another mirror of territoral cleavages present in South Korea in general, and between Honam and Yungnam in particular. Recently, four large political parties emerged as advocates of specific regional interests, rather than interests of the whole population. The presence of the regionally based parties provides one of the most important mechanisms for transforming regional group consciousness into genuine interest groups to advance the residents' causes in the dynamics of territorial politics in South Korea. Where the parties are only concerned with the well-being of people living within specific areas, the likelihood of regional cleavages becomes greater. Also, a fragmented party system consisting of exclusively regionally identified parties is incapable of producing positive outcomes in the parliamentary process. In addition, given the short history of the party system in Korea,

parties tend to be geographically identified with the leader, regardless of party policies or ideological grounds. Thus, each of the existing four major parties has its base of support in the native area of its leader. As evidenced in the results of the 13th Congressional Election held in April, 1988, each party generated massive support in its leader's native area.

We conceptualized the ideal democratic society as one in which consensus on the regime and community is widespread, but support for the authorities (including parties) is moderate with small variations between groups. We found that trust in the political authorities is relatively low in the Honam and Yungnam regions, and that variance in trust between the two regions is substantial. Critical attitudes toward the political authorities were found to be more prominent in Honam than in Yungnam. What this result suggests is that, in Gamson's terms, the Korean polity is inefficient in its achievement of common goals, and also, that it is biased in the distribution of benefits.[1]

Also, it was found that cleavages at the partisan level are very substantial. Each party is geographically based, regardless of its policy or ideological positions. Consequently, each of the existing largest four political parties captured most of the Congressional seats alloted to its supporting region in the 1988 Congressional Election, but lost heavily in other regions. Political parties in Korea, then, should be regarded as being representative of narrow regional group interests, rather than national well-being. This fragmented political party system, of course, causes a serious problem for the political integration of South Korea.

Despite severe political divisions, however, Koreans manifest a remarkable overarching attitude of solidarity--a strong sense of national identity. Identity with the nation was found to be widely diffused among the members of the Korean political system, including the politically alienated Honam people. The presence of severe inter-regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam do not echo in the orientations toward the national level.

It is needless to say, then, that the Korean polity, characterized by widespread political disagreements regarding the regime and the authorities, but strong national solidarity, is far from the ideal state of democracy. Thus, the Korean polity does not bear out the ideal state of democratic political life--a balance between consensus and cleavage.

It would seem, then, that the existence of enormous regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam, and the operation of the contemporary Korean polity looks somewhat paradoxical. Viewed from the standpoint of political stability, some element must be at work to overcome the stress to the system and maintain its stability. The final question raised at this point is this: How can Koreans manage to overcome the cleavages and divisiveness associated with extreme regional tensions?

Any characterization of contemporary Korean polity must take into acccount two sets of facts: those making for unity and stability, and those making for diversity, stress, and tension. A high level of support for the community seems to be important for the unity and stability of the Korean political system. Consensus on the community level tends to hold up under conditions of conflicts and crises. It may provide one of the plausible

explanations for the persistence of the Korean political system under stress. It conditions and sets limits to the divisive impact of regionalism upon the political system, thus alleviating severe cleavages.

As Almond and Verba have pointed out, "the management of cleavage is accomplished by subordinating conflicts on the political level to some higher, overarching attitudes of solidarity,"[2] that is, in the Korean case, a strong sense of national identity. Thus, national sentiments tend to make for certain kinds of political agreement, despite severe cleavages in the regime and authorities. Korea is, then, preeminently a community system in Eckstein's terms, in which national unity is maintained despite political division.[3]

To conclude, some comments are in order. It is often asserted that Korea, as a homogeneous society in terms of racial and linguistic factors, lacks a strong basis for social cleavages.[4] However, territorial strains, resulting mainly from uneven progress among regions in the process of modernization, have worked to undermine social unity in Korea today. The Yungnam region, as the main beneficiary of development programs since 1960s, has enjoyed remarkable and persistent economic, social, and political rewards, whereas the Honam region has been persistently excluded from the benefits of national policies. Such uneven progress has resulted in today's regional conflicts between Honam and Yungnam. And regional strains present between the two regions are so severe as to cast serious problem on the political integration of South Korea. Regional tensions led to disagreements among members of the Korean political

system on the authority and regime level. Citizens, especially in the Honam region, persistently displayed a critical attitude toward the authority and regime.

Nonetheless, Korea, although it certainly does not deserve to be called a "democracy," has maintained social cohesion in the face of such serious regional cleavages, largely through attachment to the nation "Korea," among members of the system. Generalized support for the community is, then, an important way of explaining how the Korean polity is able to maintain itself in the face of severe stress.

Endnotes

1 For details, see William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illi.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), P. 53-54.

2 For a reference, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), P. 492.

3 For details, see Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), P. 193-194. In addition, he introduces two other types of systems in which consensus and cleavage are balanced. One is a consensus system in which "cohesion results from a low degree of political division (P. 193)." The other is a mechanically integrated system in which "cohesion results largely from political divisions themselves, either directly through their countervailing effects on one another or indirectly through the moderating effects--the tendency to scale down political demands--that Truman and Kornhauser both attribute to overlapping memberships (P. 193)."

4 For more information, see Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), P. 13-35.

Bibliography

English-Language Sources

Aberback, Joel. "Alienation and Political Behavior." American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 86-99.

Abramson, Paul R. and Finifter, A. W. "On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978." American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981), 297-307.

_____, and Inglehart, R. "The Development of Systematic Support in Four Western Democracies." Comparative Political Studies, 2 (1970), 419-42.

Agger, Robert E.; Goldstein, Marshall N.; and Pearl, Stanley A. "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning." Journal of Politics, 23 (1961), 477-506.

Ake, Claude. "Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis." World Politics, 19 (April 1967), 486-99.

_____. A Theory of Political Integration. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967.

Allardt, Eric, and Yrjo, Littunen. (eds.) Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology. Helsinki: Westermarch society, 1964.

Almond, Gabriel, and Coleman, James S. (eds.) The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

_____, and Powell, G. Gingham. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966.

_____, and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Angell, Robert. The Integration of American Society. New York: McGraw-Hill Book C., 1941.

Applebaum, Richard P. Theories of Social Change. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970.

Apter, David E. (ed.) Ideology and Discontent. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

_____. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Atkinson, M. M.; Coleman, W. D.; and Lewis, T. J. "Regime Support in Canada: A Comment." British Journal of Political Science, 10 (1980), 402-409.

Bachrach, Peter. The Theoy of Democratic Elitism. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

Bendix, Reinhard. Nation-Buinding and Citizenship. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964.

Bennett, Lance W. Public Opinion in American Politics. New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc., 1980.

Bentley, Arthur F. The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures. Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1935.

Berelson, Bernard R. "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion." Public Opinion Quarterly, 16 (Fall 1952), 313-330.

_____; Lazarsfeld, Paul L.; and McPhee, William M. Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Berman, D. R., and Stookey, J. A. "Adolescents, Television, and Support for Government." Public Opinion Quarterly, 44 (1980), 330-40.

Bertsch, Gary K. Nation-Building in Yugoslavia. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971.

Binder, Leonard. "National Integration and Political Development." American Political Science Review, 58 (September 1964), 622-63.

_____ et al. (ed.) Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Birch, Anthony H. Political Integration and Disintegration in the British Isles. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977.

Blake, Donald E. "The Measurement of Regionalism in Canadian Voting Patterns." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 5 (March 1972), 55-81.

Bondurant, Joan. Regionalism Versus Provincialism: A Study in Problems of Indian National Unity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.

Butwell, Richard. "Individual and Collective Identity in Nation Building." World Politics, 15 (April 1963), 488-94.

Campbell, Angus; Gurin, Gerald; and Miller, Warren E. The Voter Decides. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954.

Campbell, Angus; Converse, Philip E.; Miller, Warren E.; and Stokes, Donald E. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960.

Carter, Gwendolyn M. (ed.) National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966.

Citrin, Jach. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 973-88.

_____; McClosky, Herbert; Shanks, Merrill; and Sniderman, Paul. "Personal and Political Sources of Political Alienation." British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), 1-31.

Coleman, James. "The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa,"

Western Political Quarterly, 8 (March 1955), 44-58.

_____ and Rosberg, Carl. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966.

Converse, Philip E. "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelsen W. Polsby. (eds.) Handbook of Political Science. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

_____. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." in David E. Apter. (ed.) Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press, 1964.

Corbett, Michael. Political Tolerance in America: Freedom and Equality in Public Attitudes. New York: Longman Inc., 1982.

Coser, Lewis A. The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956.

Cox, Kevin R. "On the Utility and Definition of Regions in Comparative Political Sociology." Comparative Political Studies, 2 (April 1969), 68-98.

Craig, Stephen C. and Maggioto, Michael A. "Political Discontent and Political Action." Journal of Politics, 43 (1981), 514-22.

Dahl, Robert A. "Further Reflections on the 'Elitist' Theory of Democracy." American Political Science Review, 60 (June 1966), 296-305.

_____. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

_____. Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

_____ and Lindblom, Charles E. Politics, Economic and Welfare. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1953.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford,

Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959.

Daniel, J. E. Welsh Nationalism: What It Stands For. London: Foyles Welsh, Co., 1937.

Dean, Dwight G. "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement." American Sociological Review, 25 (1961), 753-58.

Dennis, Jach. "Public Support for Congress." Political Behavior, 3 (1981), 319-50.

_____ ; Lindberg, Leon; McCrone, Donald; and Stiefbold, Rodney. "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems." Comparative Political Studies, 1 (April 1968), 71-101.

Deutsch, Karl W. "Communication Theory and Political Integration." in P. Jacob and J. Toscano. (eds.) The Integration of Political Communities. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964.

_____. Nationalism and Communication. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953.

_____. "The Price of Integration." in P. Jacob and J. Toscano. (eds.) The Integration of Political Communities. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1964.

Devine, Donald J. The Political Culture of the United States. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972.

Dickinson, Robert E. Regional Ecology: The Study of Man's Environment. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970.

Douglas, William A. "The Role of Political Parties: Symposium." Korea Journal, 3 (September 1961), 31-33.

Downs, Anthony. Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, Harper, 1957

Duke, James T. Conflict and Power in Social Life. Brigham Young

University Press, 1976.

Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press, 1964.

_____. Professional Ethics and Civil Morals. Glencoe, Illi.: Free Press, 1958.

Dye, Thomas R. The Politics of Equality. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.

Easton, David. "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support." British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), 435-57.

_____. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley, 1965.

_____. "Theoretical Approaches to Political Support." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 9 (1976), 431-448.

_____ and Hess, Robert D. "The Child's Changing Image of the President." Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 632-44.

_____. "Youth and the Political System." in Seymour Martin Lipset and Leo Lowenthal. (eds.) Culture and Social Character. New York: Free Press, 1961.

Eckstein, Harry. Division and Cohesion in Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

_____. (ed.) Internal War: Problems and Approaches. New York: Free Press, 1963.

_____. A Theory of Stable Democracy. Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1961.

Edwards, George C. The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964.

Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism: A View from the States. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972.

_____. Cities of the Prairie. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970.

Emerson, Rupert. "Nationalism and Political Development." Journal of Politics, 22 (February, 1960), 3-28.

Erickson, Robert S., and Luttbeg, Norman R. American Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley, 1973.

Erickson, Robert S.; Luttbeg, Norman R.; and Tedin, Dent L. American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980.

Etzioni, Amitai. "A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification." World Politics, 15 (October, 1962), 44-74.

Ferrar, J. W. "The Dimensions of Tolerance." Pacific Sociological Review, 19 (1976), 63-81.

Fields, J. M., and Schuman, H. "Public Beliefs About the Beliefs of the Public." Public Opinion Qurterly, 40 (1976-77), 427-48.

Finifter, Adaw. "Dimensions of Political Alienation." American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970), 389-410.

Fisher, Jack C. Yugoslavia: A Multinational State. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1966.

Frank, A. G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.

Gamson, William A. Power and Discontent. Homewood, Illi.: Dorsey Press, 1968.

Geertz, Clifford. (ed.) Old Societies and New States. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

Gilmour, Robert S., and Lamb, Robert B. Political Alienation in Contemporary America. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.

Glenn, Normal D., and Simmons, J. L. "Are Regional Differences Diminishing?" Public Opinion Quarterly, 31 (Summer 1967), 176-93.

Gooch, Robert K. Regionslism in France. New York: Century Press, 1931.

Gordon, L. "Economic Regionalism Reconsidered." World Politics, 13 (1961), 231-53.

Gonzales-Casanova, Pablo. "Internal Colonialism and National Development." Studies in Comparative International Development, 1 (1965).

Green, Alan G "Regional Inequality, Structural Change, and Economic Growth in Canada--1890-1956." Economic Development and Cultural Change, 4 (July 1969), 567-83.

Green, Leslie. "Support for the System." British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 127-42.

Green, Thomas H. Comparative Revolutionary Movements. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.

Greenberg, Edward. The American Political System: A Radical Approach. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1977.

Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.

Halebsk, Sandor. Mass Society and Political Conflict: Toward a Reconstruction of Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Han, Y. C. "Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea."

Pacific Affairs, 42 (1969), 446-64.

Henderson, Gregory. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Herberle, R. "Regionalism: Some Critical Observation." Social Forces, 21 (1943), 280-86.

Herson, Lawrence J. R., and Hofstetter, C. Richard. "Tolerance, Consensus, and the Democratic Creed: A Contextual Exploration." Journal of Politics, 37 (November 1975), 528-36.

Hess, Robert D., and Torney, Judith. The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. Chicago: Aldine Press, 1967.

Hetcher, Michael. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.

_____. "Regional Inequality and National Integration in the British Isles." Journal of Social History, 5 (Fall 1971), 96-117.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. "The Dynamics of Political Support for American Presidents among Occupational and Partisan Groups." American Journal of Political Science, 26 (1982), 312-32.

Hirschman, Albert O. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Hooper, Michael. "A Multivariate Approach to the Measurement and Analysis of Social Identity." Psychological Reports, 57 (1985).

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Hyman, Herbert H., and Eleanor, Singer. (eds.) Readings in Reference Group Theory and Research. New York: Free Press, 1968.

Iyengar, Shanto. "Subjective Political Efficacy as a Measure of Diffuse Support." The Public Opinion Quarterly, 44 (1980), 249-56.

Jackman, Robert W. "Political Elies, Mass Publics, and Support for Democratic Principles." Journal of Politics, 34 (August 1972), 753-73.

_____. "Political Parties, Voting and National Integration: The Canadian Case." Comparative Politics, 4 (1972), 511-36.

Jacob, Philip E., and Tuene, H. (eds.) The Integration of Political Communities. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964.

Janenhaus, Joseph and Murphy, Walter. "Patterns of Public Support for the Supreme Court: A Panel Study." Journal of Politics, 43 (1981), 24-39.

Jensen, Merrill. (ed.) Regionalism in America. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951.

Jewell, M. E., and Kim, C. L. "Sources of Support for the Legislature in a Developing Nation: the Case of Korea." Comparative Political Studies, 8 (1976), 461-89.

Katz, Elihu, and Lazarsfeld, Paul F. Personal Influence. New York: Free Press, 1955.

Kautsky, John H. (ed.) Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism. New York: Wiley, 1962.

Key, Valdimer O., Jr. The Responsible Electorate. Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966.

Kim, Bun-Woong. "Korean Political Tradition and Democratic Elitism." Korea Journal, 17 (October 1977), 4-11.

Kim, Chong Lim. (ed.) Political Participation in Korea. Santa Barba, Calif.: Clio Books, 1980.

Kim, C. I. Eugene. "The Meanings of the 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattern of

Political Development." Asian Survey, 12 (March 1972), 213-24.

_____. "Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections." Pacific Affairs, 41 (Spring 1968), 60-70.

_____. (ed.) A Patterns of Political Development: Korea. Kalamazoo, Mich.: KRP, 1964.

_____. Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections." Asian Survey, 4 (March 1964), 765-73.

_____, and Kihl, Young Whan. (eds.) Party Politics and Elections in Korea. Silver Spring, Md.: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976.

Kim, Kyong-su. "Political Parties and Party Politics in Korea." Korea Journal, 7 (June 1967), 4-9.

Kim, Young-jun. "Development of Party Politics in Korea." Korean Frontier, 2 (March 1971), 3-10.

Klapper, Joseph. The Effects of Mass Communication. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960.

Ko, Yong-bok. "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea." Koreana Quarterly, 9 (Summer 1967), 18-37.

Kohn, Hans. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origin and Background. New York: Macmillan, 1961.

Kornberg, A.; Clarke, H. D.; and LeDuc, L. "Some Correlates of Regime Support in Canada." British Journal of Political Science, 8 (1978), 199-216.

_____. "Regime Support in Canada: A Rejoinder." British Journal of Political Science, 10 (1980), 410-16.

Kornberg, A.; Clarke, H. D.; and Stewart, M. "Federalism and Fragmentation: Political Support in Canada." Journal of Politics, 41 (1971), 889-906.

_____. "Public Support for Community and Regime in the Regions of Contemporary Canada." American Review of Canadian Studies, 10 (1980), 75-93.

Kornberg, A., and Pittman, K. "Representative and Military Bodies: Their Roles in the Survival of Political Systems in New States." in J. Smith and L. D. Musolf. (eds.) Legislatures in Development. Durhan, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1979.

Kornhauser, Authur; Sheppard, William Harold; and Mayer, Albert J. When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers. New York: University Books, 1956.

Kornhauser, William. The Politics of Mass Society. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959.

Lane, Robert E. Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. New York:The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

_____. Political Life. New York: Free Press, 1959.

_____, and Sears, David O. Public Opinion. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Lang, Nicholas R. "The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia." World Politics, 27 (1975), 309-35.

LaPalombara, Joseph. Interest Groups in Italian Politics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Press, 1964.

Lawrence, David G. "Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment." American Political Science Review, 70 (March 1976), 80-100

Lee, Chong-sik. "Development of Party Politics in Korea." Koreana Quarterly, 9 (Summer 1967), 1-17.

_____. The Politics of Korean Nationalism. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1963.

Lee, Tong-won. "The Korean Party Politics: Past and Future." Koreana Quarterly, 5 (March 1963), 100-112.

Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

Lipset, Seymour M. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind. London: Free Press, 1983.

_____. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York: Doubleday, 1963.

_____, and Rokkan, Stein. (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: Free Press, 1967.

_____, and Schneider, Wiliam. "The Decline of Confidence in American Institutions." Political Science Quarterly, 98 (1983), 379-402.

_____. "Is There a Legitimacy Crisis?" Micropolitics, 3 (1983), 1-37.

Litt, Edgar. "Political Cynicism and Political Futility." The Journal of Politics, 25 (1963), 312-23.

Loewenberg, G. "The Influence of Parliamentary Behavior on Regime Stability: Some Conceptual Clarifications." Comparative Politics, 3 (1971), 177-200.

_____. "The Institutionalization of Parliament and Public Orientation to the Political System." in A. Kornberg. (ed.) Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. New York: David McKay, 1973.

Lowie, Robert H. The Origin of the State. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927.

Lustick, I. "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism

Versus Control." World Politics, 31 (1979), 325-44.

Maine, Henry. Ancient Law. London: Murray, 1861.

Manheim, Jarol B. The Politics Within. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975.

Markus, G. B. "Political Environment and the Dynamics of Public Attitudes: A Panel Study." American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 338-59.

Martin, James G., and Westie, Frank R. "The Tolerant Personality." American Sociological Review, 24 (August 1959), 521-28.

McClosky, Herbert. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics." American Political Science Review, 58 (June 1964), 361-82.

Merrill, Gordon. "Regionalism and Nationalism." in John Warkentin. (ed.) Canada, A Geographical Interpretation. Toronto: Methuen, 1968.

Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957.

Milbrath, Lester W., and Goel, M. L. Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1977.

Miller, Arthur H. "Political Issues and Trust in Government 1964-1970." American Political Science Review, 68 (September 1974), 951-72.

_____. "Regaining Confidence: Challenge for Yet Another Administration (Declining Trust in Government; United States)." National Forum, 61 (1981), 30-33.

Mitchell, William C. The American Polity. New York: The Free Press, 1962.

Morgan, Roger. (ed.) Regionalism in European Politics. London: Policy Studies Institute, 1986.

_____; D'Alcantara, G.; and Genot A. (eds.) The Reality of Regionalism in Europe: Its Impact on Political Institutions. Leuven and Amersfoort: Acco Publications, 1986.

Morris-Jones, W. H. "In Defense of Apathy; Some Doubts on the Duty to Vote." Political Studies, 2 (February 1954), 33-37.

Muller, Edward M. Aggressive Political Participation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

_____. "The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support." American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), 1149-66.

_____, and Jukam, Thomas. "On the Meaning of Political Support." American Political Science Review, 71 (1977), 1149-66.

_____; Jukam, Thomas; and Seligson, Mitchell. "Diffuse Political Support and Anti System Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis." American Journal of Political Science, 26 (1982), 240-64.

_____, and Williams, C. J. "Dynamics of Political Support-Alienation." Comparative Political Studies, 13 (1980), 33-59.

Nilson, Douglas C. and Nilson, Linda B. "Trust in Elites and Protest Orientation: An Integrative Approach." Political Behavior, 2 (1980), 385-404.

Nunn, Clyde Z.; Crockett, Harry J., Jr.; and Williams, J. Allen, jr. Tolerance for Nonconformity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978.

Nurmi, Hannu. "Power and Support: The Problem of Representational Democracy." Munish Social Science Review, 4 (1978), 5-24.

Nye, Joseph. S., Jr. "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement." International Organization, 22 (1968), 855-880.

_____. Pan-Africanism and East African Integration. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1965.

_____. International Regionalism: Readings. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968.

Oberschall, Anthony. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973.

Odum, Howard. Southern Regions of the United States. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936.

_____, and Moore, Harry E. American Regionalism. New York: Henry Holt, 1938.

Olorunsola, Victor A. (ed.) The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa. Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1972.

Olsen, Marvin E. "Two Categories of Political Alienation." Social Forces, 47, 288-99.

Organski, A. F. K. The Stages of Political Development. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965.

Park, Kwon-sang. "Party Politics in Korea." Korea Journal, 6 (Febuary 1966), 4-10.

Parsons, Talcott. Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

_____. Sociological Theory and Modern Society. New York: The Free Press, 1967.

_____. "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System." in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck. (eds.) American Voting Behavior. Glencoe, Illi.: Free Press, 1959.

_____, and Shils, Edward A. (eds.) Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Patterson, S. C.; Hedlund, R. D.; and Boynton, G. R. Representatives and Represented: Bases of Public Support for the American Legislatures. New York: Wiley, 1975.

Patterson, S. C.; Hedlund, R. D.; Boynton, G. R.; and Wahlke, J. "Dimensions of Support in Legislative Systems." in A. Kornberg. (ed.) Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. New York: David McKay, 1973.

Pierce, John C.; Beatty, Kathleen H.; and Hagner, Paul R. The Dynamics of American Public Opinion. Glenview, Illi.: Scot, Foresman, 1982.

Piereson, James; Sullivan, John L.; and Marcus, George. "Political Tolerance: An Overview and Some New Findings." in John C. Pierce and John L. Sullivan. (eds.) The Electorate Reconsidered. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980.

Pollock, 3d. P. H. "Participatory consequences of Internal and External Political Efficacy: A Reseach Note." Western Political Quarterly, 36 (1983), 400-409.

Prewitt, Kenneth "Political Efficacy." International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, 12 (1968), 225.

Price, Kent A. (ed.) Regional Conflict & National Policy. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.

Prothro, James W., and Grigg, Charles, M. "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement." Journal of Politics, 22 (May 1960), 276-94.

Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966.

_____. Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

_____, and Verba, Sidney. (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Rivkin, Arnold. "The Politics of Nation-Building: Problems and Preconditions." Journal of International Affairs, 56 (1962), 131-43.

Rogowski, R. Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Universtiy Press, 1974.

_____. "Political Support for Regimes: A Theoretical Inventory and Critique." in A. Kornberg & H. D. Clarke. (eds.) Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1983.

Roper, Burns. "The Limits of Public Suppport." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 442 (1979), 40-45.

Rose, Richard. Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

_____. "Public Confidence, Popular Consent. A Comparison of Britain and the United States." Public Opinion, 7 (1984), 9-11.

Rosenbaum, Walter. Political Culture. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.

Rosenberg, Morris. "Some Determinants of Political Apathy." Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (Winter 1954), 349-66.

Ross, Alf. Why Democracy? Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Ross, Edward A. The Principles of Sociology. New York: The Century Co., 1920.

Schattschneider, Elmer E. Party Government. New York: Rinehart, 1942.

Schneider, Peter; Schneider, Jane; and Hansen, Edward. "Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the

European Mediterranean." Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14 (1972), 328-50.

Schwartz, Mildred A. Politics and Territory: The Sociology of Regional Persistence in Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974.

_____. Public Opinion and Canadian Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

_____. Trends in White Attitudes Toward Negroes. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1967.

Segal, Aaron. "The Integration of Developing Countries: Some Thoughts on East Africa and Central America." Journal of Common Market Studies, 5 (1967), 252-82.

Seligson, Mitchell. "On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico." Social Indicators Research, 12 (1983),1-24.

Sharabi, Hisham B. Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab world. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965.

Sharkansky, Ira. "Economic Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems." Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (1968), 41-61.

_____. Regionalism in American Politics. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970.

Shils, Edward. Political Development in the New States. The Hague: Mouton, 1962.

Silvert, Kalman H. (ed.) Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development. New York: Random House, 1963.

Simmel, George. Conflict: The Web of Group Affiliation. Trans. K. Wolff and R. Bendix. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

Steinberger, P. J. "Social Context and Political Efficacy." Sociology and Social Research, 65 (1981), 129-41.

Stouffer, Samuel A. Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966.

Sullivan, John L.; Piereson, James; and Marcus, George E. "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s--1970s." American Political Science Review, 73 (September 1979).

Tessler, M. and Freeman, P. K. "Regime Orientation and Participant Citizenship in Developing Countries: Hypotheses and a Test With Longitudinal Data from Tunisia." Western Political Quarterly, 34 (1981), 479-98.

Tilly, C. "Revolutions and Collective Violence." in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. (eds.) Handbook of Political Science. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

Tonnies, Ferdinand. Community and Society. Trans., and ed. Charles P. Loomis. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963.

Trow, M. "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and Support for McCarthy." American Journal of Sociology, 54 (1958), 270-81.

Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Turkel, Gerald. "Legitimation, Authority and Consensus Formation." International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 8 (1980), 19-32.

Useem, Bert. "Trust in Government and the Boston Anti-Busing Movement." Western Political Quarterly, 35 (1982), 81-91.

_____, and Useem, Michael. "Government Legitimacy and Political Stability." Social Forces, 57 (1979), 840-52.

Useem, Michael. Conscription, Protest, and Social Conflict: The Life and Death of a Draft Resistance Movement. New York: Wiley, 1973.

_____. Protest Movements in America. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975.

Vance, Rupert B. "Region." in David L. Sills. (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 13 (1968), 377-78.

Verba, Sidney, and Nie, Norman. Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

_____. Political Participation. New York: Harper & Row, 1973

Wade, Mason. (ed.) Regionalism in the Canadian Community, 1867-1967. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.

Wahlke, J. "Policy Demands and System Support: The Role of the Represented." British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 271-90.

Walker, Jack L. "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy." American Political Science Review, 60 (June 1966), 285-95.

Ward, Barbara. Nationalism and Ideology. New York: Norton, 1966.

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Trans. Talcott Parsons and A. M. Henderson. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

Weiner, Myron. "National Integration Versus Nationalism." Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15 (1973), 248-54.

_____. "Political Integration and Political Development." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965, 52-64.

Welch, Claude E. Jr. (ed.) Political Modernization. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971.

Williams, J. Allen, Jr.; Nunn, Clyde, Z.; and St. Peter, Louis. "Origins of Tolerance: Fingings from a Replication of Stouffer's Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties." Social Forces, 55 (December 1976), 394-408.

Wilson, John. Introduction to Social Movements. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

Wilson, Kenneth and Orum, Tony. "Mobilizing People for Collective Political Action." Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 4 (Fall), 187-202.

Wolff, Robert P.; Moore, Barrington; and Marcuse, Herbert. A Critique of Pure Tolerance. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

Wriggins, William H. Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Yantek, Thomas A. "Public Support for Presidential Performance." Polity, 15 (1982), 268-78.

Zolberg, Aristide R. "Patterns of National Integration." Journal of Modern African Studies, 5 (1967), 449-67.

Korean-language sources

Chang, Il-baek. "Absurd Remarks about Honam Poeple." (Heosang-eu-ro Geurin Mangeon-deul) Yeio-Huang, 12 (September 1985).

Choi, HongKi. "The Study on the Social Characteristrics of Citizens from Taegu." (Taegu-Shimin-eui Sahwoijeog SeongKyuk-eoi Kwanhan Yunkoo) Administrative Policy Study, 2 (1968).

Kim, Bu-sik. A Chronicle of the Era of the Three Kingdoms. (Samkook-Saki) Trans. Jong-Kwon Kim. Seoul: Dae-Yang Co., 1972.

Kim, Man-heum. The Study of Regional Conflicts in Korean Socierty, with Special References to Inter-regional Strife between Honam and Yungnam. (Hankook Sahwoi Chiyuk Galdeung Yunkoo) Seoul: Research Institute of Modern Society, 1987.

Kim, Yong-mo. The Study of Choson Ruling Class. (Chosun Chibaecheung-eoi dae-han Yunkoo) Seoul: Iljogak, 1977.

Lee, Jin-sook. "Stereo-type about the Character of People from Eight Different Provinces of Korea." (Paldoin Seonggyuk-eoi dae-han Seonib-Kwannyum) Sa-sang-gae, (December 1959), 74-87.

Lee, Ki-baek. Nation and History. (Minjok-kwa Yuksa) Seoul: Iljogak, 1978.

Lee, Li-hwa. Factions in Korea. (Hankook-eui Pabeol) Seoul: Uo-moon-gak, 1984.

Jin, Pyung-ki. "Open Letter Sent to President Park." (Park-daetongryung-eo-ke Bonaen Gonggae-Seohan) Chun-book Daily Newspaper (April 13, 1966).

Kang, Man-kil. "Politically Alienated and Economically Exploited." (Kwonryuk-sun Soeoi-si-ki-go Kyungchejeog-eu-ron Suetal) Yeio-Hyang, 12 (Sempter 1985).

Kim, Woon-tae. Administrative History of the Yi's Choson Dynasty. (Eissi-Chosun-eui Haengcheongsa)

Ko, Moon-suk. "The Study of the Regional Consciousness of Korean." (Hankookin-eui Chiyuk-Euisik-eoi dae-han Cheongchisajeog Goechal) The Journal of Social Science Studies, 4 (1985).

Moon, Suk-nam. The Consciousness Structure of the People from South of Honam. (Chonnamin-eui Euisik-Kucho) Seoul: Dae-Wang Co., 1984.

_____. "Study of Regional Difference and Conflicts, with Special References to Relations between Honam and Yungnam." (Chiyuk Gyukcha-woa Galdeung-eoi Kwan-han Yunkoo) Korean Journal of

Sociology, (Winter 1984).

Park, Seong-do. Distortion of Korean History. (Hankooksa-eui Woaikok) Seoul: Min-ji Inc., 1982.

Shin, Bok-Ryong. "The Social Change after the Battle among the Three Kingdoms." (Samkook-Chunjaeng ei-hoo-eui Sahwoi-Byundong) in Korean Politics. Seoul: Bak-Yung Inc., 1984.

Song, Joon-ho. Honam in the Yi Dynasty. (Yicho Sidae-eui Chonlado) Chunju: Chun-book University Press, 1971.

Song, Jung-Hyun. "The Historical Reasons for Honam's Falling Behind." (Honam-Chibang-eui Yuksajeog Nakhoo-Yoin) Journal of Study on Regional Development, (Chiyuk-Kaebal-Yunkoo) 6 (1971), 23-40.

Yang, Dong-kyun. "What is the Truth of Inhospitality against the Honam Region? (Honam-Chiyuk-eoi dae-han Pudaejub-eui Chinsang-eun Mueok-in-ka?) Shindonga (January 1968).

Appendix A. Sampling design

1. Sampling method

The primary source of data in this study is a national proportional probability random sample of Korean voters between 18 and 70 in age. Before describing the sampling procedure, it would be helpful to look into the Korean Administrative District System (See Chart A-1).

Chart A-1: Korean Administrative District System



Notes: 1) Do, Kun, Dong, and Myun are comparable to Province, County, Ward, and Township, in the U. S., respectively.

2) The low level administrative district, Dong or Ri, is the preliminary sampling location. Ban and Settlement are the lowest level of administrative district and the final sampling location. The former comprises around 20 households, while the latter comprises around 20 to 80 households. Most Settlements are naturally formed in response to the

geographic environment in rural areas.
3) In simple terms, Cities, including Special Cities, are urban areas, whereas Kuns are rural areas.

The method used in this survey is a replicated probability sampling to the low level of administrative district, that is, Dong (which is comparable to a ward in the U. S.) or Ri, and further down to the lowest level of administrative district, that is, Ban and Settlement. After selecting 100 sampling locations by proportionate probability sampling (PPS), we replicated a systematic random sampling (SRS) to the final unit of households and then selected one interview from each household. we took 8 persons per one sampling location. Step-by-step discription of sampling procedures for the survey is as follows.

1) Step one: Geographical stratification

The first strata is composed of the Yungnam and Honam regions. An equal number of samples, that is, 400, was selected from each stratum with no regard to the population of each stratum. This can be justified because this dissertation is aimed at comparing the patterns of political orientation of Honam to that of Yungnam. The analysis will be made, then, on a regional basis.

The second strata is composed of Special Cities and Dos (which are comparable to States in the U. S.) in each region. Two Special Cities, Pusan and Daegu, and Kyungsang North and South Provinces constitute the second strata of the Yungnam region. One Special City, Kwangju, and Jonla North and South Provinces constitute the second strata of the Honam

region.

Substratificaion of Provinces into sub-strata, that is, City, Eup, and Myun (which is comparable to American Township) follows. The population within respective Special City strata and sub-strata (City, Eup, Myun) is listed respectively in Dongs in the case of Special City, City, Eup, and in Ris in the case of Myun. Dongs' and Ris' individual size of population is listed in increasing order, acccording to the Handbook of National Administrative District which was published by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1985. 50 sampling locations were allocated to the respective strata and sub-strata of each region in proportion to the population contained in respective strata and sub-strata. The rationale for step I (geographic stratification) is to get homogeneous groups of population in terms of urban or rural characteristics of the population.

2) Step two: selection of actual sampling locations

The selected locations are called Actual Preliminary Sampling Locations. Their geographical names are the actual names of the low level of the administrative district, for example, ZZ Dong in case of Special or commom Cities, YY Ri in case of Myuns (and in some cases of Eups). After selecting 100 Actual Preliminary Sampling Locations, the systematic sampling techique was replicated to Tong and further to Ban, the lowest and the smallest level of the administrative district in case of Dong, and Settlement in case of Ri (and in some cases of Eup). These selected Bans and Settlements are called Actual Final Sampling Locations.

3) Step three: selection of respondents

Interviewers visited the Actual Final Sampling Locations assigned to them and met a head of Ban or Ri to sample systematically 8 households from the head's resident list. From each selected household, interviewers selected, by a kind of simple random sampling method, one member of the household between 18 and 70 in age whose birthday is the earliest of the members of the household. If the interviewers failed to meet that person, they tried two more visits.

2. Representativeness of the sample

It was anticipated that following the aforementioned scientific sampling procedures would guarantee the sample's representativeness. More than mere guesswork or sanguine expectation, however, is required for scientific studies. To see whether or not this anticipation has been realized, the sample should be compared with the population in terms of a number of characteristics. It is known that the Honam and Yungnam region differ in the demographic characteristics of the population. For instance, the Yungnam region, as compared with the Honam region, is known to be more educated, and urbanized. It follows, then, that the sample of each region should be compared with its population rather than the whole population of South Korea. As may be seen in Table A-1 to A-5, the sample of each region is compared with its population in terms of population composition rate, education, sex, types of residence, and age compositon.

Table A-1: Population Composition Rate and Sample Size in Honam and Yungnam

(in percentages)

	Hanam			Yungnam	
	Population	Sample		Population	Sample
Kwangju	14.9	15 2	Pusan	27.9	29.0
ChunBuk	35.5	37.1	KyungNam	27.7	28.9
ChunNam	49.6	47.7	DaeKu	18.4	16.9
			KyungBuk	26 1	25.2
Total	100.0	100.0		100.1	100.0

Source: The Economic Planing Board, 1985 Census

Notes: 1) Subsequent tables are all obtained from the same source.

2) Sample is the ratio of samples allocated to each site. It seems natural that same size in each site reflects its population size fairly well, for the sampling method used in this study is basically population proportional sampling.

Table A-2: Educational Attainment of Population and Sample

(in percentages)

	Honam		Yungnam	
	Population	Sample	Population	Sample
0-6 years	51.0	27.9	37.8	22.3
7-9 years	16.9	17.8	21.3	18.1
10-12 years	21 1	34 7	28.1	39 4
13 years or more	11.0	19.6	12.8	20.2

Table A-3: Sex of population and Sample

(in percentage)

	Honam		Yungnam	
	Population	Sample	Population	Sample
Male	49.3	50.7	48 8	49 5
Female	50.7	49.3	51.2	50.5

Table A-4: Age Composition of Population and Sample

(in percentages)

	Honam		Yungnam	
	Population	Sample	Population	Sample
18-29	34.5	32.4	37.9	38 1
30-39	19 0	26.8	22.7	31 6
40-49	17 5	22.8	16.5	14 9
50 over	29 0	18 0	23.0	15 4

Table A-5: Types of Residence

(in percentages)

	Honam		Yungnam	
	Population	Sample	Population	Sample
Urban Areas	40.5	44.6	66.9	70 7
Rural Areas	59.5	55.4	33.1	29.3

The sample can be regarded as highly representative of the population in terms of population composition rate, sex composition, and types of residence. A marked and remarkable gap is, however, found to exist between the population and the sample in terms of educational attainment in particular as well as age composition. Table A-2 tells that the low educated having less than 6 year educational attainment are extremely under-represented, whereas the highly educated having more than a 10 year educational attainment are highly over-represented. Also, Table A-4 shows that the old (fifties or over) are highly under-represented, and conversely, the middle aged (in thirties) are over-represented. Interestingly enough, the middle aged are likely to have high educational background, whereas the old tend to be low-educated. Tables A-2 and A-4 in this sense reveal the same story. This discrepancy between the sample and the population has been caused possibly by different refusal rates in interview between groups. As mentioned below, 5 percent of the respondents did not successfully complete an interview for various reasons. It should be remembered that the population is being compared here with the final sample for which interview refusal rates have been considered, not with the original sample. The gap, then, might be accounted for partly by the interview refusal rate of 5 percent. The less educated, and thus, the old, are more likely to fail to complete the interview possibly due to their illiteracy, or concern about severe government reprisals being likely to occur when they speak openly about sensitive political issues. From these considerations it may be proposed that external uncontrolled variables including interview refusals, rather than the sampling method, has

opereted to cause the discrepancy between the sample and the population.

A number of additional characteristics of the sample are shown in Table A-6 to A-8. The results are as expected: Yungnam is more economically prosperous than Honam as evidenced in occupation composition as well as income. It is impossible, however, to compare the characteristics of the sample with the population, for comparable data on the population are not available. Nontheleses, the characteritics of the sample are in agreement with the results of the analysis of the objective conditions indicating regional imbalances as reviewed in Section 3 of Chapter 2.

Table A-6: Subjective Class Consciousness of the Sample
(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Upper	7 2	8 5
Midddle	40.6	39.1
Lower	52 3	52.4

Table A-7: Income of the Sample
(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Upper	25.7	32.2
Middle-upper	14.6	26 9
Middle-lower	27.9	22.6
Lower	24.7	15.2
N. A.	7.2	3.2

Note: "N. A." indicates those who refused to tell the amount of income.

Table A-8: Occupation of the Sample
(in percentages)

	Honam	Yungnam
Farmer	17 5	8 5
Blue Collar	25.2	20 7
White Collar	13 8	25 3
Student	10.6	6 9
Housewife	32.9	38.6

Notes: Farmer includes fisher, miner, and forester. Salesman, and the unemployed are included in Blue Collar. White collar includes self-employed businessman, office worker, professional, and manager.

3. Some comments on the sampling

First of all, two age limits, lower and upper, were given for the sampling. A lower limit of eighteen and an upper limit of seventy were adopted. In Korean society, it is generally believed that individuals down to the age of eighteen are politically sensitive and very informed about political and governmental affairs. Considering the low life expectancy in comparison with Western countries, there seems to be relatively few people aged over seventy. They are generally known to be physically in poor health and, more important, to be least involved and interested, in politics. In short, they are politically very ignorant, rendering interviews with them, although not impossible, meaningless.

Despite all the effort exerted to reduce interview refusal, its rate reached 5 percent of the total respondents. Some of the respondents could not be contacted at all because they were out of their place of residence at the time of the survey. In reality, the interviewers were asked to make at least three visits to interview respondents. Most of the refusals, however, came from persons who were unwilling to speak openly about political issues. They never willingly revealed their political opinions, not because of their inability to articulate opinions, but because they were afraid of the possibility of severe government reprisals when asked to answer frankly items dealing with sensitive political issues. Accordingly, they repeatedly responded, "I do not know." Those who answered 70 percent of the items in that way, were excluded from the analysis.

Appendix B.

QUESTIONNAIRE

I would like to know how you feel about your native place and your country, Korea. Do you agree or disagree on the following statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	so and so	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q1. I am proud of traditional culture and ceremonies specific to my native place (Yungnam or Honam region).	5	4	3	2	1
Q2. I am proud of being born in Korea.	5	4	3	2	1
Q3. I will not emigrate to any other provinces, although I may be badly off in my native place (Yungnam or Honam region).	5	4	3	2	1
Q4. Korean people are superior to people of other countries.	5	4	3	2	1
Q5. I am proud of being born in my native place (Yungnam or Honam region).	5	4	3	2	1

Q6. I stop to salute the national flag when it is being lowered.	5	4	3	2	1
Q7. I talk proudly about my native place (Yungnam or Honam region).	5	4	3	2	1
Q8. I can be promoted to a high social position, if I have ability.	5	4	3	2	1
Q9. It is important in the success in life where I was born.	5	4	3	2	1

I would like to know how much information you have on government affairs and how much interest you have in politics.

Q10. Can you tell me the name of the existing political parties?

Q11. Who do you think is the leader of each party?

Q12. When a new President comes into office, one of the first things he must do is appoint people to cabinet positions and ministries. Could you tell me what these cabinet positions are?

Q13. How often do you follow the accounts of political and government affairs reported in newspaper?

1. Everyday
2. Several times a week
3. Once a week

4. Infrequently
5. Never

Q14. How often do you talk about public affairs or political affairs to other peple?

1. Very frequently
2. Frequently
3. From time to time
4. Infrequently
5. Never

I will present questions to measure your feelings about the operation of democratic institutions and officials of the government. Do you agree or disagree on the following statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	so and so	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q15. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can not understand what's going on.	5	4	3	2	1
Q16. On the whole, the decisions made by the national government are right.	5	4	3	2	1
Q17. The Congress reflects the will of the people correctly.	5	4	3	2	1

Q18. The politicians work generally for the interest of ordinary citizens rather than for their own interest.	5	4	3	2	1
Q19. People like me do not have any say about what the government does.	5	4	3	2	1
Q20. The reports released by the government are trustworthy.	5	4	3	2	1
Q21. I do not think officials care much what people like me think.	5	4	3	2	1
Q22. Politics is fascinating to me.	5	4	3	2	1

Let me ask questions about Korean political situation in general and party identification.

Q23. How many points will you give to the efforts of the government to realize democracy in the past ten years, putting together such democratic principles as freedom of speech and expression, the liberty to criticize government policies, and freedom of assembly and association?
In the diagram below, 10 points indicates the best situation, 5 points indicates the moderate situation, and 0 points indicates the worst situation.

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Q24. How many points will you give to the present political situation in terms of the management of democratic principles?

Q25. How many points will you give to the management of democratic principles in the next ten years?

Q26. Do you have any existing party with which you are identified, or at least which gives you a good impression?

1. Yes (Go to Q27)
2. No (Go to Q28)

Q27. (If you have) Could you tell me the name of the party?

1. Democratic Justice party
2. New Democratic party
3. Reunification Democratic party
4. Korean People's party
5. Other (Write in)_____

Q28. Which do you think most important for the development of our country?

1. Political development in terms of realization of democracy
2. Economic development
3. National security
4. Other (Write in)_____

Q29. What kinds of political activities other than voting have you ever participated in?

1. I have ever joined an organization that takes stands on political issues.
2. I have ever made financial contributions to a party or a candidate.
3. I have ever participated in a meeting to support or demonstrate against a party or party policies.
4. I have ever worked in a political campaign.
5. I have ever run for a political office.
6. Other (Write in)_____
7. None

I would like to know your opinions on the way of approaching political development in terms of realization of democracy. Do you agree or disagree on the following statement?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	so and so	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q30. Student demonstration against government does not contribute	5	4	3	2	1

anything to political development of Korea.					
Q31. The government should restore political stability by any means when political disturbance is appears.	5	4	3	2	1
Q32. Political development of our country should be based only on the legal activities of the party or Congress.	5	4	3	2	1

Here, I will present six questions to measure attitudes of people from one region (Yungnam or Honam) towards people from the other region (Honam or Yungnam). Do you agree or disagree on the following statements.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	so and so	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q33. The fact that a person is from the other region prevents me from making a true friend with him or her.	5	4	3	2	1
Q34. I would be displeased if my son or daughter were getting married to a person from the other region.	5	4	3	2	1
Q35. If I were a president of	5	4	3	2	1

some company, I would not employ a person from the other region.					
Q36. The candidate for Congress who runs in this region may not be from the other region.	5	4	3	2	1
Q37. The president of Korea may not be from the other region.	5	4	3	2	1
Q38. I do not purchase merchandise which is produced by the company whose owner is from the other region.	5	4	3	2	1

Also, I would like to know your opinion on the distribution of the wealth between the Hanam and Yungnam regions.

Q39. To what extent do you think that the benefit of national policies is equally distributed to your region, compared to the other region?

1. Very favorably
2. More or less favorably
3. So and so
4. More or less unfavorably
5. Very unfavorably

Q40. (Ask the respondents who checked in fourth and fifth item of Question39) If you think that the benefit of national policies is

unfavoravly distributed to your region, compared to the other region, to what are you going to attribute it?

1. It should be attributed to the lack of residents' abilities and efforts in my region.
2. It is due to the problem of the political system, that is, partial political consideration in favor of the other region.
3. Other (Write in)_____

Q41. (Ask the respondents who checked in first and second item of Question 39) If you think that the benefit of national policies is favoravbly distributed to your region, compared to the other region, to what are you going to attribute it?

1. It should be attributed to residents' abilities and efforts in my region.
2. It is due to the probem of political system, that is, partial political consideration in favor of my region.
3. Other (Write)_____

(SES QUESTIONS) Here are some questions about yourself.

1) Job

1. Farmer, fisher, miner, forester
2. Self-employed businessman
3. Salesman
4. Office worker, public services, banker
5. Professional (lawyer, engineer, professor, writer, ets)
6. Manager
7. Student
8. Housewife
9. Other (write in)_____
10. Not employed

2) Religion

1. Christian
2. Catholic
3. Buddhism
4. Others (write in)_____
5. None

3) Education

1. Less than finished primary school
2. Finished middle school
3. Finished high school
4. In college now
5. More than finished college

4) Could you tell me total monthly family income?

5) To what class do you think you belong?

1. Upper class
2. In between middle and upper class
3. Middle class
4. In between middle and lower class
5. Lower class

6) Present home address

1. City
2. Eup
3. Myon, Ri

7) Sex

1. Female
2. Male

8) How old are you?